Category: infrastructure software

Why wouldn’t HP jump the McAfee bid instead?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

If we had to guess about Hewlett-Packard making an uncharacteristic move and jumping an announced transaction, we would have thought the company would go after McAfee rather than 3PAR. After all, HP has a giant hole in its security portfolio (we might describe it as a ‘McAfee-sized’ hole), while it’s already pretty well covered on the storage side, even if much of its offering is a bit long in the tooth.

Yet that isn’t the way it’s playing out. The recently decapitated company offered $1.7bn earlier this week for 3PAR, adding roughly $410m, or 33%, to the proposed price of the high-end storage vendor. Meanwhile, McAfee’s planned $7.8bn sale to Intel, announced last week, continues to track to a close before the end of the year. (We would note that McAfee is being valued at 3.4 times trailing sales, exactly half the level of 3PAR following HP’s bumped bid, which took the valuation to 7.6x trailing sales.)

HP’s topping bid for 3PAR appears to be a fairly defensive move. For starters, there’s the matter that 3PAR would overlap more than a little bit with its existing core storage offering called StorageWorks Enterprise Virtual Array. Betting on an acquired property to replace – or at the very least, refresh – the heart of a company’s current offering is a risky proposal. On top of that, 3PAR would require a new architecture, rather than just running on top of HP’s existing hardware like its other software-based storage acquisitions (PolyServe, IBRIX and Lefthand Networks).

All in all, looking to derail Dell’s offer for 3PAR appears to be at odds with much of HP’s previous strategy and rationale around storage. And while it pursues that deal (cost what it may), HP passes on McAfee, a one-of-a-kind security asset that would instantly make it much more competitive with IBM, EMC and Cisco Systems. If HP has sincere aspirations about outfitting the next generation of datacenters, we might suggest that it needs to actually own its intellectual property (IP) for security.

So far, however, HP has been content with just OEM arrangements to cover itself for security. (Notably, it has extracted a fairly one-sided agreement with Symantec for consumer anti-malware protection.) And even though buying McAfee would mean an unraveling of a number of those arrangements, we would note that reality isn’t preventing HP from making its bid for 3PAR. Remember that HP currently has an OEM arrangement with Hitachi Data Systems for a high-end offering like 3PAR. Yet it’s prepared to pay – and pay a lot of money – to own the IP itself. Couldn’t the same rationale be used for McAfee?

Arms race M&A in application security

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

If IBM and Hewlett-Packard basically matched each other’s deal size in the first round of M&A for application security, HP has gone much bigger than Big Blue in the second round. In fact, we gather that the price tag for HP’s recent purchase of Fortify Software is more than 10 times larger than the amount IBM paid last summer for rival static code analysis vendor Ounce Labs. (When IBM announced the deal, we speculated that HP may well work out its own tit-for-tat deal, reaching for its partner Fortify.)

Terms weren’t revealed on either the Fortify or Ounce Lab transactions. However, we gather that IBM picked up Ounce Labs for about $25m and that HP likely paid about $275m (including an earnout) for Fortify. Our understanding is that Ounce Labs garnered roughly 3 times trailing sales, while Fortify went for about 4.6x trailing sales of about $60m.

Those deals, which were separated by roughly a year, came after both tech giants had made acquisitions of dynamic code analysis vendors within two weeks of one another. Back in mid-2007, IBM purchased Watchfire for an estimated $140m, roughly matching HP’s $135m acquisition of SPI Dynamics. Both transactions were done at more than 5x trailing sales, according to our understanding. For those keeping track of the arms race M&A by these two tech superpowers, the collective bill for their application security purchases now exceeds a half-billion dollars.

Select application security acquisitions

Date announced Acquirer Target Deal value Target trailing revenue
August 17, 2010 HP Fortify Software $275m* $60m*
July 28, 2009 IBM Ounce labs $25m* $8m*
June 19, 2007 HP SPI Dynamics $135m* $20m*
June 6, 2007 IBM Watchfire $140m* $30m*

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase *451 Group estimate

There’s only one 3PAR

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Let’s see, where have we heard this before? A storage company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue finds itself in a billion-dollar bidding war between two tech giants, advised in the process by high-end boutique Qatalyst Partners. Last summer, scarcity value drove the price of Data Domain; today it’s 3PAR.

Looking to trump Dell’s existing agreement for 3PAR, Hewlett-Packard on Monday lobbed a topping bid for the high-end storage provider. HP, advised by JP Morgan Securities, is offering $24 for each share of 3PAR, giving the proposed transaction an enterprise value of $1.56bn. (That’s according to our math, compared to the $1.66bn that HP gives its bid.) In any case, the offer is some $380m, or 33%, richer than Dell’s initial bid. Recall that Dell’s offer of $18 valued 3PAR at the highest level ever for the stock.

One interesting observation about HP’s topping bid: it is exactly the same percentage (33%) that EMC had to hand over for Data Domain, which had agreed to sale to NetApp. Of course, this is HP’s first counter, while EMC had to bump its own bid. (Initially it offered $30 for each Data Domain share, but ultimately paid $33 per share when it closed the deal in July 2009.) Of course, there was little hope of NetApp matching EMC in a bidding war for Data Domain. In the case of 3PAR, however, rivals Dell and HP are on much closer financial footing. Terms of Dell’s original agreement with 3PAR call for a $53.5m breakup fee

‘You bought what? For how much?’

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

In both of the largest enterprise IT acquisitions so far this year, the deals are not what they seem. Or more accurately, the target companies were not acquired for what they are. What do we mean? Well, we would posit that Intel didn’t buy McAfee for its core security applications any more than SAP scooped up Sybase for its core database product. Instead, in each case, the buyers really only wanted a small part of the business but found themselves nonetheless writing multibillion-dollar checks for a whole company.

For SAP, the apps giant really wanted Sybase’s mobile technology, essentially using the Sybase Unwired Platform to ‘mobilize’ all of its offerings. It’s nice that the purchase also brought along some data-management capabilities, particularly some pretty slick in-memory database technology. But for SAP, this deal was all about getting its apps onto mobile devices. However, Sybase’s mobile business only generated about one-third of total revenue at the company. So SAP ends up handing over $5.8bn in cash for a business that’s currently running at just $400m.

If anything, Intel is paying even more for the business that it truly wanted – or, at least, the business that’s most relevant – at McAfee: embedded security. Yet that’s only a small (undisclosed) portion of the roughly $2bn revenue at McAfee, the largest stand-alone security vendor. Tellingly, Intel plans to operate as a kind of holding company, letting McAfee continue undisturbed with its business of selling security applications to businesses and consumers.

Dell’s not-so-identical twin storage deals

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

From an investment banking perspective, both EqualLogic and 3PAR started out and finished their lives in much the same way. The two storage vendors filed to go public within a week of one another back in August 2007, and – pending the close of 3PAR’s sale – both will end up inside Dell. Yet while the final destination is the same, the two vendors’ not-so-parallel tracks to Round Rock, Texas, underscore the fact that the tech M&A market, as well as the capital markets, still have a long way to go to recover from the Credit Crisis.

Consider this: In the sale announced Monday, 3PAR garnered just half the multiple that fellow storage vendor EqualLogic got in its sale to the same buyer, at least based on one key metric. 3PAR sold for 5.6 times trailing sales, while EqualLogic went for 12x trailing sales. We would chalk up the eye-popping premium for EqualLogic mostly to the fact that Dell had to effectively outbid the public market to prevent the company from going public. More to the point, Dell had to outbid a bull market, as the Nasdaq had tacked on 20% in the year leading up to its purchase of EqualLogic in November 2007.

As any company – including 3PAR and Dell – can attest, the bull market ended abruptly and painfully just days after the EqualLogic trade sale. So now we’re left with a market where Dell can offer the highest-ever price for 3PAR shares (representing a staggering 87% premium) and still get a ‘half-off discount’ on valuation compared to its earlier billion-dollar storage deal. But then Dell knows all about discounts over that time period. The company’s market cap has been cut in half (to $25bn from $50bn) from the day it announced its EqualLogic acquisition to Monday’s announcement of the 3PAR purchase.

RainStor, the structured data retention and compression startup that recently renamed itself from Clearpace, has raised $7.5m in series B funding. The round brought in two new investors – Storm Ventures and data integration software specialist Informatica (which licenses RainStor’s technology as part of its Applimation data archive suit <!– /* Font Definitions */ @font-face {font-family:”Cambria Math”; panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4; mso-font-charset:0; mso-generic-font-family:roman; mso-font-pitch:variable; mso-font-signature:-1610611985 1107304683 0 0 159 0;} @font-face {font-family:Calibri; panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4; mso-font-charset:0; mso-generic-font-family:swiss; mso-font-pitch:variable; mso-font-signature:-1610611985 1073750139 0 0 159 0;} @font-face {font-family:Verdana; panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4; mso-font-charset:0; mso-generic-font-family:swiss; mso-font-pitch:variable; mso-font-signature:536871559 0 0 0 415 0;} /* Style Definitions */ p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal {mso-style-unhide:no; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:””; margin:0in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:”Times New Roman”,”serif”; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;} a:link, span.MsoHyperlink {mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; color:blue; mso-text-animation:none; text-decoration:none; text-underline:none; text-decoration:none; text-line-through:none;} a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed {mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; color:purple; mso-themecolor:followedhyperlink; text-decoration:underline; text-underline:single;} p.bodytxt02, li.bodytxt02, div.bodytxt02 {mso-style-name:body_txt_02; mso-style-unhide:no; mso-margin-top-alt:auto; margin-right:0in; mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto; margin-left:0in; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:”Times New Roman”,”serif”; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;} .MsoChpDefault {mso-style-type:export-only; mso-default-props:yes; font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;} @page WordSection1 {size:8.5in 11.0in; margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in; mso-header-margin:.5in; mso-footer-margin:.5in; mso-paper-source:0;} div.WordSection1 {page:WordSection1;} –>
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by Brenon Daly

From an investment banking perspective, both EqualLogic and 3PAR started out and finished their lives in much the same way. The two storage vendors filed to go public within a week of one another back in August 2007, and – pending the close of 3PAR’s sale – both will end up inside Dell. Yet while the final destination is the same, the two vendors’ not-so-parallel tracks to Round Rock, Texas, underscore the fact that the tech M&A market, as well as the capital markets, still have a long way to go to recover from the Credit Crisis.

Consider this: In the sale announced Monday, 3PAR garnered just half the multiple that fellow storage vendor EqualLogic got in its sale to the same buyer, at least based on one key metric. 3PAR sold for 5.6 times trailing sales, while EqualLogic went for 12x trailing sales. We would chalk up the eye-popping premium for EqualLogic mostly to the fact that Dell had to effectively outbid the public market to prevent the company from going public. More to the point, Dell had to outbid a bull market, as the Nasdaq had tacked on 20% in the year leading up to its purchase of EqualLogic in November 2007.

As any company – including 3PAR and Dell – can attest, the bull market ended abruptly and painfully just days after the EqualLogic trade sale. So now we’re left with a market where Dell can offer the highest-ever price for 3PAR shares (representing a staggering 87% premium) and still get a ‘half-off discount’ on valuation compared to its earlier billion-dollar storage deal. But then Dell knows all about discounts over that time period. The company’s market cap has been cut in half (to $25bn from $50bn) from the day it announced its EqualLogic acquisition to Monday’s announcement of the 3PAR purchase. e

Do-or-die time for LANDesk divestiture

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

It’s do-or-die time for the LANDesk divestiture, with the period of exclusivity with the most serious bidder set to expire Friday. Buyout shop Thoma Bravo is said to be the last remaining party at the table for the systems management vendor, which Emerson Electric has been trying to shed for more than six months. The current betting is that Thoma Bravo, which has done a half-dozen deals so far this year, will not take home LANDesk.

Thoma Bravo, of course, already has a play in this market – one that it got thanks to another public company divestiture. The private equity (PE) firm picked up the IT asset management division from Macrovision (now known as Rovi) in February 2008, renaming the business Flexera Software. Flexera has since bolted on four other businesses, including the purchase of ManageSoft in May. As my colleague Dennis Callaghan has noted, the hypothetical pairing of Flexera and LANDesk would bring some overlap, but would add technology for endpoint security management, service desk, remote control, power management and application virtualization that Flexera doesn’t have on its own.

While the combination makes sense strategically, we have heard that the process is snagged financially. Several sources have indicated that the asking price for LANDesk has come down from more than $300m early in the process to $250m now. (LANDesk sold for $416m back in April 2006 to Avocent, which was subsequently acquired by Emerson.) At the current level, LANDesk would be valued at more than eight times EBITDA, according to our understanding. That might prove a little rich for Thoma Bravo.

Same old, same old at Novell?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Ever since hedge fund Elliott Associates put Novell in play five months ago, we’ve said that the company was going to be a tough sell. It’s a mixed bag of businesses, both in terms of what those businesses sell and how they perform. (Or rather, how those businesses underperform, as we were reminded by Novell’s warning earlier this week about third-quarter results. If nothing else, that kept alive Novell’s streak – it also came up short in the two quarters leading up to Elliott’s run at the company.)

Undoubtedly, Novell – an underperforming company that nonetheless found its treasury stuffed with more than $1bn of cash – offered an easy target for the gadfly investor. But having that agitation turn into an acquisition is proving much more difficult. (We recently took an in-depth look at Novell, as well as the specific business lines and which suitors might be eyeing them, in a special report.)

While the process initially attracted a number of parties, we understand that there are only three left at the table: a private equity-backed company, a UK-based PE firm and a joint bid between a publicly traded tech company and a buyout shop. It’s not clear that any of the three will actually close a deal for Novell. (The process has already run past two deadlines, we gather.) Without a deal, shares of Novell would be left to trade on the company’s own merits, which probably wouldn’t do much for shareholder value.

Novell timeline

Date Event
March 2, 2010 Elliott Associates launches unsolicited bid of $5.75 per share, or $2bn equity value
March 20, 2010 Novell board rejects Elliott’s bid, retains JP Morgan Securities to explore alternatives

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Strategic ardor for Arbor

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

In yet another sign that private equity (PE) still hasn’t recovered to the level that the buyout barons enjoyed in the halcyon days before the Credit Crisis, consider the process around Arbor Networks. The network security and monitoring vendor had many of the characteristics that would typically appeal to a PE shop: a mature company that was running at about $100m, with EBITDA margins approaching the mid-teens, according to our understanding. Along with the decent cash generation, 10-year-old Arbor was also growing, targeting about 20% expansion for 2011.

Even though some half-dozen PE firms looked at Arbor, the company ended up going to a strategic acquirer, Tektronix. (See our full report on the deal, which wasn’t the most intuitive pairing we could have come up with for Arbor. That said, as my colleague Andrew Hay notes in the report, the acquisition of Arbor gives Tektronix a way to couple its network diagnostics and management of fixed, mobile, IP and converged multiservice networks with security and threat mitigation products.)

So while the portfolio expansion certainly makes sense for Tektronix, there’s also the interesting side note that, in this case, a strategic buyer is outbidding would-be financial acquirers. Further, that’s largely without relying on so-called ‘synergies,’ or cost savings from cutting duplicative operations at the acquired company to effectively lower the valuation for a corporation. (The reason: Tektronix is basically absorbing all of Arbor, running it as a stand-alone business.) That sort of corporate dealmaking is a far cry from three years ago, when the low cost of capital sometimes allowed PE firms to outbid companies, even when a not-insignificant amount of synergies figured into the deal.

Private equity activity

Period Deal volume Deal value
Jan. 1-Aug. 10, 2010 170 $18.4bn
Jan. 1-Aug. 10, 2009 170 $3.8bn
Jan. 1-Aug. 10, 2008 158 $18.3bn
Jan. 1-Aug. 10, 2007 209 $109.7bn
Jan. 1-Aug. 10, 2006 189 $53bn

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Symantec to talk shop — and shopping

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Although most of the attention in Symantec’s quarterly report Wednesday night will be focused on the top and bottom line, we expect the company’s recent shopping spree to also come up. The storage and security giant announced three acquisitions in its just-completed quarter – more deals than it did in all of 2009. The bill for Big Yellow’s almost unprecedented M&A activity in the quarter came in at $1.65bn. As we recently noted, Symantec on its own has accounted for one-third of the spending for all security deals so far this year.

The biggest part of Symantec’s spending will go toward covering its purchase of the identity and authentication business from VeriSign, its largest transaction in more than a half-decade. (As a reminder, VeriSign’s business was running at about $370m, generating a very healthy $100m or so in cash flow each year.) Big Yellow has yet to close that deal, which was announced in mid-May, or offer specific financial projections for that business. Look for more information on that acquisition on the call tonight.

Symantec will be reporting its fiscal first-quarter results, which covers the second calendar quarter, after the closing bell. Analysts are projecting earnings of about $0.35 per share on revenue just shy of $1.5bn. However, we would note that rivals in each part of Big Yellow’s two main businesses have come up short of Wall Street expectations in their recent quarters. Two weeks ago, storage vendor CommVault indicated that sales had softened while just this morning, security rival Websense offered a disappointing earnings outlook. Websense shares were down more than 10% in midday trading.

A different outcome of the EMC-Netezza rumors

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Although EMC paid top dollar for Greenplum, the startup may not have been EMC’s top choice for its move into data warehousing. At least two sources have indicated that the storage giant talked with fellow Boston-area company Netezza earlier this year. Talks were apparently short-lived, as the two sides never got close on price.

When discussions were going on, Netezza stock was trading at about $10. Our sources report that EMC was kicking around a bid that had a roughly 40% premium – in other words, essentially where shares change hands right now. Netezza, which came public three years ago, has been trading at its highest level since October 2007 lately.

Yet even with the run in Netezza shares (up 45% so far this year), the company isn’t egregiously expensive. It currently sports a market capitalization of $870m, but has about $110m in cash and equivalents, lowering its net cost to $760m. That’s about 3.2 times projected sales this fiscal year and just 2.7x next fiscal year’s estimated sales.

As it is, EMC paid a substantially higher multiple for Greenplum. (Our estimate, based on two sources familiar with the transaction, is that EMC handed over about $400m, or roughly 13x estimated trailing sales, for Greenplum.) Of course, there are different motivations – and, naturally, multiples – attached to either move. Netezza was a much more mature company, with more than twice the number of customers of Greenplum. On the other side, Greenplum had developed some pretty slick technology, particularly for cloud environments, that should fit easily into EMC’s broad sales channel.