Category: application software

Dell’s not-so-identical twin storage deals

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

From an investment banking perspective, both EqualLogic and 3PAR started out and finished their lives in much the same way. The two storage vendors filed to go public within a week of one another back in August 2007, and – pending the close of 3PAR’s sale – both will end up inside Dell. Yet while the final destination is the same, the two vendors’ not-so-parallel tracks to Round Rock, Texas, underscore the fact that the tech M&A market, as well as the capital markets, still have a long way to go to recover from the Credit Crisis.

Consider this: In the sale announced Monday, 3PAR garnered just half the multiple that fellow storage vendor EqualLogic got in its sale to the same buyer, at least based on one key metric. 3PAR sold for 5.6 times trailing sales, while EqualLogic went for 12x trailing sales. We would chalk up the eye-popping premium for EqualLogic mostly to the fact that Dell had to effectively outbid the public market to prevent the company from going public. More to the point, Dell had to outbid a bull market, as the Nasdaq had tacked on 20% in the year leading up to its purchase of EqualLogic in November 2007.

As any company – including 3PAR and Dell – can attest, the bull market ended abruptly and painfully just days after the EqualLogic trade sale. So now we’re left with a market where Dell can offer the highest-ever price for 3PAR shares (representing a staggering 87% premium) and still get a ‘half-off discount’ on valuation compared to its earlier billion-dollar storage deal. But then Dell knows all about discounts over that time period. The company’s market cap has been cut in half (to $25bn from $50bn) from the day it announced its EqualLogic acquisition to Monday’s announcement of the 3PAR purchase.

RainStor, the structured data retention and compression startup that recently renamed itself from Clearpace, has raised $7.5m in series B funding. The round brought in two new investors – Storm Ventures and data integration software specialist Informatica (which licenses RainStor’s technology as part of its Applimation data archive suit <!– /* Font Definitions */ @font-face {font-family:”Cambria Math”; panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4; mso-font-charset:0; mso-generic-font-family:roman; mso-font-pitch:variable; mso-font-signature:-1610611985 1107304683 0 0 159 0;} @font-face {font-family:Calibri; panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4; mso-font-charset:0; mso-generic-font-family:swiss; mso-font-pitch:variable; mso-font-signature:-1610611985 1073750139 0 0 159 0;} @font-face {font-family:Verdana; panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4; mso-font-charset:0; mso-generic-font-family:swiss; mso-font-pitch:variable; mso-font-signature:536871559 0 0 0 415 0;} /* Style Definitions */ p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal {mso-style-unhide:no; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:””; margin:0in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:”Times New Roman”,”serif”; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;} a:link, span.MsoHyperlink {mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; color:blue; mso-text-animation:none; text-decoration:none; text-underline:none; text-decoration:none; text-line-through:none;} a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed {mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; color:purple; mso-themecolor:followedhyperlink; text-decoration:underline; text-underline:single;} p.bodytxt02, li.bodytxt02, div.bodytxt02 {mso-style-name:body_txt_02; mso-style-unhide:no; mso-margin-top-alt:auto; margin-right:0in; mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto; margin-left:0in; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:”Times New Roman”,”serif”; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;} .MsoChpDefault {mso-style-type:export-only; mso-default-props:yes; font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;} @page WordSection1 {size:8.5in 11.0in; margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in; mso-header-margin:.5in; mso-footer-margin:.5in; mso-paper-source:0;} div.WordSection1 {page:WordSection1;} –>
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by Brenon Daly

From an investment banking perspective, both EqualLogic and 3PAR started out and finished their lives in much the same way. The two storage vendors filed to go public within a week of one another back in August 2007, and – pending the close of 3PAR’s sale – both will end up inside Dell. Yet while the final destination is the same, the two vendors’ not-so-parallel tracks to Round Rock, Texas, underscore the fact that the tech M&A market, as well as the capital markets, still have a long way to go to recover from the Credit Crisis.

Consider this: In the sale announced Monday, 3PAR garnered just half the multiple that fellow storage vendor EqualLogic got in its sale to the same buyer, at least based on one key metric. 3PAR sold for 5.6 times trailing sales, while EqualLogic went for 12x trailing sales. We would chalk up the eye-popping premium for EqualLogic mostly to the fact that Dell had to effectively outbid the public market to prevent the company from going public. More to the point, Dell had to outbid a bull market, as the Nasdaq had tacked on 20% in the year leading up to its purchase of EqualLogic in November 2007.

As any company – including 3PAR and Dell – can attest, the bull market ended abruptly and painfully just days after the EqualLogic trade sale. So now we’re left with a market where Dell can offer the highest-ever price for 3PAR shares (representing a staggering 87% premium) and still get a ‘half-off discount’ on valuation compared to its earlier billion-dollar storage deal. But then Dell knows all about discounts over that time period. The company’s market cap has been cut in half (to $25bn from $50bn) from the day it announced its EqualLogic acquisition to Monday’s announcement of the 3PAR purchase. e

Do-or-die time for LANDesk divestiture

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

It’s do-or-die time for the LANDesk divestiture, with the period of exclusivity with the most serious bidder set to expire Friday. Buyout shop Thoma Bravo is said to be the last remaining party at the table for the systems management vendor, which Emerson Electric has been trying to shed for more than six months. The current betting is that Thoma Bravo, which has done a half-dozen deals so far this year, will not take home LANDesk.

Thoma Bravo, of course, already has a play in this market – one that it got thanks to another public company divestiture. The private equity (PE) firm picked up the IT asset management division from Macrovision (now known as Rovi) in February 2008, renaming the business Flexera Software. Flexera has since bolted on four other businesses, including the purchase of ManageSoft in May. As my colleague Dennis Callaghan has noted, the hypothetical pairing of Flexera and LANDesk would bring some overlap, but would add technology for endpoint security management, service desk, remote control, power management and application virtualization that Flexera doesn’t have on its own.

While the combination makes sense strategically, we have heard that the process is snagged financially. Several sources have indicated that the asking price for LANDesk has come down from more than $300m early in the process to $250m now. (LANDesk sold for $416m back in April 2006 to Avocent, which was subsequently acquired by Emerson.) At the current level, LANDesk would be valued at more than eight times EBITDA, according to our understanding. That might prove a little rich for Thoma Bravo.

Same old, same old at Novell?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Ever since hedge fund Elliott Associates put Novell in play five months ago, we’ve said that the company was going to be a tough sell. It’s a mixed bag of businesses, both in terms of what those businesses sell and how they perform. (Or rather, how those businesses underperform, as we were reminded by Novell’s warning earlier this week about third-quarter results. If nothing else, that kept alive Novell’s streak – it also came up short in the two quarters leading up to Elliott’s run at the company.)

Undoubtedly, Novell – an underperforming company that nonetheless found its treasury stuffed with more than $1bn of cash – offered an easy target for the gadfly investor. But having that agitation turn into an acquisition is proving much more difficult. (We recently took an in-depth look at Novell, as well as the specific business lines and which suitors might be eyeing them, in a special report.)

While the process initially attracted a number of parties, we understand that there are only three left at the table: a private equity-backed company, a UK-based PE firm and a joint bid between a publicly traded tech company and a buyout shop. It’s not clear that any of the three will actually close a deal for Novell. (The process has already run past two deadlines, we gather.) Without a deal, shares of Novell would be left to trade on the company’s own merits, which probably wouldn’t do much for shareholder value.

Novell timeline

Date Event
March 2, 2010 Elliott Associates launches unsolicited bid of $5.75 per share, or $2bn equity value
March 20, 2010 Novell board rejects Elliott’s bid, retains JP Morgan Securities to explore alternatives

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Shopping hard in the City of Light

Brenon Daly

Contact:  Brenon Daly

On its visit to Paris, Francisco Partners brought home more than just a miniature souvenir Eiffel Tower. In the past week, the buyout shop has announced not one but two $100m deals struck in the French capital. Francisco’s unusual double dip comes at a time when the dollar, which had been at multiyear highs against the euro earlier in 2010, has slumped in recent weeks. (We recently looked at the trade winds blowing across the Atlantic.)

For Francisco, the transactions would help restock its European holdings. The buyout shop sold Swiss chip company Numonyx to Micron Technology for $1.3bn in May. In its first deal, Francisco put forward a $100m offer for the Grass Valley Broadcast business, which is being divested by Paris-based Technicolor. (The actual Grass Valley Broadcast business operates in central California, an ocean away from The City of Light.) In probably the more interesting move, Francisco picked up a majority stake in on-demand email marketing company Emailvision. The purchase gave Emailvision, which was advised by Pacific Crest Securities, a fully diluted equity value of about $109m.

Early-mover (dis)advantage at Daptiv

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

So much for early-mover advantage. Daptiv – a pioneering Web-hosted project and portfolio management (PPM) startup founded in 1997 that was originally known as eProject – got sold for scraps late last week. The sale to a buyout shop stands as particularly disadvantaged when compared to earlier deals in the market, a number of which saw giant software companies writing checks in the hundreds of millions of dollars to snap up other PPM vendors. (See our full report on the deal.)

While its rivals were selling out (at rather nice multiples, thank you very much), Daptiv was focusing on selling its product. And it was doing a fair job at that, running at around $20m in revenue. (Incidentally, that’s true revenue, not bookings at the subscription-based company.) Along the way, Daptiv managed to raise about $30m from backers, following a recapitalization in the mid-2000s. So far, so good.

Problems began surfacing at Daptiv earlier this year, however. The company went through a restructuring, trimming about 15% of its employees and swapping out its CEO. It had been trying to raise another round of funding, but we suspect that it found its existing investment syndicate rather frayed. (Daptiv includes Vault Capital as well as Pinpoint Ventures among its investors. Neither firm is particularly active – or even lively – these days.)

While Daptiv had been out looking to drum up dollars from venture capitalists, the company had also been in talks with a firm on the other end of the entrepreneurial spectrum: buyout shop Parallax Capital Partners. Parallax Capital has acquired a number of other tech businesses that have gotten a bit long in the tooth, and, like other additions to its portfolio, it reportedly got a bargain in its acquisition of Daptiv. One report, which included photocopies of the purchase agreement, indicated that Parallax Capital is paying just $12.7m for Daptiv, with only $5.3m of that flowing to shareholders.

Select PPM transactions

Date announced Acquirer Target Deal value
July 27, 2010 Parallax Capital Partners Daptiv (fka eProject) Reported $12.7m
October 8, 2008 Oracle Primavera Software $350m*
June 9, 2005 CA Technologies Niku $350m
June 10, 2003 Mercury Interactive (now HP) Kintana $225m

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase *451 Group estimate

Symantec to talk shop — and shopping

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Although most of the attention in Symantec’s quarterly report Wednesday night will be focused on the top and bottom line, we expect the company’s recent shopping spree to also come up. The storage and security giant announced three acquisitions in its just-completed quarter – more deals than it did in all of 2009. The bill for Big Yellow’s almost unprecedented M&A activity in the quarter came in at $1.65bn. As we recently noted, Symantec on its own has accounted for one-third of the spending for all security deals so far this year.

The biggest part of Symantec’s spending will go toward covering its purchase of the identity and authentication business from VeriSign, its largest transaction in more than a half-decade. (As a reminder, VeriSign’s business was running at about $370m, generating a very healthy $100m or so in cash flow each year.) Big Yellow has yet to close that deal, which was announced in mid-May, or offer specific financial projections for that business. Look for more information on that acquisition on the call tonight.

Symantec will be reporting its fiscal first-quarter results, which covers the second calendar quarter, after the closing bell. Analysts are projecting earnings of about $0.35 per share on revenue just shy of $1.5bn. However, we would note that rivals in each part of Big Yellow’s two main businesses have come up short of Wall Street expectations in their recent quarters. Two weeks ago, storage vendor CommVault indicated that sales had softened while just this morning, security rival Websense offered a disappointing earnings outlook. Websense shares were down more than 10% in midday trading.

A post-IPO shopping list for QlikTech

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly, Krishna Roy

Bucking the trend of trimmed prices and broken issues for tech IPOs, QlikTech debuted on the market Friday with a strong offering. The analytics vendor sold 11.2 million shares at $10 each, above the $8.50-9.50 range the company had set. In their Nasdaq debut, shares of QlikTech continued higher, changing hands at around $12.50 in early-afternoon trading. With 75 million shares outstanding, that gives the company an initial market capitalization of some $940m. (That’s basically spot-on to where we expected the company to begin its life on Wall Street when the paperwork first came in.)

As the proceeds from the IPO make their way to QlikTech, we’ve put together a handy-dandy shopping list for the company. Not that we necessarily expect QlikTech to immediately step into the M&A market. After all, it’s got a pretty solid business running right now. In recession-wracked 2009, QlikTech managed an impressive 33% increase in revenue. Even more impressive, the company doubled that rate in the first quarter of this year. Perhaps mindful of not messing with a good thing, QlikTech hasn’t done any deals up to now.

Nonetheless, my colleague Krishna Roy recently noted that QlikTech is essentially a one-product company that competes against the enterprise software giants that sell analytics as part of a larger product suite. (IBM, Oracle and SAP combined to snap up all three primary BI vendors in a string of deals that, collectively, set them back $15bn.) Further, one of QlikTech’s key technological advantages that the company helped pioneer (in-memory analytics) has become much more commonplace. Both of those facts turn up the competition on QlikTech, which might benefit from looking out-of-house for some additional technology.

If so, one area where we could imagine QlikTech going shopping is in the predictive analytics market. The company already offers some predictive analytics with the inclusion of advanced aggregation features in the latest QlikView 9. But additional technology could make for an easy knock-on sale to existing customers. (That’s a key for QlikTech, which gets roughly 60% of its revenue from existing customers.) Two small startups that might fit the bill for QlikTech are Revolution Analytics and Rapid-I.

A different outcome of the EMC-Netezza rumors

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Although EMC paid top dollar for Greenplum, the startup may not have been EMC’s top choice for its move into data warehousing. At least two sources have indicated that the storage giant talked with fellow Boston-area company Netezza earlier this year. Talks were apparently short-lived, as the two sides never got close on price.

When discussions were going on, Netezza stock was trading at about $10. Our sources report that EMC was kicking around a bid that had a roughly 40% premium – in other words, essentially where shares change hands right now. Netezza, which came public three years ago, has been trading at its highest level since October 2007 lately.

Yet even with the run in Netezza shares (up 45% so far this year), the company isn’t egregiously expensive. It currently sports a market capitalization of $870m, but has about $110m in cash and equivalents, lowering its net cost to $760m. That’s about 3.2 times projected sales this fiscal year and just 2.7x next fiscal year’s estimated sales.

As it is, EMC paid a substantially higher multiple for Greenplum. (Our estimate, based on two sources familiar with the transaction, is that EMC handed over about $400m, or roughly 13x estimated trailing sales, for Greenplum.) Of course, there are different motivations – and, naturally, multiples – attached to either move. Netezza was a much more mature company, with more than twice the number of customers of Greenplum. On the other side, Greenplum had developed some pretty slick technology, particularly for cloud environments, that should fit easily into EMC’s broad sales channel.

In the dark on Big Blue’s buys

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

At the risk of stepping into a Kantian dialectic on ‘materiality,’ we can’t help but comment on the fact that when IBM does a deal – even a semi-large deal – mum’s the word. So far this year, Big Blue has picked up two companies that were large enough to consider going public at some point, with each acquisition costing the company around $400m in cash (according to our estimates). Yet in both the purchase of Initiate Systems and BigFix, IBM declined to disclose the price.

Viewed from the Big Blue side, it’s understandable that a startup like Initiate or BigFix, both of which were generating less than $100m in sales, is hardly a significant addition to a tech giant that’s going to post about $100bn in sales this year. Further, even though $400m sounds like a lot of money to most of us, we have to remember that IBM generates that much in cash roughly every two weeks. So, the thinking goes, Big Blue is well within its rights to not disclose ‘immaterial’ transactions. (That’s a view shared by Apple, for instance, which we have taken to task in the past for being run more like a private fiefdom than a public company.)

However, as is often the case in arguments based on relativism, there’s a distinct lack of accountability in it. After all, IBM is spending other people’s money. Shareholders own the company and, at least theoretically, the executives and management at the company – including all those who had a hand in the deals – work for shareholders.

Not to get overly sanctimonious about it, but in deals like Initiate and BigFix, IBM’s true owners are in the dark about how their employees are spending their money. And we’re not talking about dipping into the petty cash jar, but emptying hundreds of millions of dollars from the corporate treasury. That seems to us to be a fairly significant event.

The Big Blue erasure

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

In addition to the current snarling bear market and the onerous regulatory requirements, we’ve noticed yet another hurdle IPO candidates have to clear to get to the public market: IBM. With last week’s purchase of BigFix, the tech giant has gobbled up two private companies this year that were both tracking for an IPO. In February, Big Blue snagged Initiate Systems, a master data management vendor that had filed to go public in late 2007 but pulled its prospectus in mid-2008.

As we understand it, BigFix wasn’t nearly as close to an offering as Initiate. But the security management startup certainly had the financial profile to become a public company. (In fact, we’ve listed the Emeryville, California-based vendor as a possible IPO candidate in our outlook for the security market in each of the past two years.) BigFix was tracking to $65m in revenue for 2010, up from $52m in 2009, according to sources. (Bookings were closer to $85m last year.) The company also generated some $14m in free cash flow in 2009, a surprisingly large amount for a 13-year-old startup that had only raised $36m in venture backing.

In both of the deals, IBM paid a fairly rich multiple. Although terms weren’t disclosed, we understand that Big Blue handed over $425m, or 5.3 times trailing revenue, for Initiate. And we hear from multiple sources that IBM paid $400m, or nearly 8x trailing revenue, for BigFix. The multiple in both deals is substantially higher than the median price-to-sales multiple (1.8x) that we recently calculated for all tech transactions in the second quarter.

As a final thought, we highly (highly, highly) doubt that if either Initiate or BigFix came public right now, it would garner anywhere near a $400m valuation. (We recently put out a special report on the dreary IPO market.) More likely, skittish investors would discount the debut valuation to around $250m, give or take. Add in lockup periods and other considerations in an IPO that draw out the path to liquidity, and it’s no wonder both Initiate and BigFix took a rich, all-cash offer from IBM.