Big Oil has big trouble; Big Data has big opportunity

Contact: Brenon Daly

If data is the new oil, as some futurists would have it, then the accompanying transfer of value came through loud and clear in Friday trading. As oil prices slumped to their lowest levels since the recession, a pair of data-centric startups skyrocketed onto the market. The IPOs of New Relic and Hortonworks, collectively, created $2.5bn of market value.

Both offerings priced above the expected range and then surged another 40% on a day that saw US stock markets tick lower, in part, because of the pronounced slump in oil prices. The debut left both companies trading at platinum double-digit valuations. (New Relic, which will put up about $115m in sales in the current fiscal year, is being valued on Wall Street at about $1.5bn, while Hortonworks, which will do roughly $50m in sales this year, garnered a $1bn valuation.)

New Relic, which collects billions of data points around the performance of applications and the IT systems that run them, priced its shares at $23 each and saw them soar to about $33 in mid-Friday trading. ( See our full report on the New Relic offering.)

Similarly, Hortonworks – a ‘big data’ vendor that sells a Hadoop distribution – priced its shares at an above-range $16 and then saw its stock change hands at roughly $23. (See our full report on the Hortonworks offering.)

Just to put a point of contrast between old oil patch and new digital economy, consider this: the cost of buying one share each of New Relic and Hortonworks is roughly the same as the cost of buying a barrel of benchmark crude oil. Wall Street was very clear on which investment option looks more rewarding right now.

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In the IPOs of New Relic and Hortonworks, it’s the grownup vs. the startup

Contact: Brenon Daly

Although both New Relic and Hortonworks revealed their IPO paperwork on the same day, that’s pretty much all the similarities we could find between the two enterprise technology companies. The two candidates have wildly different delivery models, operating margins, customer counts and even maturity of business models. That’s not to say they both can’t find a home on Wall Street, but only one of them is likely to dwell in a ritzy neighborhood. (451 Research subscribers: look for our full reports on both the New Relic and Hortonworks offerings later today.)

Of the two offerings, New Relic looks to be the standout. The application performance management vendor is growing quickly, but maybe more importantly, it is starting to show some leverage in its business model. This stands in sharp contrast to some of the other unprofitable IPO candidates that talk distantly about the company hitting some magical ‘inflection point’ when the red ink turns black.

New Relic is already demonstrating greater efficiency in its model, which will undoubtedly appeal to Wall Street. Consider this: In the first six months of the company’s current fiscal year, its operating loss basically stayed the same even as revenue soared 84%. More specifically, New Relic actually lost less money in its most recent quarter, which wrapped in September, than it did in the same quarter a year earlier. It trimmed its quarterly loss even as the company added more than $10m, or 78%, to its top line.

In contrast, Hortonworks is still forming its business, without much – if any – regard to optimizing it. The three-year-old Hadoop distributor is a classic startup, with many of the concerns that come with early-stage businesses: customer concentration, heavy upfront spending and precariously thin margins. (Hortonworks’ professional services business, which actually runs at a negative gross margin, has been a serious drag on the company’s overall gross margin. Through the first three quarters of the year, Hortonworks has been running at just a 34% gross margin, less than half the 81% gross margin posted by New Relic.)

When we net out all the differences between New Relic and Hortonworks, we see a vast gulf between the two IPO candidates at the bottom line. Sure, both still run in the red, but New Relic is only a light red, while Hortonworks is hemorrhaging a blood red. To put some specific numbers on that metaphor: At its current rate, New Relic loses about 40 cents for every $1 it brings in as revenue. In contrast, Hortonworks loses a staggering $2.60 for every $1 it brings in as revenue.

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NetApp carves SteelStore out of Riverbed

Contact: Brenon Daly

NetApp’s first acquisition in more than a year and a half comes with a bit of a twist. The storage giant is only a few months removed from a period in which hedge fund Elliott Management was stirring for changes at the company. Having largely settled with the activist investor, NetApp has now picked up a division carved out from Riverbed Technology, which is currently being targeted by Elliott.

Terms call for NetApp to pay $80m for Riverbed’s SteelStore cloud storage gateway. The size of the business, which was formerly known as Whitewater, wasn’t disclosed. However, our understanding is that it was generating less than $10m in sales. Only 26 employees are going over to NetApp as part of the deal.

SteelStore was part of Riverbed’s broader portfolio expansion, an effort that hasn’t really paid off for the company. Some 70% of Riverbed’s revenue still comes from its core WAN optimization unit. The slowdown in that business is one of the main drags on Riverbed, which recently forecasted that sales in the current quarter may be flat.

However, according to our understanding of the transaction, it wasn’t driven by Riverbed, which is currently exploring ‘strategic alternatives,’ looking to jettison a non-core business. Instead, we gather that NetApp went after the division. Neither side used a financial adviser.

That dynamic may help explain the relatively rich valuation of the deal. (Though we would note that both EMC and Microsoft also paid princely multiples in their purchases of cloud storage gateways.) Also, price-to-sales multiples tend to get exaggerated by companies posting only tiny revenue.

And to be clear, virtually all of the cloud storage gateway startups are generating tiny sales. In a recent study of IT professionals at midsized and large enterprises conducted by TheInfoPro, a service of 451 Research service, only 4% of participating companies had deployed cloud storage gateways – a figure that was essentially unchanged from a similar TIP study in 2013. (See our full report .) With the cloud storage market still very much in its early stages, we would argue that a gateway startup is more at home in a storage vendor like NetApp than in a networking provider like Riverbed.

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Small ball M&A paying off for salesforce.com

Contact: Brenon Daly

When it comes to M&A at salesforce.com, starting small has yielded higher returns than going big. The SaaS giant has returned to the ‘buy and build’ strategy with its latest step into a new market with Analytics Cloud. The data visualization offering, which was unveiled this week at Dreamforce, was underpinned by the acquisition of EdgeSpring back in June 2013.

The $134m price notwithstanding, EdgeSpring stands as a small deal for salesforce.com. (We profiled EdgeSpring shortly after it emerged from stealth and a half-year before it was acquired. At the time, it claimed more than 10 paying customers and about 30 employees.)

Certainly, there were bigger targets for a move into the analytics market by salesforce.com, which will do more than $5bn in revenue this fiscal year and says it has a ‘clear line of sight’ to $10bn in sales. For instance, both Qlik Technologies and Tableau Software offer their data visualization software on salesforce.com’s AppExchange. With hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue, either of those vendors would have established salesforce.com as a significant player in the data analytics market as well as moving the company closer to its goal of doubling revenue in the coming years.

However, in that regard, a purchase of either Qlik or Tableau would be comparable with salesforce.com’s reach for ExactTarget in June 2013, which serves as the basis for its Marketing Cloud. The deal was uncharacteristically large, with salesforce.com spending more on the marketing automation provider than it has in all 32 of its other acquisitions combined. More significantly, salesforce.com has struggled a bit with ExactTarget, both operationally (platform integration and cross-selling opportunities) and financially (margin deterioration).

In contrast to that big spending, salesforce.com dropped only about one one-hundredth of the price of ExactTarget on InStranet in August 2008 ($2.5bn vs. $32m). The purchase of InStranet helped establish Service Cloud, which is now the company’s second-largest business behind its core Customer Records Management offering. And salesforce.com says the customer service segment is much larger than the market for its sales software.

Those divergent deals are something to keep in mind when salesforce.com buys its way into a new market. If we had to guess, we would expect the company to next make a play for online retailing (maybe call it Commerce Cloud?). If that’s the case, we might suggest that it look past the big oaks like Demandware and focus on the seedlings that can then grow up in the salesforce.com ecosystem.

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In HubSpot IPO, it’s the company and the company it keeps

by Brenon Daly

Wall Street typically doesn’t have the chance to learn too much about the companies that come public before the actual IPO. Certainly, the debutants don’t come with the track record of businesses that have lived in institutional investor portfolios for quarters on end. To alleviate some of that uncertainty, which is corrosive to any investment, a key selling point for some IPOs isn’t so much the company, but the company that it keeps.

Consider the case of HubSpot. (Subscribers: See our earlier preview of the HubSpot IPO .) The marketing automation (MA) vendor hit the NYSE on Thursday, creating more than $900m of market value. (The company priced its 5.75-million-share offering at an above-range $25 each, with shares ticking to $30 after the IPO.) HubSpot’s initial valuation works out to roughly 10 times trailing revenue, which is among the richest valuations for MA providers. In fact, it almost exactly matches the current trading valuation for MA high-flier Marketo.

While HubSpot is lumped in with Marketo, the two companies aren’t direct head-to-head rivals. They hawk their wares to very different customers, with HubSpot focusing solidly on the midmarket while Marketo targets bigger businesses. That shows up clearly in the fact that HubSpot has more than three times as many customers as Marketo, but generates roughly one-quarter the revenue of the larger – and faster-growing – MA vendor. (HubSpot has more than 11,600 customers, while Marketo has 3,300 or so.)

Undoubtedly, HubSpot is enjoying a bit of a boost by getting compared with an upmarket vendor. It wouldn’t find such bullishness if it went the opposite way, selling its marketing suite to small businesses. The public market proxy for that market is Constant Contact, which has had a choppy run on Wall Street and trades at a sharp discount to either Marketo or HubSpot.

Constant Contact sells to very small businesses. Nearly two-thirds of its roughly 600,000 customers have less than 25 employees. Still, it has built a sizeable business selling to corner stores, freelancers and other small operations. (Constant Contact will put up more revenue this year than Marketo and HubSpot combined.) What the marketing platform supplier hasn’t done so successfully is market its story to Wall Street. Constant Contact trades at about 3x trailing sales, just one-third the valuation of upmarket vendors HubSpot and Marketo.

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‘One HP’? Not any longer

Contact: Brenon Daly

In the largest-ever corporate overhaul of a tech company, Hewlett-Packard said Monday that it will split its business in half. The 75-year-old company, which had recently marketed itself under the tagline ‘One HP,’ will separate its broad enterprise IT portfolio from its printer and PC unit within a year. Each of the two stand-alone businesses (Hewlett-Packard Enterprise and HP Inc.) will be roughly the size of rival Dell, booking more than $50bn of sales annually.

Increasing those sales, even under the new structure, will be challenging. In discussing the planned separation, HP executives emphasized that the move comes at the end of a three-year ‘fix and rebuild’ phase at the company. During that time, HP’s top line has shrunk more than 10%. It has already laid off 36,000 employees, and said Monday that the final number of employee cuts may reach as high as 55,000. And HP has virtually unplugged its M&A machine, even as rivals such as IBM and Cisco continue to buy their way into new, faster-growth markets.

Through the first three quarters of its current fiscal year, HP has flatlined. The company indicated that will continue into its next fiscal year, which starts in November. While HP didn’t offer specific growth rate targets or forecasts for the stand-alone companies – once they get on the other side of the hugely disruptive separation – executives noted that the two businesses would be more ‘nimble’ and ‘responsive’ than they would be together.

That may well be, but the two businesses will also be burdened by higher costs individually than they currently face. ‘Dis-synergies’ such as higher supply and distribution costs, as well as supporting two full corporate structures, will shrink cash flow, which has been the key metric for Wall Street’s evaluation of HP’s mature business. Still, HP will throw off several billion dollars of free cash flow.

Some of that cash appears to be earmarked for M&A, although spending there will be a distant afterthought behind dividends and share repurchases. (And HP executives were quick to add that any deals would be ‘return-driven’ and ‘disciplined.’) But even stepping back into the market for acquisitions represents a dramatic shift at HP. After all, it was a series of poor acquisitions – most notably Autonomy but also services giant EDS – that partially forced the prolonged restructuring that culminated in this planned separation.

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Concur is just the latest of SAP’s pricey plays in the cloud

Contact: Brenon Daly

Announcing the largest SaaS acquisition in history, SAP will pay $8.3bn for travel and expense management software provider Concur Technologies. The purchase comes as the German giant is on the hook for doubling its cloud revenue in 2015 – a corporate target that has driven SAP’s recent M&A.

In its 42-year history, SAP has announced seven acquisitions valued at $1bn or more, according to The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase . However, the five most recent deals have all been pickups of subscription-based software vendors. (SAP’s two consolidation plays for firms hawking software licenses came in 2007 and 2010, with Business Objects and Sybase, respectively.) The purchase of Concur is the Germany company’s largest acquisition, and the fifth-largest transaction in the software market overall.

More significantly, SAP is paying up as it tries to move to the cloud. Including the Concur buy, SAP has handed out a lavish multiple, on average, of 11x trailing revenue to its SaaS targets. (Obviously, revenue doesn’t fully reflect the economic value of multiyear contracts common at SaaS firms. But even on a more liberal measure of business activity such as bookings, SAP has paid double-digit multiples in its subscription-based acquisitions.)

The SaaS premium stands out even more when compared with the valuations SAP has paid for conventional license-based vendors. The purchases of both Business Objects and Sybase went off at slightly less than 5x trailing revenue, or half the average SaaS valuation. Further, SAP itself trades at less than half the valuation it has paid for its SaaS acquisitions.

SAP acquisitions, $1bn+

Date announced Target Software delivery model Deal value Price/revenue multiple
September 18, 2014 Concur Technologies Subscription $8.3bn 12.4
October 7, 2007 Business Objects License $6.8bn 4.7
May 12, 2010 Sybase License $6.1bn 4.8
May 22, 2012 Ariba Subscription $4.5bn 8.6
December 3, 2011 SuccessFactors Subscription $3.6bn 11.7
June 5, 2013 hybris Subscription $1.3bn 10.7*
March 26, 2014 Fieldglass Subscription $1bn* 11.8*

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase *451 Research estimate

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Did SAP exercise an an opportunistic option for OpTier?

-by Brenon Daly

Despite raising more than $100m in backing, OpTier quietly wound down this summer after a dozen years in business. Even more quietly, some of the assets from the formerly highly valued startup may have been snapped up on the cheap by SAP.

That’s according to several market sources, and an opportunistic purchase would certainly make sense. SAP licensed a fair amount of OpTier to monitor its cloud software internally, so it could have simply brought the technology in-house. Although a deal hasn’t been announced (much less terms for any transaction), we understand SAP paid $10-20m for much of OpTier’s IP.

Assuming our understanding is correct, it would mark a sharp comedown for OpTier. As recently as three years ago, the Israeli startup was reported to be seeking an exit of up to $300m in a process run by Morgan Stanley, which is also an investor in OpTier.

Although OpTier grew quickly through much of the past decade with its business transaction monitoring product, it was slow to step into the more valuable market of code-level application performance monitoring (APM). (See our 2012 report on the ‘pivot’ at OpTier .) For comparison, at least two APM startups founded after OpTier – AppDynamics and New Relic – are both valued in the neighborhood of $1bn and are expected to go public in 2015.

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Its IPO stuck, Box is no longer the upstart startup

Contact: Brenon Daly

This year’s Burning Man and BoxWorks have more in common than just a spot on the calendar. The two festivals have grown far beyond the original events, both in terms of scope and attendees. In fact, both the bacchanal in the desert and the Box user conference, in their own ways, have grown so much from their anti-establishment roots that they’ve now become part of the establishment. The onetime fringe events have gone mainstream.

While the Burners debate whether the festival ‘sold out’ its founding principles, the Boxers have posed a similarly existential question: What are we now?

Throughout its three-day conference for developers and customers, which wrapped Thursday, Box took great pains to show how much it has grown up in its nine years in business. For the first time ever, BoxWorks was held at an actual convention center (the same location Oracle will use later this month for its user conference and salesforce.com will use next month). And more than ever before, Box populated its panels and presentations at the event with big company representatives, consciously underscoring just how far it has come since its fabled ‘pivot’ away from the consumer business.

But the clearest indication of the change at Box came from the very top of the company. CEO Aaron Levie, who normally freewheels through speeches, sounded much more measured. The 20-something-year-old CEO dialed down his snark and couched some remarks in language that read like it came from an SEC filing. (Maybe filing an S-1 does that to a chief executive?)

As an example of this new business-like attitude, consider the shift in Box’s relationship with onetime nemesis Microsoft. At previous BoxWorks, Levie thrived by bashing Microsoft, positioning the company as a lumbering dinosaur that had been outflanked by the nimble startup, Box. And yet, one of the key features for Box that Levie played up during his keynote was the fact that Box now partially integrates into Office 365. (For the record: It’s in beta, and comes more than three years after Microsoft launched Office 365 and Levie blogged that Box ‘would love’ to connect with the offering.)

With Box likely to put up about $200m in sales this year, it’s clearly no longer a startup. But what was made equally clear at BoxWorks this year is that the company is no longer an upstart, either. It’s turning into another enterprise software vendor, whether it likes it or not.

In our opinion, it is that realization that makes it more likely that Box will be sold or, at the least, be a more willing seller. In the consolidated, mature market of enterprise software – where a company like Microsoft puts up more revenue each day than Box does in a year – scale is an advantage. Despite all of its marketing spending and a more grownup user conference, Box still doesn’t have scale, and can likely only obtain that by getting acquired. So which company is likely to pick up Box? Hewlett-Packard is our top pick, followed by Cisco.

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VMware needs more ‘Know Limits’, less of ‘No Limits’

Contact: Brenon Daly

As VMware lowers the curtain Thursday on its annual gathering of customers and partners, we have a suggestion for planning VMworld 2015: come up with a better tagline than this year’s conference. The slogan ‘No Limits’ was inescapable at this week’s confab, graffitied onto walls and parroted by most VMware executives. Undoubtedly, the focus-grouped message was meant to convey the image of VMware standing as a central provider in an IT landscape of boundless resources, all flowing together seamlessly.

The reality, of course, is not quite so idyllic. (Just ask anyone at VMworld who has gone hand to hand in the past with some of the company’s management products, which have now been further complicated by being bundled together in vRealize Suite.) Enterprise technology is messy and prone to breaking down. The solution to that complexity isn’t to add more.

Rather than pushing the idea of No Limits, VMworld would have been more responsibly taglined ‘Know Limits.’ We acknowledge that our tweak on the slogan knocks some of the enthusiasm out of it. And when a company needs to come up with $1bn of net new revenue next year (taking the top line from basically $6bn in 2014 to $7bn in 2015), enthusiasm is a key selling point.

The kicker on VMware’s selection of No Limits as its central message to the 22,000 attendees of its annual confab is that the company should know that there are indeed limits to technology. In fact, at last year’s VMworld the company was only just dusting itself off after having hit some limits of its own. It found out, for instance, that it wasn’t an application software vendor, so it divested SlideRocket and Zimbra as part of a larger reorganization in the first half of 2013.

There’s no doubt that VMware is a far healthier company at this year’s VMworld than it was at last year’s event. (For the record, the 2013 VMworld tagline was ‘Defy Convention.’) We would argue that the company is healthier because it replaced its freewheeling, expansive operations with a more focused and disciplined approach to business. (In other words, VMware imposed some limits on itself.) Strategically, it pared down its portfolio and simplified it into three distinct offerings. The net result? VMware is growing 50% faster in the two quarters leading into this year’s VMworld than in the two quarters heading into last year’s confab.

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