Category: application software

Social CRM: haves and have-nots

Brenon Daly1 Comment

Contact: Brenon Daly, China Martens

Even though social CRM is still an emerging market, the deals have been flowing. And it isn’t just one-off, conventional activity, but just about every conceivable type of transaction: public-to-private deals, private-to-private deals, a private equity-backed rollup and even (apparently) a wind-down. Among the more notable deals in this broadly defined space has been RightNow reaching for tiny startup HiveLive last September to add a community offering to its core CRM product and Attensity cobbling together the parts of three companies to form a European giant about a year ago. Attensity was back in the market last month, adding Biz360 to bolster its voice-of-consumer product.

Activity picked up again earlier this week, as Lithium Technologies confirmed that it had acquired Scout Labs for a reported $20-25m. As my colleague China Martens reports, the purchase adds Scout Labs’ social-media monitoring and analytics capabilities to Lithium’s management platform for customer communities. We would highlight the fact that Lithium’s buy comes just four months after the company raised its third round of funding, an $18m tranche that brought total funding to $39m.

While Lithium was raising fresh money – and putting it to work on an acquisition – it appears that another social CRM startup was coming up empty in its effort to get more cash and has pulled the plug. Helpstream, which apparently raised about $10m in two funding rounds from Mohr Davidow Ventures (MDV) and Foundation Capital, has shut its doors, the former CEO has written in a blog post. Helpstream’s website no longer works and MDV has erased Helpstream as a portfolio company, despite leading the vendor’s second round. (Calls to the VCs went unreturned.)

If indeed Helpstream has dried up (as it were), we might point to two reasons why the company struggled. For starters, it was basically a SaaS helpdesk provider that then tried to get into the online customer service community-building game. And if its customers were confused by that, they would have been additionally puzzled by Helpstream’s ‘freemium’ business model. In the end, Helpstream managed to land just 40 paying customers, compared to 200 customers using the free version of its product.

IPO woes

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

For the second straight time, a tech company hoping to come to market has scaled back the money it planned to raise. TeleNav, which started trading Thursday, originally planned to sell shares at $11-13. The mobile navigation service vendor then cut the range to $9-10 before ultimately pricing its seven-million-share offering at $8. The erosion on TeleNav’s terms comes two weeks after Convio also had to reduce the price tag on its IPO.

Of course, in the period between the two IPOs we saw an almost inconceivable market plunge that erased 1,000 points from the Dow Jones Industrial Average in just five minutes. (OK, the collapse might not be inconceivable, but it is proving to be inexplicable. Was it the black-box, high-velocity firms or just a bunch of ‘fat-fingered traders’ that bled the Dow last Thursday?) And while that uncertainty continues to weigh on the overall market, it’s basically stifling the IPO market. After all, if investors are fleeing from billion-dollar companies that are household names, are they really going to embrace unknown and unproven would-be debutants?

But as we note in a new report on the IPO market, Wall Street – as it often does – appears to have swung too far in its avoidance of risk. Investors have been demanding a ridiculously steep discount on the valuations of the companies that want to come public. Take the case of TeleNav, which closed its initial day of trading with a market cap of just $400m. If we back out the cash that TeleNav already held ($46m) along with the cash that it just raised ($45m), the company starts its life on Wall Street with an enterprise value of just $310m. By our back-of-the-envelope calculation, that’s just 2 times sales and 5 times cash flow – a slap-in-the-face valuation for a profitable company that’s growing sales at 50%.

When we look at the capital markets today, we aren’t particularly concerned with the day-to-day trading. Stocks go up and stocks go down, just as risk in the market (real or perceived) ebbs and flows. Nonetheless, it’s hard to look at the tech IPO market and not be struck by the fact that companies are putting together smaller offerings and debuting at notably lower valuations than they would have in the time before the US economy slumped into its worst decline since the Great Depression. And we don’t see that changing anytime soon.

Recent tech IPO events

Date Company Comment
May 2010 TeleNav Cuts expected range, and then prices below it
April 2010 Convio Prices below range, goes public at sub-$200m market cap
April 2010 SPS Commerce Debuts at sub-$200m market cap
April 2010 IntraLinks Files for $150m IPO, the third time it has filed an S-1
April 2010 QlikTech Files for $100m IPO
April 2010 Nexsan Postpones $55m IPO after setting initial range

The German giant’s gamble

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

In the largest software transaction in more than two years, SAP plans to pick up mobility software and database vendor Sybase for a net cost of $5.8bn. SAP’s all-cash bid of $65 per share represents a 44% premium over the three-month average closing price for Sybase. More dramatically, SAP’s offer represents the highest price for Sybase stock in the target’s two decades as a public company.

The purchase, which is expected to close in July, represents a big bet by the German giant on the future of mobile applications. The two companies have partnered for more than a year, with SAP offering mobile CRM and Business Suite applications on Sybase’s Unwired Platform. Currently, mobile products account for one-third of revenue at Sybase, which started life as a database vendor. Within the database segment, Sybase also has an analytic database (Sybase IQ) that has been generating most of the growth in recent years.

At an enterprise value of $5.8bn, SAP is valuing Sybase at basically 5 times sales. (Sybase generated revenue of $1.1bn in 2009 and recently guided Wall Street to expect about 6% sales growth this year.) That’s roughly in line with the multiple SAP paid in its other large deal, the $6.8bn acquisition of Business Objects in October 2007. It’s not out of whack with SAP’s own valuation. The company trades at about 4 times sales, and that’s before any acquisition premium is figured in. Viewed another way, SAP trades at roughly 14 times cash flow, while it is paying 15 times cash flow for Sybase.

Where might Symantec shop?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

After its double-header encryption deals last week, Symantec appears set to return to M&A. Like a number of tech giants, Big Yellow largely shunned dealmaking last year. But the drop-off was particularly notable at Symantec: It spent more than $1bn on acquisitions in both 2007 and 2008, but less than $100m in 2009. We would hasten to add that in the fiscal year that just ended on April 2, Symantec generated $1.7bn in cash flow from operations. That brought its cash stash to more than $3bn.

As to where the company might be shopping, my colleague Paul Roberts in our Enterprise Security Program outlines five areas that make sense for Symantec to buy its way into – as well as who might be of interest in those markets. In a new report, Roberts looks for M&A activity from Symantec in the following areas: threat detection and reputation monitoring, SIEM and vulnerability management, enterprise rights management, database security and endpoint control. All of those areas are a long way from Symantec’s original market of antivirus software.

A final thought on Big Yellow and its possible shopping is that the company actually enjoys a fair amount of goodwill on Wall Street right now. Symantec’s fiscal fourth quarter, which it reported Wednesday, was surprisingly strong for many investors, particularly after rival McAfee had a less-than-stellar first quarter. In fact, on many trading screens Symantec was the only green stock Thursday on an otherwise blood-red day. Symantec shares closed up less than 2%, but that was on a day that saw the Dow Jones Industrial Average plummet almost 1,000 points, or 9%, in afternoon trading.

salesforce.com puts together pieces on Jigsaw

Brenon Daly

by Brenon Daly

Just three months after salesforce.com raised $575m in a convertible note offering, the CRM vendor is dipping into its treasury for the largest deal in its history. The $142m purchase price for Jigsaw Data is more money than salesforce.com spent, collectively, on its previous seven acquisitions. (Add to that, there’s a potential $14m earnout that Jigsaw could pocket.) Yet, even after it pays for this pickup, salesforce.com will still have more than $1bn in cash on hand. The transaction is expected to close this quarter.

We understand that Jigsaw finished up last year with about $18m in revenue, and salesforce.com indicated that it was expecting $17-22m in non-GAAP revenue from Jigsaw for the three quarters that the company will be on the books this fiscal year. According to our calculations, salesforce.com is valuing Jigsaw at roughly the same level that the target is currently valued by public investors, at least on one basis metric. Salesforce.com is paying about 7.9 times trailing sales for Jigsaw while its own market cap is about 8.3 times trailing sales. (Of course, shares of the on-demand CRM vendor are currently changing hands at their highest-ever level, having more than doubled over the past year.)

For Jigsaw, the sale to its longtime partner also represents a solid return for its backers, who wrote the checks that funded the company’s growth to 1.2 million members and more than 21 million contact records. Jigsaw’s three investors (El Dorado Ventures, Norwest Venture Partners and Austin Ventures) put in a total of $18m over the past six years. Strictly in terms of money in/money out, that means Jigsaw is returning almost eight times its investment. Not many startups have been able to deliver those kinds of returns recently because they’ve typically been overfunded and exit multiples have increasingly been under pressure.

Oracle: two deals, but more than a year apart

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Exactly a year ago today, Oracle announced its unexpected $7.4bn acquisition of Sun Microsystems. If it doesn’t seem like it was that long ago, that’s because it really wasn’t. Final approval for the deal dragged on for nine full months, largely because of scrutiny by the European Commission of Oracle owning Sun’s open source database, MySQL. Eventually, Brussels agreed with our initial assessment that MySQL and Oracle rarely competed (MySQL was focused mostly on the low end of the market and on Web applications), so they cleared the transaction.

The purchase of Sun is a singular deal for Oracle. (It brings the company into the hardware game for the first time, for instance.) And it stands out even more when compared with Oracle’s pickup on Friday of Phase Forward, which is the only public company that Oracle has snagged since Sun.

For starters, the price of Phase Forward is about one-tenth the price of Sun. But more significantly, Sun was a broad, horizontal acquisition, while Phase Forward is a vertical market play. The target serves life sciences companies offering a subscription-based way to keep track of clinical trials. (It has more than 335 customers.) And perhaps most notably, parts of Sun’s technology (Sparc and Solaris, among others) will be integrated into many offerings from Oracle, which is following the strategy of other systems vendors. On the other hand, Phase Forward will be slotted into the narrowly defined Oracle Health Sciences unit.

Is third time a charm for IntraLinks?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Maybe the third time will be the charm for IntraLinks. The company, which is perhaps best known for its ‘virtual deal rooms,’ filed to go public late last week, the third time it has put in an S-1. It plans to raise $150m in the offering, which is being led by Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank Securities and Credit Suisse. IntraLinks had also been on file back in the Bubble Era, filing its IPO paperwork in mid-1999 only to pull it a year later, and again for a few months in late 2005.

To get a sense of just how much the company – and, by extension, Wall Street – has changed since the frothy time of the late 1990s, we went back and pulled IntraLinks’ original prospectus to compare it to the most-recent paperwork. It hardly seems like the same company.

In 1999, IntraLinks lost five times more money than it even brought in as revenue (a $21.3m net loss on just $4.1 in revenue for the year). The company even managed the highly impressive trick of running its business at a negative gross margin. The kicker on that upside-down business model is that it was actually pretty common back in the late 1990s. Plenty of companies running at even larger losses than IntraLinks made it public during that era.

Like a lot of us, IntraLinks seems positively grown up now compared to the time when companies were throwing equity around like it was funny money and stock prices only went up. It finished 2009 with $141m in revenue, meaning that it now generates more sales every two weeks than it did during the entire year that it first filed to go public. And while the vendor still hasn’t managed to hit profitability, it has narrowed its operating loss to just $3.4m last year. For the record, IntraLinks’ gross margin hit a respectable 65% in 2009, a sharp reversal from the Bubble Era, when it actually sank deeper into the red with every sale that it made.

Is QlikTech a billion-dollar baby?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

IPOs are not what they used to be. The companies looking to go public recently have had to scale back their expectations, cutting both the amount of money they hope to raise and what they expect to be worth as they start life as a public company. The implications of these slimmed-down debuts extend far beyond the IPO candidates themselves. Smaller offerings trim the fees available for underwriters, which rely on these hotly contested mandates to offset the cost of supporting research and trading for public companies. And perhaps more alarmingly, the lower IPO valuations make it difficult for venture capitalists and other investors to realize decent returns in what was once a fairly sure path to outsized performance.

At least that’s the situation for most IPO candidates. (For instance, we’re not knocking either Meru Networks, which went public last week, or Nexsan, which is slated to come out this week, but both are valued by the market at less than $300m.) However, there are exceptions. Just as a few companies were able to make it public in 2009, while most would-be debutants just had to ride out the recession as private businesses, there will be rich valuations doled out to IPO candidates, even during this time of discounts.

From our perspective, the next player that’s likely to enjoy a warm welcome on Wall Street is QlikTech. (At $100m, the offering itself is one of the largest enterprise software IPOs in some time.) In fact, if we pencil out the initial valuation for this fast-growing, profitable analytics provider, we come up with a number that’s in the neighborhood of $1bn. QlikTech may not hit that magical mark on its debut, but we suspect that it won’t fall too far below it. Look for our full report on the company and the offering, including our projected financials and valuation for QlikTech, in tonight’s Daily 451 sendout.

An exclusive ‘club’

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

The price of admission for a ‘club deal’ just got a bit more expensive. The trio of private equity (PE) firms bidding for Irish e-learning firm SkillSoft recently bumped their offer to $1.2bn, up from the original $1.1bn bid in mid-February. The buyout firms teaming up to take SkillSoft private are Berkshire Partners, Bain Capital and Advent International. According to terms, the trio will be using equity to cover slightly more than half of the purchase price ($680m, or 57% of the $1.2bn transaction).

The planned leveraged buyout (LBO) of SkillSoft is one of only three take-privates by a PE club since January 1, 2008 valued at more than $1bn. (That doesn’t include syndicate purchases of divestitures or other parts of companies, such as the carve-out of Skype from eBay by a quartet of firms.) When credit was flowing freely in 2006-07, multibillion-dollar LBOs were plentiful, which was a primary reason that overall spending on tech M&A in each of those years topped $400bn. In both 2006 and 2007, PE shops accounted for more than 20% of all money spent on tech deals.

The topping bid for SkillSoft comes at a time when overall PE spending is dropping to some of the lowest levels since it began to recover last year. After averaging about $9bn in both of the quarters since the US recession officially ended, the value of deals by PE firms fell to just $6bn in the recently completed first quarter. Incidentally, the decline of PE deal value matched almost exactly the drop-off in overall first-quarter tech M&A spending, which came in at the low end of the range that we’ve tallied in recent quarters. Click here to see our full report on first-quarter M&A.

PE activity

Period Deal volume Deal value
Q1 2010 63 $6bn
Q4 2009 92 $9.9bn
Q3 2009 83 $8bn
Q2 2009 76 $2.8bn
Q1 2009 46 $250m

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

‘Pay us to shut up’

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Add another deal to the hit list for plaintiffs lawyers. The ink was barely dry on Thoma Bravo’s $143m all-cash offer for PLATO Learning late last week before the ambulance-chasing law firms launched their ‘investigations’ into whether the online education company did right by its shareholders. Equally wrongheaded lawsuits (at least in our view) have been filed against Chordiant Software and Techwell in recent days.

Never mind that the bid of $5.60 for each share of PLATO represents the highest price for the stock since November 2006. And never mind that with the premium, shareholders in PLATO have seen the value of their holdings more than triple over the past year. (That’s five times the return booked by those of us who had our money in the S&P 500 over the past year.)

According to PLATO, it wasn’t looking to sell itself when the buyout shop approached it a few months ago. (Terms do include a no-shop provision, but there is a ‘fiduciary out’ that would allow the company to talk with other suitors, if any surface. There is a $5.8m breakup fee, representing a slightly higher-than-average 4% of deal value.) Of course, none of the terms really matter in the strike suits. The law firms are just looking to make noise, hoping the companies will pay them to shut up.