A short-lived bid for Chordiant

Contact: Brenon Daly

In many ways, CDC Software’s unsolicited bid for Chordiant Software was over before it even began. As it was, the end became official late Thursday, as CDC Software pulled its $105m cash-and-stock offer for the money-losing CRM vendor just a week after floating it. It was clear that the hastily assembled ‘proactive offer’ (as CDC Software referred to it) was never going to get very far with Chordiant. Shares of the company spent virtually all summer above CDC Software’s bid of $3.46, which reflected a scant 14% premium over the closing of Chordiant shares in the previous session.

Chordiant, advised by Morgan Stanley, brushed aside CDC Software’s proposal with the ever-popular dismissal that the bid ‘significantly undervalues’ the company. (CDC Software didn’t retain an adviser, we understand.) Chordiant’s rebuff, combined with the poison pill it has in place, effectively killed the deal. CDC Software pretty much acknowledged that earlier this week when it announced that it intended to unwind its tiny 1.3% stake in Chordiant, which totaled just less than 400,000 shares. Incidentally, speaking of shares, although Chordiant stock dipped a bit when CDC Software pulled its offer, it was still closed above the bid price on Friday.

Kana: bidding while the cash burns

Contact: Brenon Daly

The progression from spurned bidder to shareholder activist isn’t all that unusual. But it is unusual when the party smarting is a publicly traded company, and decides to express its agitation through press releases. Yet, that’s exactly how Chordiant Software is venting its frustration over not landing Kana Software, with Chordiant telling the world earlier this week that it plans to vote its shares (amounting to 4% of the total equity outstanding) against the proposed sale of Kana’s operating business to midmarket buyout firm Accel-KKR. Chordiant followed that up on Thursday evening with a new cash-and-stock offer that values Kana higher than the buyout bid.

All of this comes just days before shareholders are slated to vote on Accel-KKR’s offer (the vote is scheduled for Wednesday). Kana’s board continues to recommend that shareholders back the planned transaction, which would effectively carve the business out of Kana and leave only a shell company in its place. We have noted that it’s an imperfect structure, but one that probably serves the fundamentally flawed firm reasonably well. Of course, some shareholders (including Chordiant) don’t agree, and should vote however they want. We would only note that while the two sides argue, Kana continues to burn cash. At the end of its most-recent quarter (ending September 30), the company was down to just $1.8m (it started the year with $7m). While the cash burn is nothing new for Kana, which has lost $4.3bn since its inception, it could become pressing: Kana noted in its proxy that it has a $5.4m debt payment coming due in 2010.

An Old Economy version of Microsoft-Yahoo?

Contact: Brenon Daly

Where have we heard this before? A diversified, dividend-paying company makes an unsolicited approach to a target that’s only just into a restructuring program, with a goal of bolstering a business where it’s currently an also-ran. Add to that, the would-be acquirer isn’t particularly known for its brass-knuckle M&A tactics, while the would-be acquiree is busy dealing with an activist shareholder. No, Microsoft isn’t reheating its offer for Yahoo from early 2008. Instead, it looks to us like Kraft Foods has borrowed that play in its reach for candy company Cadbury.

Actually, the Old Economy rendition of Microsoft-Yahoo appears to be simply a cheaper version. For starters, there’s deal size. Microsoft’s bid of some $45bn for Yahoo is nearly three times the amount that Kraft has initially put forward for Cadbury. (We say ‘initially’ because Cadbury is trading above Kraft’s current cash-and-stock offer.)

Also, Microsoft offered a substantially richer premium for Yahoo than Kraft has indicated for Cadbury, roughly twice the level. And, Microsoft’s bid valued Yahoo at roughly 32 times trailing EBITDA, about twice the multiple that Kraft is planning to hand over for its reluctant partner. Of course, none of the largess flowing from Microsoft was enough to sway Yahoo’s board or executives, much to the dismay of shareholders in the search company. Yahoo shares currently change hands at less than half the amount Microsoft offered for them some 18 months ago.

Sourcefire: No sale turns into a great deal

Contact: Brenon Daly

With Barracuda Networks looking to gobble up Austrian IT security vendor phion, we thought we’d look back on the other time the rapacious privately held firm eyed a public company. Last summer, Barracuda launched an unsolicited bid for Sourcefire, initially offering $7.50 per share but later raising that to $8.25. The bumped-up bid valued Sourcefire at roughly $215m, but that wasn’t enough for Sourcefire’s board of directors.

We’ve noted in the past that the decision by a company to go it alone can prove very costly to shareholders, at least in the near term. Removing the takeout premium and letting a company trade on its own fundamentals can end up crushing a stock. Recovering that lost ground can be a long and painful process. (Just ask shareholders of Yahoo and Mentor Graphics, who see shares in those companies changing hands these days at just half the level that suitors were willing to pay for them last year.)

However, it’s a completely different story for Sourcefire. It has actually turned out to be one of those rare cases where a target says a bid ‘undervalues’ the business and Wall Street agrees. After telling Barracuda to buzz off, Sourcefire shares got dragged down by the recession and traded below the bid until early April. But since then, the stock has surged to its highest level since the vendor went public in March 2007. Sourcefire shares are currently trading at about $20, or nearly 150% higher than the price Barracuda was willing to pay for them. Looked at another way, Sourcefire’s decision to stay independent has created more than $300m of additional value for its shareholders than the Barracuda bid would have delivered.

MathStar saga gets ‘curiouser and curiouser’

-Contact Brenon Daly

As the tender offer for MathStar runs into its final hours ahead of this evening’s expiration, there’s a new twist in the already-twisted saga around this Pink Sheets-listed company. First, a bit of a recap. In early June, hedge fund Tiberius Capital tossed out an unsolicited bid of $1.15 for each share of MathStar, which has been exploring ‘strategic alternatives’ for more than a year. MathStar’s board rejected the initial overture, as it did when Tiberius sweetened the offer earlier this month to $1.25 per share, for a total of $11.5m. When it bumped the bid, Tiberius also said the tender offer expires late tonight. (Of course, it could extend the deadline, as often happens in these cases.)

At this point, however, the deal gets ‘curiouser and curiouser’ (as Alice said when she found herself in Wonderland). We noted late last week that rather than be a seller, MathStar is now planning to be a buyer. The erstwhile fabless semiconductor firm announced that it plans to acquire language-translation vendor Sajan. As expected, the news didn’t go over well with Tiberius, which is also MathStar’s largest shareholder. But the planned purchase also didn’t sit well with the company’s founder and longtime chief executive, Douglas Pihl, who quit in protest.

Given such a vote of no confidence, we looked more closely into MathStar’s proposed buy of Sajan. Although investment bank Craig-Hallum Capital Group is listed as the adviser for MathStar on the deal, we discovered that the transaction actually flows through a different Minneapolis-based investment bank, Feltl and Company.

Not disclosed anywhere publicly is the fact that Feltl has actually worked on deals for both sides of the proposed acquisition, serving as manager for two MathStar offerings over the past three years, and having done placements for the firm before that. Feltl also advised on a placement for Sajan in January 2007. We’re not suggesting anything nefarious about the proposed MathStar-Sajan transaction. But we sought to clarify how it came to be that a vendor with a decade of business in the semiconductor industry came up with the idea – along with Feltl as well as its lawyers and bankers – to use half of its cash holdings to buy its way into a completely different field. No one returned calls.

MathStar’s moves just don’t add up

Contact: Brenon Daly

After about a decade in business as a fables semiconductor vendor, MathStar hasn’t been doing much of anything for the past year. We mean that literally. The Pink Sheets-listed company has no ongoing business, no products and, as of Wednesday, no chief executive. However, MathStar nonetheless finds itself the target of several buyout offers. And now, in a fittingly bizarre development, the unwilling seller has turned into a would-be buyer. In a rather curious move, MathStar announced a nonbinding offer Wednesday for a language-translation company called Sajan. (Minneapolis-based investment bank Craig-Hallum Capital Group is advising MathStar on the proposed transaction.)

Even in the murky world of Pink Sheets-listed firms, MathStar’s move stands out as opaque. CEO Douglas Pihl, who also founded the vendor, apparently thought as much. As MathStar announced its play for Sajan, Pihl blasted the proposed acquisition – and then backed that up by resigning his position. Pihl noted in his resignation letter that the planned deal would result in about 50% dilution of existing MathStar shareholders.

The proposed purchase of Sajan also didn’t sit too well with the firm’s largest shareholder, Tiberius Capital, which has been trying to buy MathStar outright for the past month. The Chicago-based fund is currently offering $1.25 for each share of MathStar, or about $11.5m in total. MathStar’s board has repeatedly rejected the bids from Tiberius, just as it shot down the overtures from privately held PureChoice late last year. MathStar announced in May that it would explore strategic alternatives.

Tiberius claims MathStar disclosed the Sajan purchase to create a ‘cloud of hope’ that it could smartly obtain an operating business that would create more value than the proposed sale to Tiberius. (On the other hand, a more cynical assessment of MathStar’s planned transaction would call it a ‘scorched earth’ defense, since the deal would burn up half of the company’s cash.) Whatever the case, the clock is ticking on Tiberius’ bid, which is essentially the only thing that is propping up the penny stock. Tiberius says its tender offer for MathStar expires next Monday.

Is Kana buying time before it gets bought?

by Brenon Daly, China Martens

The showdown that has been brewing around Kana Software for months was supposed to come to a head today. Hedge fund KVO Capital Management had been planning to put forward a director for election at the company’s annual meeting, which was originally scheduled for July 15. Instead, Kana pushed the meeting back. Not by a week or two, or even a month, but until December 1. KVO is the largest shareholder in Kana, with some 3.4 million shares, or 8% of the company.

Although Kana has postponed its annual meeting, we can’t help but wonder if the customer service software vendor is merely buying time until it can get bought. That’s certainly what some shareholders have speculated about the company, which trades at just 0.5x revenue. (And we’ve been saying that for nearly three years.) On its own, there’s little to be bullish about at Kana, a money-burning shop that has been relegated to the Bulletin Board since December 2006. But it does have at least one valuable piece to its business: a deep, long-term relationship with IBM. We suspect Big Blue would be the first call Kana would make if it continues to get pushed for a sale.

Of course, IBM has repeatedly said that it doesn’t want to be an application software vendor. (Saying and doing are two different things, however. Several of its largest acquisitions were for straight application vendors, such as Cognos and FileNet.) In any case, the two firms have had an OEM arrangement for the past seven years, and we understand from a source inside Kana that IBM-related sales have exceeded their quota in recent years. Kana has also baked a fair amount of Big Blue software (notably DB2) into its offerings. So integrating the technology wouldn’t be a challenge in this hypothetical pairing. And financially, IBM has plenty of resources to share with Kana, which would be a nice change of pace for the struggling microcap company. Kana has largely lived off equity and debt offerings over the past 12 years, having run up an astounding $4.3bn in accumulated deficit since its founding.

Tech buyers shop locally

-by Yulitza Peraza, Brenon Daly

Although the Delaware Court of Chancery was slated to rule this week on Emulex’s poison pill, the court punted on the decision. In postponing the ruling on the poison pill, which has been a key part of Emulex’s defense against the unwanted advances of Broadcom, the judge indicated that the two sides may well be able to work out a deal over the next week. Broadcom, which took its bid public on April 21, recently extended the deadline of its tender offer until July 14. The extension came as Broadcom also raised its bid to $11 per share for Emulex, up from $9.25. That added about $150m to the price of Emulex, which is currently valued at some $912m. As we noted earlier, Broadcom’s initial offer essentially valued Emulex where it was trading last October.

Unsolicited offers for tech companies, while increasing, are still relatively rare. However, in one regard, Broadcom’s bid for Emulex is rather typical. Scouring our data, we noticed a significant trend among California tech vendors: they tend to shop locally. That’s certainly true for these two southern California firms, which are only about 10 miles from one another. In the last seven years, about half of total tech M&A spending by California-based buyers went toward acquiring other Golden State tech companies. We would add that the ‘shop local’ trend isn’t limited to California, which stands as the most-developed tech region in the world. It’s also true on the other side of the country, where tech vendors based on the East Coast have spent more on acquiring neighboring tech firms than they have on companies from anywhere else.

There are a number of reasons for this trend, both formal and informal. For starters, the two sides are more likely to have a number of connections, sharing financial backers or board members, for instance. Additionally, executives at the companies may belong to the same local tech organizations or business groups. (Or, more informally, they may frequent the same restaurants or belong to the same clubs.) In some ways, our finding flies in the face of the oft-repeated notion that the world is flat, with business flowing around the globe without regard to borders or geography. That may well be true in some aspects. But when it comes to M&A, business is still largely done locally.

Geographic tech M&A, 2002-2009

Acquirer state/region Target Number of deals Percentage of total deals Total value Percentage of total value
California All 2,389 100% $247bn 100%
California California 879 37% $126bn 51%
East Coast All 2,391 100% $282bn 100%
East Coast East Coast 758 32% $83bn 30%

A ‘feature rich’ bidding war for Data Domain

Contact: Brenon Daly

A multibillion-dollar bidding war over a technological feature? As crazy as it sounds, that’s one way to look at the contested effort to acquire Data Domain. (Obviously, the company offers much more than the data de-duplication technology that it’s known for. But some rivals – and even one of its current suitors – have nonetheless dismissed Data Domain as a ‘feature’ in the past.) EMC on Monday topped NetApp’s two-week-old agreement to pick up Data Domain.

Even though EMC raised the bid on Data Domain to $30 in cash for each share, the market is clearly expecting more. In mid-afternoon trading Tuesday, Data Domain shares were changing hands at $31.27 – roughly 4% above EMC’s offer. NetApp, which originally offered $25 in cash and stock for each share of Data Domain, hasn’t yet responded to EMC’s move. (As an aside, the bid-and-raise for Data Domain came just hours after we noted bidding wars for two other public companies.)

EMC entering the fray for Data Domain isn’t surprising. According to its offer to purchase the company filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, EMC planned to discuss an acquisition with Data Domain in early May, but the target cancelled the meeting. Only a few days later, NetApp, which is being banked by Goldman Sachs, announced its bid for Data Domain, advised by Qatalyst Partners. At this point, EMC hasn’t formally retained a banker to advise it on landing Data Domain (much to the dismay of fee-hungry bankers everywhere). Incidentally, speaking of Qatalyst, the boutique officially announced that it has hired former Goldman Sachs software banker Ian Macleod, which we heard about more than two months ago.

Auction action

Contact: Brenon Daly

With one bidding war over a Nasdaq-traded company wrapped up last week, two new skirmishes broke out on Monday. Both Borland and MathStar received conditional offers of higher prices than had previously been floated for the companies. The bid-and-raise process at both these otherwise-neglected companies indicates the M&A market has recovered notably from its low point earlier this year.

In the larger of the two transactions, Borland said in a proxy filed in support of its existing agreement to sell to Micro Focus that it has received a nonbinding ‘expression of interest’ from an unnamed buyout shop. The offer – which is conditional on the firm completing due diligence on the application lifecycle management software vendor – has the firm paying $1.20 for each share of Borland. That tops Micro Focus’ offer in early May of $1 for each share of Borland.

Micro Focus’ bid, which has been blessed by the boards of both companies, came after it first showed interest in picking up Borland in July 2007, according to the proxy. Meanwhile, the proxy indicated that the unnamed financial acquirer only contacted Borland on May 21 of this year. The buyout firm added that due diligence would take about two weeks, and that its offer was not conditional on financing. Borland said in the proxy that it has opened its books to the unnamed suitor.

Meanwhile, after being in play for more than a half a year, MathStar attracted the interest of Tiberius Capital, a Chicago-based fund that offered to buy half of the company at $1.15 per share. That tops an existing offer of $1.04 for each MathStar share from another company. We would note both of these deals come after a seven-week bidding war over SumTotal Systems, which saw the final price soar 50% above the opening bid.