Cut the CDN already, InterNap

Contact: Ben Kolada

We’ve long covered InterNap Network Services as both a potential target and a datacenter services vendor with disappointing earnings. With what’s likely to be another underwhelming quarter (the company reports Q3 results after the bell today), we take yet another look at what can be done to save this barely floating ship.

At this point, InterNap has got to unload some of its non-core assets. The company’s IP services segment, made up of interconnection and CDN services, is dragging on its total revenue (revenue from this segment fell 8% last year). However, interconnection is among the core services for hosting providers, so we’d suggest just divesting its CDN assets. Now may in fact be the best time to start weighing this option, given recent positive developments in the CDN sector. Akamai Technologies, the largest CDN provider, reported earnings yesterday that showed revenue grew 11% in Q3 from the year-ago period. And earlier this month, Japanese telco KDDI announced that it was taking an 86% equity stake in CDNetworks in a deal that gave the target an implied equity valuation of $195m. Even though growth had stalled at Seoul-based CDNetworks, the company was still able to command a 2x price-to-sales valuation (which stands in stark contrast to mostly disappointing valuations in the CDN sector).

Cutting some of the fat from InterNap’s business could make the company more palatable to prospective acquirers. However, the lack of growth is likely to prevent interest from most telcos. Instead, at this point buyout shops may be the most interested acquirers. Not only does InterNap have some of the characteristics PE firms prefer (it has very little net debt and consistently generates healthy cash flow), the company’s price is still within reach of some of the larger firms. Applying a simple 30%-per-share premium would put its price in the ballpark of $400m. For comparison, last year we saw financial firms announce a trio of deals each valued at $400m or more.

Renaissance plays politics

Contact: Brenon Daly

It must be election season. That’s what struck us when we saw earlier this week that Renaissance Learning went ahead and accepted a buyout offer that valued the online education vendor at about 10% less than an unsolicited bid. To our ear, some of the material in the proxies filed in connection with the $455m leveraged buyout could very well have come from a campaigning politician. The deal closed earlier this week.

Consider the language that the company used in laying out why shareholders should follow the lead of the company’s cofounders, who controlled some 69% of the equity, and back the initial offer from buyout firm Permira: The deal would be ‘more favorable’ to the employees and the broader community than the unsolicited bid from rival company PLATO Learning. (In addition, Renaissance said PLATO’s offer would take longer and be less likely to close, in their view.)

The concern, presumably, is that there would be far more overlapping employees if the two companies were merged, resulting in more job cuts than if Renaissance were taken private and largely left to run as it had been running. Who knows, maybe if PLATO took the company over, the combined company would start with cuts in the executive ranks. If that were the case, the cofounders of Renaissance would go from majority owners to unemployed.

Don’t get us wrong. We’re all for not contributing to the already intractably high unemployment rate in the US. But as a public company, Renaissance has a fiduciary responsibility to all its shareholders, not just the ones in its hometown. It’s worth noting that Renaissance is incorporated in its home state of Wisconsin, rather than the typical location for incorporation, Delaware. (Roughly half of US companies, including PLATO, are incorporated in Delaware.) So that may go some distance toward explaining why the company made ‘jobs and community’ a part of its pitch.

A little something for your trouble

Contact: Brenon Daly

Breaking up is hard to do. And it can be expensive, too. But as a pair of deals this week shows, the costs aren’t necessarily borne equally by the two sides in a planned transaction. In the higher-profile case, the market is buzzing that Google may be on the hook for a $2.5bn payment to Motorola Mobility if that deal unravels. If that’s the case, the payment (known as a reverse breakup fee) would be 6-7 times larger than the payment Google would stand to pocket if Motorola Mobility walks away from the transaction.

That gap is much wider than is seen in deals that feature reverse breakup fees, where a would-be buyer might face a fee that would be closer to twice the amount the seller might pay. That’s how it is, for instance, in Permira’s planned $440m buyout of education software maker Renaissance Learning. According to terms of Tuesday’s leveraged buyout (LBO), if Permira walks away from the transaction, it will have to come up with $26m, or nearly 6% of the equity value of the proposed deal. On the other side, if Renaissance Learning backs away, it will have to hand over just $13m, or about 3% of the equity value.

Reverse breakup fees have long been an accepted way for a would-be seller to receive compensation for any risks in getting a transaction closed. (The rationale is that the disruption in business due to an acquisition is much greater to the target company than the acquirer, so the greater potential risk is offset by a greater potential reward.) Of course, these fees are far more common in LBOs than when the deal is struck between two companies, like Google buying Motorola Mobility. But then again, the search giant – going back to its Dutch auction IPO and continuing to today’s practice of not giving quarterly financial guidance – has never been a company that really follows Wall Street convention.

Are Internet infrastructure exits interconnected?

Contact: Ben Kolada

Providing further proof that it’s a tough time to be on the market, much less come to market, GI Partners has opted to sell its Telx investment rather than battle through an IPO. The company’s sale to ABRY Partners and Berkshire Partners closes the books (at least for now) on a proposed public offering that Telx initially filed back in March 2010. And we wouldn’t be surprised if Telx’s sale caused other IPO candidates in the industry to rethink their entry onto the public stage as well.

Terms weren’t disclosed, but we understand that Telx caught a fairly high valuation that would have provided a more immediate – and lucrative – return than an IPO. Although the Internet infrastructure industry showed resilience throughout the recession, consistently growing revenue, that hasn’t always been the case when it comes to the public markets. Chinese datacenter operator 21Vianet Group, for example, closed its first trading day on the Nasdaq with a market cap of $1bn. However, since then its shares have lost 40% of their value. (We note, however, that the success of 21Vianet’s IPO was due in part to success from other Chinese IPOs, as well as buyout speculation in the industry.)

Just as the Internet infrastructure market focuses on interconnection, we suspect that its participants’ exits are also interconnected. We feel that Telx’s recent sale to ABRY Partners and Berkshire Partners could cause the industry’s other IPO candidates to pause before hitting the public markets. Our colleagues at Tier1 Research maintain a list of the Internet infrastructure industry’s potential IPO candidates. Although speculation surrounds such fast-growing firms as SoftLayer Technologies, Peak 10, Zimory and Next Generation Data, an IPO for these players may be pushed to the back burner, at least for the foreseeable future.

In Network Solutions’ sale, General Atlantic gets a bit of both exits

Contact: Ben Kolada

Web.com is acquiring Web hosting and domain name registration vendor Network Solutions in a deal valued at $756m, including the assumption of debt. And we expect that Network Solutions’ owner couldn’t be more relieved. With flat revenue and customer attrition in recent years, Network Solutions’ private equity owner, General Atlantic (GA), wasn’t likely to find much interest for the portfolio company on Wall Street.

However, GA structured the transaction in such a way that – at least for now – it is enjoying a good day on the stock market. Terms of the deal call for just over a quarter of Network Solutions’ price to be covered by Web.com shares. (That will leave GA and other Network Solutions’ shareholders owning 37% of the combined company.) Web.com initially valued that chunk of equity at about $150m. On Thursday afternoon, the value of the 18 million Web.com shares heading to GA and other owners had soared closer to $200m. The reason? Wall Street liked the acquisition as well as Web.com’s second-quarter financial results. (We’ll have a full report on this transaction in tonight’s Daily 451 and 451 TechDealmaker sendouts.)

Big deals for single PE firms

Contact: Brenon Daly

In 2010, it was The Carlyle Group. So far in 2011, it’s Providence Equity Partners. These two private equity (PE) firms have the two largest non-club tech leveraged buyouts in each of the past two years. Recall that last October – on successive days, no less – Carlyle erased both CommScope and Syniverse Technologies from the public market in a pair of deals that cost the buyout shop $6.5bn. (Understandably, Carlyle has been fairly quiet since then, announcing only a pair of small transactions.)

Now, Providence has its own double-barrel deals that are on top of the standings. Somewhat unusually, both of the firm’s acquisitions came on the first day of a new quarter: On April 1, it announced the planned take-private of SRA International for $1.9bn, and then followed that up Friday with the $1.6bn buyout of Blackboard to start the third quarter.

PE activity since the Great Recession

Period Deal volume Deal value
Q3-Q4, 2009 62 $12.1bn
Q1-Q2, 2010 57 $10.7bn
Q3-Q4, 2010 76 $15.6bn
Q1-Q2, 2011 78 $11.9bn

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Going, going, gone: Go Daddy sells to KKR

After canceling a proposed IPO in 2006 and reportedly being on the block since late last year, The Go Daddy Group is now selling an undisclosed stake to private equity firms KKR, Silver Lake Partners and Technology Crossover Ventures. The deal is believed to be among the largest private equity investments in the Internet infrastructure industry, and continues an emerging trend of buyout shops acquiring mass-market hosters and repositioning them toward higher-end services.

Reportedly worth $2.25bn, the transaction lands squarely in second place among the largest PE investments in this industry. We note that the first-place prize goes to a group led by Silver Lake (and including KKR) in the $11.3bn take private of SunGard Data Systems in 2005. Silver Lake’s interest in the industry is increasing – the Go Daddy deal comes less than a year after the firm took a minority stake in a similar hoster, Brazil-based LocaWeb.

We expect that KKR and the other investors will focus on international expansion as well as investment in cloud services. Silver Lake’s stake in LocaWeb could be particularly useful. The Latin American hosting and colocation markets are seeing increasing interest (heavyweights Savvis and Equinix have each announced plans for the region). We wouldn’t be surprised if LocaWeb and Go Daddy ultimately became partners. Further, we’ve noticed that PE firms tend to refocus their mass-market hosting companies on more specialized, higher-end cloud services. LocaWeb’s cloud services could provide additional expansion opportunities for Go Daddy, which recently began a limited launch of its own cloud product. We’ll have a full report on the Go Daddy deal in tonight’s Daily 451.

The June swoon, cont.

Contact: Brenon Daly

When we looked closer at the dramatic falloff in M&A last month – what we have called the ‘June swoon’ – we saw that the decline not only cut spending by nearly two-thirds, it also slashed the number of richly priced deals. For the 50 largest and most significant transactions of the just-completed second quarter, which we believe have an outsized impact on setting the tone in the overall M&A market, we calculated the median price-to-trailing-sales multiple at 2.25. (Incidentally, that was up slightly from 2.15 in the first quarter.)

For the first two months of Q2, there was a steady flow of significant deals valued at least twice as rich as the ‘market’ multiple of 2.25. Those transactions included Microsoft paying 10 times trailing sales for Skype, LoopNet’s sale to CoStar Group for $860m (9.5x trailing sales), Symantec’s move to bolster its e-discovery offering with its $410m purchase of Clearwell Systems (7x trailing sales), and EMC’s reach for NetWitness, which we estimate valued the network forensic player at almost 6x trailing sales.

But by June, the relatively high-multiple deals were getting harder to find. In fact, last month saw the fewest number of above-median-valuation transactions in the second quarter with just 11 deals, compared to 16 in May and 23 in April. That recent weakness doesn’t particularly bode well for the rest of the year.

Significant transactions* in 2011

Period Median price-to-trailing-sales valuation
Q2 2011 2.25
Q1 2011 2.15

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase *The 50 largest transactions, by equity value, including publicly disclosed financial terms as well as our own official estimates

Bolting onto the PE platform

Contact: Brenon Daly

One of the knock-on effects of private equity (PE) spending hitting its highest level in three years in 2010 has been the emergence of bolt-on deals in 2011. Consider the recent M&A activity at Emailvision, an SMB-focused email marketing vendor. The company had been listed on the Euronext, although, candidly, European investors didn’t really appreciate Emailvision’s SaaS delivery model. So rather than stick around as an unloved public company, the firm sold a nearly 70% stake last summer to PE shop Francisco Partners. The transaction valued the overall company at around $109m.

Fast-forward less than a year since selling a majority stake, and Emailvision has already done one small deal as well as a more recent acquisition that it could have never pulled off without the deep pockets of its PE patron. Earlier this month, Emailvision closed its $40m pickup of smartFOCUS, which had been listed on the London Stock Exchange. The transaction added more than $20m to Emailvision’s revenue, which we understand should hit about $110m this year. (That would be nearly twice the level it was before it went private, with M&A boosting an already healthy 40% organic growth rate.) And the vendor may not be done buying. We gather that Emailvision may well announce another deal before the end of the year.

Flips and flops for PE shops

Contact: Brenon Daly

There are flips that fly, and flips that flop. Consider the two recent exits by private-equity (PE)-owned companies Skype Technologies and Freescale Semiconductor. One deal basically quadrupled the price of the portfolio company, while the other company is still lingering at a value of less than half its original purchase price. Granted, that ‘headline’ calculation misses some of the nuances of the holdings and their returns to the PE shops, but it’s nonetheless a solid reminder that deals need to be done with a focus on the ‘demand’ side of the exit.

For Skype’s PE ownership of Silver Lake Partners, Index Ventures and Andreessen Horowitz, the $8.5bn all-cash sale to Microsoft came less than two years after the consortium carved the VoIP provider out of eBay for just $2bn. The deal stands as the largest ever purchase by Microsoft, and the double-digit price-to-sales valuation suggests Redmond had to reach deep to take Skype off the board. Skype had filed to go public, but was also rumored to have attracted interest from Google as a possible buyer.

On the other hand, there wasn’t much demand for Freescale, which was coming public after undergoing the largest tech LBO in history. Freescale priced its recent IPO some 20% below the bottom end of its expected range. That had to be a painful concession for the PE owners of the company: Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, Permira Funds and Texas Pacific Group. The club paid $17.6bn in mid-2006 for the semiconductor maker, loading up the company with billions in debt just as the market tanked. Freescale, which still carts around about $7.5bn in debt, has lower sales now than when it was taken private four years ago.