Not pretty, but it’s done at Novell

Contact: Brenon Daly

After holding out for more than eight months, Novell finally accepted on Monday a $2.2bn buyout offer from private equity-backed Attachmate. From the outside, it looks like a case where the buyer – or maybe more accurately, the hedge fund that put the company in play – simply wore down Novell. Under terms, Attachmate will hand over $6.10 in cash per share, or roughly $2.2bn, for Novell.

Yet if we step back and look at the offer, we can’t help but notice that the company is now embracing a bid that only values it slightly more than the original offer that put it in play. For the record, Novell’s board said three weeks after receiving the unsolicited bid from gadfly investor Elliott Associates that the offer of $5.75 for each share ‘undervalues’ the company and its prospects.

Apparently, Elliott’s opening bid wasn’t all that lowball because the company is selling for just 6% more than the offer that ‘undervalued’ it. We would also mention that Novell traded above the $6.10 bid several times over the summer, albeit on pure speculation. (JP Morgan Securities advised Novell, while Credit Suisse Securities and RBC Capital Markets worked for Attachmate.) The deal is expected to close in the first quarter of 2011, pending shareholder approval.

To be fair, the fact that Novell’s board got shareholders even a slight bump above the original offer should be viewed as a sell-side accomplishment. After all, Novell is a hoary, mixed-bag of businesses, with each unit attracting specific suitors. All of that made for an undoubtedly complicated process, with multiple permutations on bidders and bidding teams, as we understand it. (Companies we heard that may have taken a serious look at some point at Novell – or at least some of its businesses – include VMware and Oracle, among others.) Indeed, as part of the transaction, Microsoft will be acquiring a sprawling portfolio of 882 patents from Novell for $450m.

And beyond all of the complications around matchmaking is the fundamental fact that Novell just isn’t that attractive, regardless of whatever business we look at inside the company. Each component of its revenue (license, maintenance/subscription, services) has dropped so far this year, which is part of the reason why Novell has come up short of Wall Street expectations every quarter this year. Overall, sales have dropped 6% in 2010, and current projections call for Novell’s revenue to decline next year, too. So as we look at it, the board probably did a fair job to get Novell valued at $1.2bn (net of cash), which works out to basically 1.5 times sales. Novell shareholders will now have their say on the outcome of the more than eight-month process.

Symantec still struggling with storage

Contact: Brenon Daly

Symantec gives its latest quarterly update on business after the closing bell Wednesday, with Wall Street wondering if the company will ever emerge from its ‘Veritas hangover.’ The storage business, which Symantec picked up in its $13.5bn purchase of Veritas in late 2004, has long weighed on Big Yellow’s overall performance. The division posted the sharpest revenue decline at Symantec’s three business units in the previous fiscal year, and was the only one that shrank again in the first fiscal quarter. The storage business will likely shrink again in the just-completed second fiscal quarter.

None of that, of course, is new. In fact, more than two years ago, we noted how Symantec was busy knocking rumors about unwinding any of the underperforming Veritas assets. But ever since rival McAfee sold to Intel, the paltry valuation of Symantec has come into sharp relief. Consider this: Symantec generates three times the sales of McAfee ($6bn vs. $2bn) but garners less than twice McAfee’s valuation (current market cap of $12.5bn vs. McAfee’s $7.7bn equity value in its sale to Intel).

Perhaps that valuation discrepancy alone accounts for the market buzz we’ve heard recently that Symantec may be (once again) considering shedding Veritas. That move has been looked at a number of different times, in a number of different ways, over the years.

Most recently, we heard a variation on it that had the storage business going to EMC in return for the RSA division and some cash. Another rumor had the business landing at a buyout shop. (Although shrinking, the storage business is still Symantec’s largest unit, and runs at the highest margin in the company. It generates more than $1bn in operating income.) Whatever the destination, it may well be time for Symantec to acknowledge that its grand experiment of a combination of storing and securing information hasn’t gone according to plans. Wall Street has certainly given that verdict, having clipped Symantec shares in half since the Veritas deal was announced.

Oracle steps back into M&A market

Contact: Brenon Daly

After taking the summer off from M&A, Oracle on Monday announced the acquisition of authentication management startup Passlogix. The purchase is the first one by the normally acquisitive Oracle since it announced a pair of asset pickups in late May. Sitting out the summer slowed Oracle’s pace from steady deal flow earlier this year as well as other years. The Passlogix buy is Oracle’s eighth deal in 2010.

The first seven purchases, however, came in the first five months of 2010. That was ahead of the M&A pace Oracle held from 2005-2008, when it inked an average of a deal a month in each of the years. Oracle announced just eight acquisitions in recession-wracked 2009, when overall M&A activity was muted.

As we noted in our report on Q3 M&A, Oracle was one of the highly visible companies that didn’t announce a single transaction in the July-September period. Similarly, both Microsoft and Symantec sat out the quarter, too. But their inactivity was more than made up for by fellow tech giants Hewlett-Packard and IBM. That duo went on an M&A safari in the third quarter, with an eye toward bagging big game. In the just-completed July-September period, IBM and HP combined to announce 11 deals with a total bill of more than $7.3bn.

A bit of Big Blue inconsistency

Contact: Brenon Daly

Perhaps Mark Hurd feels vindicated. No, we’re not referring to the former Hewlett-Packard chief executive settling a lawsuit with his old shop. Instead, we’re talking about IBM’s stunning flip-flop with regard to high-profile M&A by itself and rival HP. At the least, Big Blue’s recent comments now appear inconsistent; at the worst, they smack of hypocrisy.

The specifics: A week ago, Big Blue’s CEO was blasting HP for ‘overpaying’ for deals, and for relying on M&A rather than R&D. Ironically, Sam Palmisano made these comments just as his own company was putting the final touches on its acquisition of Netezza, a deal that values the data-warehousing vendor at nearly 7 times this year’s forecasted sales for the current fiscal year. That’s more than twice the median software valuation, and basically matches the valuation that HP is handing over for ArcSight.

Incidentally, both transactions valued the targets, which had only come public within the past three years, at their highest-ever valuations. But if we look at how the shares of ArcSight and Netezza have performed so far this year, it becomes very clear that IBM was the much more aggressive suitor. Excluding the pop ArcSight shares got when word of a deal leaked in late August, the security vendor’s stock had only ticked up about 10%. In contrast, Netezza stock had run 150% from January to the day before Big Blue announced its purchase.

OpenPages: a restart that finished strong

Contact: Brenon Daly

In the startup world, a restart rarely goes anywhere. What typically happens is a company swaps one failing business plan for another, with the inevitable wind-down delayed only by a fresh round of capital. Yet that’s not the case with OpenPages, which secured a solid exit with its sale to IBM after completely overhauling its business.

OpenPages, which sells software for the governance, risk and compliance (GRC) market, has virtually nothing in common with the company that started out in 1996. As its name implies, OpenPages was originally a content management vendor. The firm survived the dot-com bust, but only after trimming its headcount from more than 300 down to 15. In the aftermath, it also switched to Plan B for the business: GRC.

Although the initial draw to the GRC space was Sarbanes-Oxley, OpenPages found success in the broader market. By 2006, Sarbanes-Oxley only accounted for about 15% of revenue at the firm. As it recast its business, OpenPages also recapitalized the business. It raised some $10m in 2004 and added another $10m in 2007. (Back in the Bubble Era, it had raised about $60m from investors.)

The sale to IBM makes a fair amount of sense, both strategically and financially. Big Blue and OpenPages have been partners for at least three years. In addition to OpenPages’ technology fitting well with the BI portfolio IBM acquired with Cognos, there’s also a large chunk of services revenue that Big Blue can pocket around an OpenPages implementation. (OpenPages has some 140 customers.)

And, at least as we understand the deal, the exit valued OpenPages at a healthy 5 times its estimated $35m in sales. (Both the price and the valuation line up almost exactly with the other large GRC deal of the year, EMC’s purchase of Archer Technologies back in January.) In our view, whatever valuation OpenPages got should probably be viewed as a rich one when we consider the fact that the company nearly died penniless earlier in its life.

Is HP overcompensating?

Contact: Brenon Daly

Since when does an army without its top general go on the attack? That strategy would seem to go against convention, yet Hewlett-Packard has done just that since dumping Mark Hurd for his foibles. The tech giant has chased a pair of deals to valuations that are basically 2-3 times the prevailing market multiple. HP’s recent bidding war over 3PAR and the purchase of ArcSight shows a level of aggressiveness that indicates to us that the drivers for the acquisitions may have been emotional as well as financial, at least to a small degree.

If we step back and look at the setting for both deals, we can’t help but conclude that HP announced the transactions at a time when it looked vulnerable. Its star CEO had dramatically crashed back to earth, while its board (yet again) appeared to have bungled what looked like a fairly routine internal investigation. Statements by the company that it was ‘business as usual’ didn’t get much of a hearing on Wall Street. Shares that changed hands in the low $50s in April have been worth less than $40 for much of the past month. HP’s market cap lingers below $100bn, despite the company ringing up sales of about $120bn.

At the risk of drifting too far into psychology, we wonder if the deals weren’t a bit of overcompensation. (Certainly, paying 11x trailing sales for 3PAR might be considered overcompensation, or at the least, ‘heavy compensation,’ if you’ll forgive the pun.) If investors and others were going to view HP as weak or directionless while its corner office was empty, well, HP could use its vast resources to counter with a signal to remind everyone that it was formidable, with or without a fulltime CEO. Of course, we’re just playing armchair psychologist here. But something beyond just straight numbers seemed to be at work in HP’s recent moves.

A second exits gets ArcSight a 2x valuation

Contact: Brenon Daly

Hewlett-Packard’s pending purchase of ArcSight is the third IT security deal so far this year valued at more than $1bn, after not having a single security transaction valued in 10 digits in 2009. While the other two deals have gone off at basically market multiples, ArcSight is being valued at twice that level. The largest ESIM vendor agreed to sell itself to HP for $43.50 per share, valuing the security firm at more than four times the level it went public just two and a half years ago.

HP put the enterprise value of the transaction, which is slated to close by the end of the year, at $1.5bn. That means the tech giant is paying 7.5 times ArcSight’s trailing sales of $200m. (For the current fiscal year, ArcSight is expected to put up about $225m in sales, meaning HP is paying about 6.7x projected sales.) On a trailing basis, both McAfee and VeriSign’s identity and authentication business garnered 3.5x sales in their respective sales to Intel and Symantec. (Morgan Stanley advised both McAfee and ArcSight, while JP Morgan Securities advised VeriSign.)

The high-multiple deal represents a stunningly successful outcome for ArcSight. As we have mentioned in the past, both HP and McAfee approached ArcSight in the summer of 2007, ahead of the company’s IPO. We gather that both were bidders in the range of $600-750m. Unlike other dual-track candidates, ArcSight didn’t opt for the trade sale, but went ahead with its offering even as the equity market turned bearish. ArcSight spent virtually its entire first year as a public company trading in the single digits, including a fair amount of time below its offer price. (At one point when its shares were underwater, CA Technologies lobbed a low-ball bid at the firm, we understand.) If we had to guess at another suitor in the current process around ArcSight, we might tap EMC as an interested party.

Even as its stock took off over the past two years, ArcSight never did a secondary offering. (For a company with about $200m in sales, it has a very narrow base of shares, totaling only about 38 million.) In this case, the unwillingness to sell shares – either a small chunk or all of them – except at an eye-popping valuation has generated a return that seems reminiscent of the late 1990s. ArcSight raised only about $30m to build a business that got valued at 55 times that level on the exit.

A deal in sight for ArchSight?

Contact: Brenon Daly

If nothing else, the long Labor Day weekend gave us all a chance to catch our breath following a week of some of the most frenetic dealmaking we’ve seen in some time. We had bidding wars, doubleheader deals and even a billion-dollar chip transaction. But in some ways, the loudest buzz in the tech M&A market came from a deal that didn’t happen: ArcSight still stands on its own.

The ESIM vendor was supposedly in play, at least according to a thinly sourced and almost woefully vague recent article in The Wall Street Journal. Not to pick apart the piece, but listing a half-dozen of the largest tech companies as ‘potential bidders’ misses a great deal of context. For instance, we noted two and a half years ago that Hewlett-Packard was rumored to have offered about $600m for ArcSight the summer before it went public. ArcSight is now worth twice HP’s rumored bid, and roughly four times the amount the market valued it at when it came onto the Nasdaq in February 2008, just before the IPO window pretty much slammed shut. (For the record, Morgan Stanley led the ArcSight offering.)

That stellar aftermarket performance raises another interesting point about ArcSight: despite the fact that its shares have quadrupled during a time when the Nasdaq has essentially flat-lined, the company has never done a secondary offering. It has just 37 million shares outstanding. That strikes us a narrow base for a firm with $200m in sales and a market valuation of more than $1bn. But maybe the company figures it shouldn’t bother selling shares at current market prices if it stands to get a substantial takeout premium on top of that. For our part, we wouldn’t at all be surprised to see ArcSight get a second exit.

A bidding war (of sorts) between the virtualization vendors

Contact: Brenon Daly

The tech industry has another bidding war. No, we’re not talking about the parrying over 3PAR or even the private equity shops slugging it out over Phoenix Technologies, a company that had largely been consigned to the corporate ash heap. Instead, we’re talking about the latest M&A moves by the virtuosos of virtualization, Citrix Systems and VMware.

Citrix opened the bidding with one deal earlier this week, putting its chips on virtualization management startup VMLogix. One day later, VMware matched the bid of one acquisition and then raised it another one. In a rare twin billing, VMware said it would be taking home both performance analytics startup Integrien as well as identity and access management vendor TriCipher. VMware’s two deals in a single day (do we call the amalgamated company ‘Trintegrien’?) brings its total number of acquisitions so far this year to five, after just one in all of last year. For its part, Citrix had been out of the market entirely since November 2008 before announcing the VMLogix purchase.

Of the three deals, the one that caught our eye was VMware’s pickup of Integrien. That might have been due to the astronomical multiple the startup garnered. We understand that the company, which was only running at about $2m in revenue, went for about $100m. Of course, looking at this transaction on a revenue multiple largely misses the point. Instead, as my colleague Dennis Callaghan notes in his report on the deal, the move makes VMware a legitimate contender in the IT performance management market and could hurt opportunities for other IT performance management vendors looking to sell into the vast VMware installed base.

The acquisition came just one day after Integrien released a special version of its flagship predictive root cause analysis software for VMware environments, so the two sides clearly knew each other. In fact, we gather that the two sides knew each other so well they negotiated directly, without an outside adviser. The VMware team was led on the Integrien deal by Alex Wang. Meanwhile, on the day’s other transaction, America’s Growth Capital advised TriCipher, while Jason Hurst, who recently joined VMware after a long stint as a software banker at Citigroup, led the buyside effort.

Why wouldn’t HP jump the McAfee bid instead?

Contact: Brenon Daly

If we had to guess about Hewlett-Packard making an uncharacteristic move and jumping an announced transaction, we would have thought the company would go after McAfee rather than 3PAR. After all, HP has a giant hole in its security portfolio (we might describe it as a ‘McAfee-sized’ hole), while it’s already pretty well covered on the storage side, even if much of its offering is a bit long in the tooth.

Yet that isn’t the way it’s playing out. The recently decapitated company offered $1.7bn earlier this week for 3PAR, adding roughly $410m, or 33%, to the proposed price of the high-end storage vendor. Meanwhile, McAfee’s planned $7.8bn sale to Intel, announced last week, continues to track to a close before the end of the year. (We would note that McAfee is being valued at 3.4 times trailing sales, exactly half the level of 3PAR following HP’s bumped bid, which took the valuation to 7.6x trailing sales.)

HP’s topping bid for 3PAR appears to be a fairly defensive move. For starters, there’s the matter that 3PAR would overlap more than a little bit with its existing core storage offering called StorageWorks Enterprise Virtual Array. Betting on an acquired property to replace – or at the very least, refresh – the heart of a company’s current offering is a risky proposal. On top of that, 3PAR would require a new architecture, rather than just running on top of HP’s existing hardware like its other software-based storage acquisitions (PolyServe, IBRIX and Lefthand Networks).

All in all, looking to derail Dell’s offer for 3PAR appears to be at odds with much of HP’s previous strategy and rationale around storage. And while it pursues that deal (cost what it may), HP passes on McAfee, a one-of-a-kind security asset that would instantly make it much more competitive with IBM, EMC and Cisco Systems. If HP has sincere aspirations about outfitting the next generation of datacenters, we might suggest that it needs to actually own its intellectual property (IP) for security.

So far, however, HP has been content with just OEM arrangements to cover itself for security. (Notably, it has extracted a fairly one-sided agreement with Symantec for consumer anti-malware protection.) And even though buying McAfee would mean an unraveling of a number of those arrangements, we would note that reality isn’t preventing HP from making its bid for 3PAR. Remember that HP currently has an OEM arrangement with Hitachi Data Systems for a high-end offering like 3PAR. Yet it’s prepared to pay – and pay a lot of money – to own the IP itself. Couldn’t the same rationale be used for McAfee?