Bets on casual games are paying off

-Contact: Thomas Rasmussen, Brenon Daly

Fittingly enough, on the one-year anniversary of our piece predicting continued consolidation of the social and casual gaming space, Electronic Arts announced the industry’s largest acquisition. The Redwood City, California-based videogame giant acquired Playfish on November 9 for $275m, although an earnout could mean that EA will pay as much as $400m over the next two years for the company. We estimate that Playfish, which will be slotted into the EA Interactive division, generated about $50m in trailing sales. Overall M&A continues to be strong in the still-niche gaming sector, with deal volume up about 25% from last year with about 35 transactions inked so far in 2009.

With the gaming industry seemingly in recovery mode after not-so-horrible earnings announcements from industry bellwethers EA and Activision Blizzard, we’re confident that more videogame and media companies will look to add social networking games. (After all, the big gaming players have used M&A as a way to buy a piece of a fast-growing, emerging market. For instance, EA spent $680m in cash four years ago for Jamdat Mobile to get into wireless gaming.) With Playfish off the board, which other social gaming startups might find themselves targeted by one of the big gaming vendors?

While there are literally hundreds of promising startups, most are too small to be important enough for a big buyer. Nevertheless, there are a few firms that have grown – both organically and inorganically – enough to make them attractive acquisition targets. For instance, Playdom, which develops games primarily for MySpace and Facebook, recently reached for a pair of smaller gaming startups. The company also recently raised $43m. Similarly, Zynga recently raised a funding round ($15m) and has also picked up two small startups this year. Two other names to watch in the emerging social gaming market are Digital Chocolate and Social Gaming Network Inc.

A thaw in the market

Contact: Brenon Daly

In recent weeks, there’s been a lot of talk about a thaw in the once-frozen M&A market. While that’s true for overall activity, it’s also turning out to be true for specific deals that for one reason or another found themselves on ice at some point. Whether the transaction originally froze because of financing, regulation or pricing, a few of the notable deals are now looking like they’ll get done. That warming trend in dealmaking stands in sharp contrast to the climate at the beginning of the year. The Ice Age that spanned the first few months of 2009 is the main reason why total M&A spending for this year is likely to come in at just half the level it was in 2008.

Among the transactions that have been reheated in recent weeks: JDA Software’s consolidation play for i2, the sale of once-hot-but-now-cold 3Com and Cisco Systems warming up to the shareholders of Tandberg, who had given the networking giant a Nordic brush-off in its first bid for the videoconferencing company. (Incidentally, the additional $400m that Cisco will kick in for Tandberg will deplete its overseas cash stash by a whopping 1.3%.) What’s interesting in this trio of deals is that all of them involve the target company pocketing more money than was offered in an earlier proposed transaction. That’s certainly a change in the climate from this time last year, when we were writing about bidders ‘recalibrating’ their offers lower.

Is mobile advertising back?

-Contact Thomas Rasmussen

In a clear sign that mobile advertising has grown up, Google spent a whopping $750m in stock on Monday to pick up San Mateo, California-based AdMob in what we hear was a contested process. This transaction goes a long way toward securing control of mobile display advertising for Google and comes just days after the launch of Android 2.0. Although we’ve been projecting dealmaking in the mobile advertising market for quite some time, we’re nonetheless floored by the rich valuation for AdMob, a three-year-old startup that’s raised just shy of $50m. We estimate that the 140-person firm pulled in about $20m in gross revenue in 2008 and was on track to double that figure this year (we surmise that this translates to roughly $20m on a net revenue basis).

The double-digit valuation for AdMob reminds us more than a little bit of the high-multiple online advertising deals that we saw in 2007. Viewed in that context, Google’s purchase of AdMob stands as the third-largest ‘new media’ advertising purchase since 2002. Of course, like many of those transactions, this was not based on revenue, but instead on technology and market extension, which is consistent with Google’s strategy of acquiring big into core adjacencies.

Looking forward, AdMob’s top-dollar exit is sure to have a number of rival mobile advertising startups excited. One competitor that’s preparing to raise an additional sizable round of funding quipped at the near-perfect timing of this transaction. This is an industry that has seen its ups and downs over the past few years. When we first wrote about AdMob back in May it was in the backdrop of fire sales and failed rounds of funding. If nothing else, this deal will dramatically change that.

Microsoft has been actively playing catch-up to Google in advertising and search, and is sure to follow it onto the mobile device. As are many other niche advertising shoppers such as Yahoo, Nokia, AdKnowledge, Adobe-Omniture and traditional media conglomerates such as Cox. AOL has already made its move, reaching for Third Screen Media two years ago. (We would note that AOL’s $105m purchase of Third Screen is a rare case of that company actually being ahead of the market.)

Startups that could benefit from this increasing focus on the sector include AdMarvel, Amobee, InMobi, and Velti’s Ad Infuse. However, we suspect that some of the major advances – and consequently the most promising targets – are likely to come from players that are just now getting started, with fresh and profitable approaches to location-based mobile advertising.

Some recent mobile advertising deals

Date announced Acquirer Target Deal value Target TTM revenue
November 9, 2009 Google AdMob $750m $20m*
September 14, 2009 Nokia Acuity Mobile Not disclosed Not disclosed
August 27, 2009 AdMob AdWhirl Not disclosed Not disclosed
May 21, 2009 Limelight Networks Kiptronic $1m $2m*
May 12, 2009 Velti Ad Infuse <$1m* $1.3m*
March 11, 2008 Qualcomm Xiam Technologies $32m Not disclosed
August 21, 2007 Yahoo Actionality Not disclosed Not disclosed
May 15, 2007 AOL Third Screen Media $105m $3m*

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase *451 Group estimate

A fittingly imperfect end for Kana

Contact: Brenon Daly

As liquidity events go, the just-announced sale of Kana Software is shaping up to be a pretty dry one for most shareholders. The customer service automation vendor said on Tuesday that it plans to sell its operating business to buyout group Accel-KKR for $49m and retain the publicly listed shell of a company as an acquisition vehicle. The proceeds from the sale of the business will flow to what essentially amounts to a special-purpose acquisition company, or SPAC, rather than long-suffering Kana shareholders. Shares of Kana have barely moved since the announcement, holding steady at around $0.75 each.

From our view, the structure of the deal reflects a creativity born out of necessity. Essentially, the challenge that shaped the sale process at Kana, which has been playing out for several years, was how to realize value for a decidedly mediocre operating business, while at the same time preserve the value of the tax advantages accrued from having burned money ($4.3bn and counting) since the company opened its doors. (The sole ‘asset’ at the SPAC, besides access to the capital markets, is the $400m in credits to offset taxes on any profit generated at whatever company it does acquire.) While the deal goes some distance toward satisfying both goals, several disgruntled shareholders have charged that it doesn’t go far enough.

For starters, the shareholders point out that if the carve-out goes through, as is expected within three months, they will have nothing to show for the sale of ‘their’ company. Instead, their future returns will be determined by an unknown group that may – or may not – buy some yet-to-determined business. (So much for the Wall Street maxim of investing in management and markets.) Particularly galling to those shareholders stuck holding illiquid Bulletin Board equity is that two of the largest owners of Kana (hedge funds KVO Capital Management and Nightwatch Capital Management, which also has a board seat) got to exit their investments at an above-market price of $0.95 per share, with the possible addition of another $0.10 for each share on top of that.

Kana would probably counter that shareholders who don’t want to roll their ownership of the company into a SPAC are free to sell their shares. And we have little doubt that the vendor exhausted every opportunity to get some value from the business, since we know that the process has been grinding along fitfully for years. In the end, though, we can’t help but view the less-than-ideal transaction as a fittingly imperfect ending to a thoroughly flawed company. Or more precisely, a thoroughly flawed public company. Red ink-stained Kana went public in 1999 on less than $5m in aggregate sales, but within a year of the offering had topped $1,000 per share on a split-adjusted basis. As shareholders now argue about dimes on the firm’s Bulletin Board-listed stock, the end of Kana just seems pathetic.

Dassault Systemes bulks up through an old friend

Contact: John Abbott

Dassault Systèmes’ $600m purchase of IBM’s CATIA product lifecycle management (PLM) sales and client support operations on Tuesday is the latest twist in a complex, 30-year relationship between the two companies. Dassault, founded in 1981, inherited the rights to CATIA, one of the first 3-D computer-aided design (CAD) packages, from its aerospace parent Avions Marcel Dassault (now Dassault Aviation). Then in 1992, Dassault bought the rights to the other pioneering CAD package, CADAM, from IBM. It set about combining the two, and continued to jointly market the product set with Big Blue.

Now it seems that Dassault wants more control over its business. Through the deal, which is expected to close during the first half of next year, it gains access to 1,000 more clients and around $700m in annual sales. The transaction is expected to boost earnings in the first year. (Dassault plans to speak more about the financial impact of the deal during its third-quarter earnings call on Thursday.)

The partnership will continue with IBM in the services role, but should enable Dassault to simplify its contracts with very large customers such as Ford Motor and Boeing, which until now had to negotiate with both vendors. The scope of CAD software has evolved over the years from core engineering and complex product design into collaborative PLM focused on business processes, workflows and the supply chain. However, Big Blue didn’t have the agreements in place to sell the full set of Dassault tools. The result was that more big firms were dealing directly with Dassault. A side effect is that both companies will be more able to work with other partners: Dassault with Hewlett-Packard, for instance, and IBM with other PLM providers such as Siemens PLM Software and PTC.

The deal is the biggest in Dassault’s history, though it has spent heavily in the past on industry consolidation, most notably through the acquisitions of MatrixOne (March 2006, $408m), ABAQUS (May 2005, $413m) and SolidWorks (June 1997, $310m). Other vendors have also been buying up big chunks of the PLM market. Siemens inked the sector’s largest deal in January 2007, spending $3.5bn on UGS, while Oracle handed over $495m for Agile Software in May 2007. The PLM shop that appears to be left behind is PTC, which despite spending more than $600m on 11 purchases of its own since 2004 is now much smaller than either Siemens or Dassault and is under pressure from moves into PLM by mainstream enterprise software houses such as Oracle and SAP. Several market sources indicated that PTC has retained Goldman Sachs to advise it on a possible sale.

At long last, Kana gets gone

Contact: Brenon Daly

Exactly three years ago, we bluntly wrote that there was no reason for Kana Software to be a public company, at least in its current form. Kana’s performance in the intervening 1,000 days since we published that report did nothing to change our view. If anything, as the red ink continued to gush at Kana, we became even more convinced of the need for a sale of the customer support software vendor. The sale finally happened Tuesday, with Accel-KKR agreeing to pay $49m in cash for most of Kana.

We were hardly alone in our assessment that Kana – a money-burning, Bulletin Board-listed company that also had negative working capital – should be cleared off the exchange. As we noted earlier this summer, Kana’s largest shareholder also wanted something to change at the company. KVO Capital Management, which had owned some 8.5% of the company, was pushing earlier this summer to get a director on the Kana board. KVO, which declined to comment, has agreed to back the sale to the buyout group, according to the release.

Patient Smith Micro is big on M&A

-Contact: Thomas Rasmussen, Chris Hazelton

Up until the credit crisis knocked the economy into a recession, mobile software company Smith Micro Software had been a fairly active acquirer. The Aliso Viejo, California-based firm closed five deals worth $93m in 2007 alone. However, as the economy slid into a tailspin, Smith Micro pretty much stepped out of the market. Last year, it announced only a pair of tuck-in acquisitions, which we estimate cost just $3m total.

We suspect Smith Micro may be looking to return to a quicker M&A pace. Last month, it announced its second-largest deal, picking up Mountain View, California-based Core Mobility for $18.5m. (We understand the two sides discussed a deal back in 2007, but couldn’t get together on price.) Smith Micro will hand over $10m in cash and cover the rest of the Core Mobility purchase in stock, which will hardly limit its ability to do future deals. The debt-free company, with a market cap of $340m, claimed $44m in cash and short-term investments (at least before announcing the Core Mobility purchase). Moreover, it recently filed a shelf offering intended to fatten its treasury toward additional deals. At current prices, the four million-share offering will effectively double Smith Micro’s cash on hand. So where might it be looking to shop?

The Core Mobility acquisition reached into a new market segment. But we believe any significant future deal would see the company aiming to bolster its core mobile enterprise VPN offerings. That is where it shopped before putting the breaks on its M&A program in late 2007, when it picked up PCTEL’s mobility assets and Ecutel Systems. Potential targets include Norwegian Birdstep Technology, Swedish Columbitech, Seattle-based NetMotion Wireless and Canadian vendor ipUnplugged.

Although all four would make excellent tuck-in acquisitions, we view publicly traded Birdstep as a particularly good fit for Smith Micro. The Norwegian company has trailing revenue of about $18m, which would be a not-insignificant boost to Smith Micro’s revenue. But more importantly, acquiring cash-burning Birdstep would provide a much-needed foot in the door to the Nordic/European markets to help Smith Micro expand beyond the Americas, which currently accounts for more than 90% of revenue. Birdstep can likely be had at a discount too, as the company currently sports a market cap of about $30m, a mere one-fifth of its 2007 levels. Patience might be the operative word for Smith Micro’s M&A strategy, and it looks like it’s paying off.

Smith Micro’s historical M&A

Period Number of acquisitions Total deal value
2009 YTD 1 $18.5m
2008 2 $2-3m*
2007 5 $93m

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase * official 451 Group estimate

A unanimous quartet

Contact: Brenon Daly, Dennis Callaghan

With BMC Software reaching across the Atlantic this week for Tideway Systems, the Big Four systems management vendors are now four for four in terms of buying startups that do datacenter asset discovery and dependency mapping. The deal, which is the second acquisition by BMC in as many months, should help the company round out its datacenter management lineup. Although terms weren’t disclosed, we understand that BMC paid $30m for Tideway, which was running at about $15m in revenue. Tideway, which is based in London, had raised some $37.5m in backing, including a whopping $27m series C in April 2008.

Most of BMC’s other rivals had already inked deals in this market. In addition to the Big Four, other tech giants also picked up startups that had discovery and mapping technology. The deals started in mid-2004, when Mercury Interactive (now part of Hewlett-Packard) reached for Appilog. After that, a yearlong flurry of transactions starting in late 2005 saw pretty much all the big names make their play. IBM acquired Collation, Symantec reached for Relicore, EMC grabbed nLayers and CA Inc bought Cendura. Based on disclosed or estimated deal values, all the buyers during that period paid in the neighborhood of $50m for their respective discovery and mapping startups, roughly 40% more than we hear BMC handed over for Tideway. Look for a full report on the transaction in tonight’s MIS sendout.

Does Wall Street run through the RedPrairie?

Contact: Brenon Daly

Along with the rising equity markets, there’s a new flow of companies that are planning to file their IPO paperwork in the next few weeks. For instance, we know of two venture-backed mobile vendors that have picked underwriters and plan to put in their prospectuses shortly. And we’re willing to bet that the expected strong offering from Fortinet, which initially filed in early August and is likely to debut before Thanksgiving, will catch the eye of quite a few VCs who have sizeable security providers in their portfolios.

Altogether, it looks like a decent IPO pipeline for VCs, as long as the equity markets hold. But what about their brethren at PE firms? We’ve seen the buyout barons file to flip a few non-tech holdings back onto the market, and the big offering from Avago Technologies (the carve-out of Hewlett-Packard’s semiconductor business by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Silver Lake Partners) has been above water since it hit the Nasdaq in early August. But there are still a lot of PE firms with pretty full portfolios that would like to post a realized gain – as opposed to ‘paper gains’ – before going out and raising a new fund.

So which PE-backed company is likely to hit the public market? Several sources have indicated that RedPrairie, an inventory management software vendor owned by Francisco Partners, has selected bankers and plans to ink an S-1 in the coming weeks. Francisco acquired RedPrairie in mid-2005, 30 years after the company was founded. Since the buyout, RedPrairie has rolled up six other companies. In 2008, the firm generated almost $300m in revenue. That puts RedPrairie’s revenue in the same neighborhood as rivals i2 and Manhattan Associates, but below the sales of JDA Software and Epicor Software.

Out with the old and in with the new at Compuware

Contact: Brenon Daly

Deal flow at Compuware so far this year has been out with the old and in with the new. The 36-year-old company sold off its testing automation and software quality business to MicroFocus for $80m earlier this year, and then last week, it put some of those proceeds toward covering its $295m purchase of Gomez. (Interestingly, Updata Advisors worked both the divestiture and acquisition for Compuware.)

The purchase of Gomez significantly bolsters Compuware’s application performance management (APM) business. It also dramatically changes the face that Compuware shows to Wall Street. Most investors know Compuware – if they know it at all – as ‘a mainframe company.’ (Indeed, roughly two-thirds of the firm’s product revenue comes from its mainframe business.) Even in a robust IT spending environment, the mainframe business is a slow-growing one.

While only a small slice of overall revenue, Gomez brings a predictable base of subscription revenue that’s been growing at a pretty good clip recently. In the first two quarters of 2009, Gomez increased revenue 25%. Granted, Compuware paid for that growth, valuing Gomez roughly four times as richly as Wall Street currently values Compuware itself. But the fact that Compuware shares actually ticked higher when the vendor announced the acquisition indicates that the deal has some support. (In contrast to, say, Wall Street’s punishment of Xerox shares on that company’s plan to pick up ACS.)

And Compuware is essentially paying the prevailing market valuation (5.5x trailing sales) for an on-demand company in its reach for Gomez. Undeniably, the firm could have found any number of targets available at a sharp discount if it wanted to consolidate a bunch of mainframe software providers. After all, Compuware has some experience with M&A, having inked nearly 40 deals since it went public in 1992. However, we would argue that few of those transactions have been as forward-looking as the addition of Gomez.