Plenty of capital for Human Capital Management buyers

Contact: Brenon Daly

For the fragmented market segment called human capital management (HCM), we’d put the emphasis on ‘capital.’ Both of the two largest public HCM vendors (Taleo and SuccessFactors) have done secondaries in recent months, despite already having pretty fat treasuries. Taleo, which held some $77m in cash at the end of the most recent quarter, sold more than $130m worth of stock in late November. That offering came a month after rival SuccessFactors, which held $122m in cash, raised some $215m in its secondary.

Despite all the cash, neither player has been particularly concerned with using it to go shopping. SuccessFactors has never bought a company while Taleo has inked just one deal in each of the past two years. In May 2008, Taleo consolidated rival Vurv Technology for $128.8m in cash and stock. Last September, it spent $16m in cash for startup Worldwide Compensation, an acquisition that followed an initial early investment in the compensation management vendor. We have noted for some time that both SuccessFactors and Taleo are likely to be busy, and in fact, we heard gossip that SuccessFactors came very close to closing a deal at the end of 2009, but it fell through.

We were thinking about all this potential M&A last week, when one of the HCM rollups got rolling. Authoria, which is owned by buyout firm Bedford Funding, announced its first deal since it got snapped up in September 2008. We estimate that the $100m purchase of Peopleclick will more than double Authoria’s revenue. Not that the deal tapped out Authoria’s bank account, either. It still has some $700m to spend. Adding up the money the would-be buyers (both financial and strategic) have to shop in this market, we expect HCM deals to follow in 2010.

A fittingly imperfect end for Kana

Contact: Brenon Daly

As liquidity events go, the just-announced sale of Kana Software is shaping up to be a pretty dry one for most shareholders. The customer service automation vendor said on Tuesday that it plans to sell its operating business to buyout group Accel-KKR for $49m and retain the publicly listed shell of a company as an acquisition vehicle. The proceeds from the sale of the business will flow to what essentially amounts to a special-purpose acquisition company, or SPAC, rather than long-suffering Kana shareholders. Shares of Kana have barely moved since the announcement, holding steady at around $0.75 each.

From our view, the structure of the deal reflects a creativity born out of necessity. Essentially, the challenge that shaped the sale process at Kana, which has been playing out for several years, was how to realize value for a decidedly mediocre operating business, while at the same time preserve the value of the tax advantages accrued from having burned money ($4.3bn and counting) since the company opened its doors. (The sole ‘asset’ at the SPAC, besides access to the capital markets, is the $400m in credits to offset taxes on any profit generated at whatever company it does acquire.) While the deal goes some distance toward satisfying both goals, several disgruntled shareholders have charged that it doesn’t go far enough.

For starters, the shareholders point out that if the carve-out goes through, as is expected within three months, they will have nothing to show for the sale of ‘their’ company. Instead, their future returns will be determined by an unknown group that may – or may not – buy some yet-to-determined business. (So much for the Wall Street maxim of investing in management and markets.) Particularly galling to those shareholders stuck holding illiquid Bulletin Board equity is that two of the largest owners of Kana (hedge funds KVO Capital Management and Nightwatch Capital Management, which also has a board seat) got to exit their investments at an above-market price of $0.95 per share, with the possible addition of another $0.10 for each share on top of that.

Kana would probably counter that shareholders who don’t want to roll their ownership of the company into a SPAC are free to sell their shares. And we have little doubt that the vendor exhausted every opportunity to get some value from the business, since we know that the process has been grinding along fitfully for years. In the end, though, we can’t help but view the less-than-ideal transaction as a fittingly imperfect ending to a thoroughly flawed company. Or more precisely, a thoroughly flawed public company. Red ink-stained Kana went public in 1999 on less than $5m in aggregate sales, but within a year of the offering had topped $1,000 per share on a split-adjusted basis. As shareholders now argue about dimes on the firm’s Bulletin Board-listed stock, the end of Kana just seems pathetic.

Does Wall Street run through the RedPrairie?

Contact: Brenon Daly

Along with the rising equity markets, there’s a new flow of companies that are planning to file their IPO paperwork in the next few weeks. For instance, we know of two venture-backed mobile vendors that have picked underwriters and plan to put in their prospectuses shortly. And we’re willing to bet that the expected strong offering from Fortinet, which initially filed in early August and is likely to debut before Thanksgiving, will catch the eye of quite a few VCs who have sizeable security providers in their portfolios.

Altogether, it looks like a decent IPO pipeline for VCs, as long as the equity markets hold. But what about their brethren at PE firms? We’ve seen the buyout barons file to flip a few non-tech holdings back onto the market, and the big offering from Avago Technologies (the carve-out of Hewlett-Packard’s semiconductor business by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Silver Lake Partners) has been above water since it hit the Nasdaq in early August. But there are still a lot of PE firms with pretty full portfolios that would like to post a realized gain – as opposed to ‘paper gains’ – before going out and raising a new fund.

So which PE-backed company is likely to hit the public market? Several sources have indicated that RedPrairie, an inventory management software vendor owned by Francisco Partners, has selected bankers and plans to ink an S-1 in the coming weeks. Francisco acquired RedPrairie in mid-2005, 30 years after the company was founded. Since the buyout, RedPrairie has rolled up six other companies. In 2008, the firm generated almost $300m in revenue. That puts RedPrairie’s revenue in the same neighborhood as rivals i2 and Manhattan Associates, but below the sales of JDA Software and Epicor Software.

Intuit mints a rich deal

-Contact Thomas Rasmussen, Brenon Daly

We might be inclined to read Intuit’s recent purchase of Mint Software as a case of ‘If you can’t beat ’em, buy ’em.’ The acquisition by the powerhouse of personal finance software undoubtedly gives the three-year-old startup a premium valuation. Intuit will hand over $170m in cash for Mint, which we understand was running at less than $10m in revenue. (Although we should add that Mint had only just begun looking for ways to make money from its growing 1.5-million user base.)

More than revenue, we suspect this deal was driven by Intuit’s desire to get into a new market, online money management and budgeting, as well as the fear of the prospects of a much smaller but rapidly growing competitor. (Intuit and Mint have been talking for most of this year, according to one source.) In that way, Intuit’s latest acquisition has some distinct echoes of its previous buy, that of online payroll service PayCycle. For starters, the purchase price of both PayCycle and Mint totaled $170m. And even more unusually, bulge bracket biggie Goldman Sachs advised Intuit on both of these summertime deals. (Remember the days when major banks would hardly answer the phone for any transaction valued at less than a half-billion dollars? How times change.) On the other side of the table in this week’s deal, Credit Suisse’s Colin Lang advised Mint.

Intuit M&A, 2007 – present

Date Target Deal value
September 14, 2009 Mint Software $170m
June 2, 2009 PayCycle $170m
April 17, 2009 BooRah <$1m*
December 3, 2008 Entellium $8m
December 19, 2007 Electronic Clearing House $131m
November 26, 2007 Homestead Technologies $170m

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase *451 Group estimate

Will Taleo exercise its M&A option?

Contact: Brenon Daly

Having crossed the anniversary of its acquisition of Vurv Technology earlier this summer, Taleo recently indicated that it is looking to return to the M&A market. (Shares of the human capital management vendor trade essentially where they did when the company closed its $128m consolidation play with Vurv, while the Nasdaq is down about 12% over that same period.) Taleo’s pickup of Vurv was its largest-ever transaction, roughly doubling the number of customers for the company. The success that Taleo has enjoyed with migrating Vurv users to its own platform stands in sharp contrast to the other main consolidation play by a publicly traded rival, Kenexa’s $115m reach for BrassRing in 2006.

If we had to speculate on Taleo’s next M&A move, we suspect it would involve exercising a kind of ‘call option’ that it has on a startup. What do we mean by that? Last summer, when Taleo had its hands full with Vurv, it also made a $2.5m equity investment in a Redwood City, California-based startup called Worldwide Compensation (WWC). So rather than take on another acquisition immediately, Taleo smartly structured its investment – its only such investment – to give it right of first refusal to pick up all of WWC at any time through the end of 2009.

The investment in WWC comes with a partnership that adds WWC’s compensation management offering to Taleo’s core performance management products. In the second quarter, Taleo reported that it had three joint deals with WWC involving enterprise customers. As pay-for-performance offerings get more widely adopted, we could certainly imagine a case where Taleo would want to bring WWC in-house. In that regard, we might view the WWC investment as just a ‘try before you buy’ arrangement for Taleo.

Versata bags Everest

Contact: Brenon Daly

In half of the recent buys by Versata Enterprises, Updata Advisors has worked on behalf of the acquisitive enterprise software provider. In the latest purchase, however, the boutique advisory firm swung to the other side of the desk. On Friday, Versata, the Austin, Texas-based company that used to go by the name Trilogy, picked up Everest Software for an undisclosed sum. (We hear from a source that Everest was running at a bit more than $10m in revenue. However, the vendor’s top line suffered recently because it sold predominantly to retailers, as well as SMB customers – both of which have been hit disproportionately hard by the ongoing recession.)

Since December 2007, Updata has advised Versata on its acquisitions of Nuvo Network Management, TenFold and Evolutionary Technologies International. Switching over to the sell side for Everest is perhaps understandable for Updata because its sister firm – Updata Partners, which does venture investing – had put money into the CRM vendor. Other backers of Everest include Sierra Ventures, Boulder Ventures and Actis Capital. Founded in 1994, Everest had pulled in around $20m in funding.

Incidentally, we would note that in a press release announcing its sale, Everest took the unconventional step of thanking all of its backers. Even though we understand that the investments in Everest didn’t necessarily produce the returns that had been hoped for, it’s nonetheless a classy move by Everest. Too few companies do that. Most executives and investors simply and quietly move on to ‘the new, new thing’ without taking time to acknowledge the money and time that people put into the first venture. So the sale of Everest probably wasn’t a high-dollar deal, but the firm did take the high road.

Emptoris shrugs off possible fine, goes shopping

Contact: Brenon Daly

A little more than four months after selling to Marlin Equity Partners, Emptoris reached into the deep pockets of its buyout shop owner to fund its first acquisition: the recent pickup of the contract and service management business from Click Commerce. The deal was part of a larger divestiture of Click Commerce by Illinois Tool Works (ITW), effectively unwinding its September 2006 acquisition. In all, three Click Commerce units went to Marlin, with only the contract and service management unit getting slotted under Emptoris.

As we noted when ITW announced the divestiture last October, Click Commerce was a puzzling purchase for ITW, a 96-year-old company that makes everything from commercial ovens to industrial packing tape to arc welders. ITW paid $292m for Click Commerce in 2006. Although terms weren’t disclosed, we understand that the unit Emptoris acquired was generating some $15m in sales. With the additional revenue, we estimate that Emptoris would be running north of $50m.

Whatever size the check that Emptoris wrote for the Click Commerce division, we would note that one insider at rival Ariba quipped that Emptoris better not spend all ‘our’ money. The Ariba source was needling its rival about the fact that a patent lawsuit between the two companies is currently in the final stages. A jury has awarded – and the court has affirmed – some $6m in damages to Ariba. Emptoris is appealing the judgment.

Back-of-the-envelope thinking on Red Hat-Oracle

Contact: Brenon Daly

If Oracle was seriously planning a bid for Red Hat (and we have our doubts about such a pairing), then Larry Ellison had better be prepared to reach deeper into his pocket. Following Red Hat’s solid fiscal fourth-quarter report, shares of the Linux giant jumped 17% to $17.60 on Thursday. That added about a half-billion dollars to Red Hat’s price tag, with the company now sporting a fully diluted equity value of some $3.5bn.

Looking back at the nine US public companies that Oracle has acquired this decade, we would note that Oracle has paid an average premium of 14% above the previous day’s closing price at the target company. (Note: We excluded the two-year-long saga around PeopleSoft.) If we apply that premium, which we acknowledge is crudely calculated, to Red Hat, the company’s equity value swells to $4bn, or about $21 per share. That’s essentially where Red Hat shares changed hands in August, before Wall Street imploded.

On the other side of the table, Red Hat recently cleaned up its balance sheet, which certainly makes it a more palatable target. (Again, we don’t think the company is in play, much less took the steps to catch Oracle’s eye. More so, that it was just good fiscal practice.) Specifically, Red Hat paid off all of its debt and finished its fiscal year, which ended last month, with $663m in cash and short-term investments. That would be a nice ‘rebate’ for any potential buyer, in the unlikely event that Ellison or anyone else reaches for Red Hat.

Oracle’s stimulus package

Contact: Brenon Daly

One way to read Oracle’s novel announcement on Wednesday that it will start paying a dividend is that after years of handing out money to shareholders of other companies in the form of acquisitions, it will dole out some to its own investors. Word that the software giant will pay a dividend for the first time comes after a quarter in which Oracle acquired just one company, mValent. It was the lowest quarterly total for the company in recent memory, and compares with the shopping spree in the same quarter last year that saw it take home BEA Systems for $8.5bn, among other deals.

Although terms for Oracle’s most-recent acquisition weren’t released, we understand that it paid less than $10m for mValent, a change and configuration management startup. Viewed in light of the announced dividend of a nickel per share, even assuming that Oracle paid $10m for mValent, the purchase price works out to just 4% of the cash that the company is set to return to shareholders next month. (With five billion shares outstanding, Oracle’s dividend bill will be $250m per quarter, or $1bn for the full year.)

Even though time and money can only be spent once (as the saying goes), merely committing to paying a dividend doesn’t necessarily take a company out of the M&A market. Look at Microsoft, which has been a dividend-paying company since the beginning of 2003. It has inked four of its five largest deals even as it handed back billions of dollars to its own shareholders. And that corporate largess has hardly imperiled the Redmond, Washington-based behemoth. It finished last year with more than $20bn in cash and short-term investments on its balance sheet.

Oracle’s M&A, by quarter

Period Deal volume Disclosed and estimated deal value
Fiscal Q3 (December-February) 2009 1 Estimated less than $10m
Fiscal Q2 (September-November) 2008 5 $455m
Fiscal Q1 (June-August) 2008 2 Not disclosed
Fiscal Q4 (March-May) 2008 2 $100m
Fiscal Q3 (December-February) 2008 4 $8.5bn
Note: Oracle’s fiscal year ends in May

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Bargains for SuccessFactors

Contact: Brenon Daly

Having organically built an on-demand business that cracked $100m in sales last year, SuccessFactors may be ready to do a bit of shopping. The switch comes a year after the human capital management (HCM) vendor told us that despite the company’s close ties to Jack Welch, it didn’t expect to do deals like the former General Electric chief executive.

But as valuations of smaller HCM players have been slashed, there may be some bargains out there that are too good to pass up, CFO Bruce Felt said recently. He added that the company has some $70m in cash and $33m in short-term investments. And in the fourth quarter of 2008, SuccessFactors generated operating cash flow for the first time, and the company indicated that would continue in 2009.

SuccessFactors would be looking to pick up technology, rather than make a large-scale consolidation move. (We would note that neither of the recent consolidation moves in the HCM market, Taleo’s $128.8m purchase of rival Vurv Technology and Kenexa’s $115m acquisition of BrassRing, has gone particularly well.) While SuccessFactors says it’s in the market, the company isn’t counting on deals to continue to boost its top line. It recently forecast 30% organic growth for this year. While that’s less than half as fast as it grew in 2008, it’s a pretty healthy clip during a recession.