Category: VC

Any deals to be done in open source content management market?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly, Kathleen Reidy

Following a massive wave of consolidation that swept through the enterprise content management (ECM) market, the list of significant vendors has basically narrowed to a handful of tech giants. Essentially, it’s just one stand-alone ECM provider with other software companies offering ECM as part of their broader portfolio. All of them have done deals to expand their ECM business, with the collective bill for acquisitions across the sector topping more than $12bn since 2002.

However, all of that activity has been done by – and for – proprietary software firms. In a recent report, my colleague Kathleen Reidy analyzes how M&A might play out for open source content management startups. Granted, the market is still young, with many of the startups still bootstrapped. (Reidy looks at a dozen potential open source content management targets, including their funding and their focus.)

So which startup might be the first to go? We speculate that Alfresco Software could eventually find itself inside a larger company. However, it probably won’t be the company we initially thought it would be. Adobe and Alfresco have a tight relationship, with Adobe embedding an Alfresco repository in its LiveCycle for content services like workflow, indexing and version control. But with Adobe reaching across the Atlantic for Day Software, it probably has all the Web content management technology it needs.

OpenPages: a restart that finished strong

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

In the startup world, a restart rarely goes anywhere. What typically happens is a company swaps one failing business plan for another, with the inevitable wind-down delayed only by a fresh round of capital. Yet that’s not the case with OpenPages, which secured a solid exit with its sale to IBM after completely overhauling its business.

OpenPages, which sells software for the governance, risk and compliance (GRC) market, has virtually nothing in common with the company that started out in 1996. As its name implies, OpenPages was originally a content management vendor. The firm survived the dot-com bust, but only after trimming its headcount from more than 300 down to 15. In the aftermath, it also switched to Plan B for the business: GRC.

Although the initial draw to the GRC space was Sarbanes-Oxley, OpenPages found success in the broader market. By 2006, Sarbanes-Oxley only accounted for about 15% of revenue at the firm. As it recast its business, OpenPages also recapitalized the business. It raised some $10m in 2004 and added another $10m in 2007. (Back in the Bubble Era, it had raised about $60m from investors.)

The sale to IBM makes a fair amount of sense, both strategically and financially. Big Blue and OpenPages have been partners for at least three years. In addition to OpenPages’ technology fitting well with the BI portfolio IBM acquired with Cognos, there’s also a large chunk of services revenue that Big Blue can pocket around an OpenPages implementation. (OpenPages has some 140 customers.)

And, at least as we understand the deal, the exit valued OpenPages at a healthy 5 times its estimated $35m in sales. (Both the price and the valuation line up almost exactly with the other large GRC deal of the year, EMC’s purchase of Archer Technologies back in January.) In our view, whatever valuation OpenPages got should probably be viewed as a rich one when we consider the fact that the company nearly died penniless earlier in its life.

A second exits gets ArcSight a 2x valuation

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Hewlett-Packard’s pending purchase of ArcSight is the third IT security deal so far this year valued at more than $1bn, after not having a single security transaction valued in 10 digits in 2009. While the other two deals have gone off at basically market multiples, ArcSight is being valued at twice that level. The largest ESIM vendor agreed to sell itself to HP for $43.50 per share, valuing the security firm at more than four times the level it went public just two and a half years ago.

HP put the enterprise value of the transaction, which is slated to close by the end of the year, at $1.5bn. That means the tech giant is paying 7.5 times ArcSight’s trailing sales of $200m. (For the current fiscal year, ArcSight is expected to put up about $225m in sales, meaning HP is paying about 6.7x projected sales.) On a trailing basis, both McAfee and VeriSign’s identity and authentication business garnered 3.5x sales in their respective sales to Intel and Symantec. (Morgan Stanley advised both McAfee and ArcSight, while JP Morgan Securities advised VeriSign.)

The high-multiple deal represents a stunningly successful outcome for ArcSight. As we have mentioned in the past, both HP and McAfee approached ArcSight in the summer of 2007, ahead of the company’s IPO. We gather that both were bidders in the range of $600-750m. Unlike other dual-track candidates, ArcSight didn’t opt for the trade sale, but went ahead with its offering even as the equity market turned bearish. ArcSight spent virtually its entire first year as a public company trading in the single digits, including a fair amount of time below its offer price. (At one point when its shares were underwater, CA Technologies lobbed a low-ball bid at the firm, we understand.) If we had to guess at another suitor in the current process around ArcSight, we might tap EMC as an interested party.

Even as its stock took off over the past two years, ArcSight never did a secondary offering. (For a company with about $200m in sales, it has a very narrow base of shares, totaling only about 38 million.) In this case, the unwillingness to sell shares – either a small chunk or all of them – except at an eye-popping valuation has generated a return that seems reminiscent of the late 1990s. ArcSight raised only about $30m to build a business that got valued at 55 times that level on the exit.

A deal in sight for ArchSight?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

If nothing else, the long Labor Day weekend gave us all a chance to catch our breath following a week of some of the most frenetic dealmaking we’ve seen in some time. We had bidding wars, doubleheader deals and even a billion-dollar chip transaction. But in some ways, the loudest buzz in the tech M&A market came from a deal that didn’t happen: ArcSight still stands on its own.

The ESIM vendor was supposedly in play, at least according to a thinly sourced and almost woefully vague recent article in The Wall Street Journal. Not to pick apart the piece, but listing a half-dozen of the largest tech companies as ‘potential bidders’ misses a great deal of context. For instance, we noted two and a half years ago that Hewlett-Packard was rumored to have offered about $600m for ArcSight the summer before it went public. ArcSight is now worth twice HP’s rumored bid, and roughly four times the amount the market valued it at when it came onto the Nasdaq in February 2008, just before the IPO window pretty much slammed shut. (For the record, Morgan Stanley led the ArcSight offering.)

That stellar aftermarket performance raises another interesting point about ArcSight: despite the fact that its shares have quadrupled during a time when the Nasdaq has essentially flat-lined, the company has never done a secondary offering. It has just 37 million shares outstanding. That strikes us a narrow base for a firm with $200m in sales and a market valuation of more than $1bn. But maybe the company figures it shouldn’t bother selling shares at current market prices if it stands to get a substantial takeout premium on top of that. For our part, we wouldn’t at all be surprised to see ArcSight get a second exit.

Arms race M&A in application security

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

If IBM and Hewlett-Packard basically matched each other’s deal size in the first round of M&A for application security, HP has gone much bigger than Big Blue in the second round. In fact, we gather that the price tag for HP’s recent purchase of Fortify Software is more than 10 times larger than the amount IBM paid last summer for rival static code analysis vendor Ounce Labs. (When IBM announced the deal, we speculated that HP may well work out its own tit-for-tat deal, reaching for its partner Fortify.)

Terms weren’t revealed on either the Fortify or Ounce Lab transactions. However, we gather that IBM picked up Ounce Labs for about $25m and that HP likely paid about $275m (including an earnout) for Fortify. Our understanding is that Ounce Labs garnered roughly 3 times trailing sales, while Fortify went for about 4.6x trailing sales of about $60m.

Those deals, which were separated by roughly a year, came after both tech giants had made acquisitions of dynamic code analysis vendors within two weeks of one another. Back in mid-2007, IBM purchased Watchfire for an estimated $140m, roughly matching HP’s $135m acquisition of SPI Dynamics. Both transactions were done at more than 5x trailing sales, according to our understanding. For those keeping track of the arms race M&A by these two tech superpowers, the collective bill for their application security purchases now exceeds a half-billion dollars.

Select application security acquisitions

Date announced Acquirer Target Deal value Target trailing revenue
August 17, 2010 HP Fortify Software $275m* $60m*
July 28, 2009 IBM Ounce labs $25m* $8m*
June 19, 2007 HP SPI Dynamics $135m* $20m*
June 6, 2007 IBM Watchfire $140m* $30m*

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase *451 Group estimate

A bummer of a summer

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Since we’re right at the midpoint of the third quarter, we thought we’d check up on recent deal flow. (For all of the pre-decimalization Wall Street traders out there, this means that 2010 is now five-eighths in the book.) When we ran the M&A numbers for Q3 so far, we found that it’s been a bummer of a summer for dealmakers: The number of transactions from July 1 to August 15 hit a six-year low.

For the six-week summer period so far this year, the number of deals totaled just 373 transactions, only a slight 3% decline from the recent low (386 deals during the same period in 2008) but a whopping 30% drop from the recent high (530 deals during the same period in 2006). Further, the scant spending in the period so far puts the full third quarter on track to hit just the low end of the range we’ve seen since the Credit Crisis erupted. And that’s coming after a post-recession M&A spending record notched in the second quarter. (See our full Q2 report.)

There are a number of reasons for the light activity. The stock market has been weak lately, with the recent slide leaving the Nasdaq underwater for the year. So far in August, the Nasdaq has registered seven down days compared to three days when it closed in positive territory. During that same period, the uncertainty in the market – as represented by the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Volatility Index – has moved from the low-20s to the mid-20s. Risk and uncertainty tend to work against M&A, either by prolonging negotiations or killing deals altogether.

Mid-Q3 M&A totals

Period Deal volume Deal value
July 1-Aug. 15, 2010 373 $16.2bn
July 1-Aug. 15, 2009 403 $11.9bn
July 1-Aug. 15, 2008 386 $18bn
July 1-Aug. 15, 2007 427 $35.2bn
July 1-Aug. 15, 2006 530 $55.5bn
July 1-Aug. 15, 2005 383 $37.9bn
July 1-Aug. 15, 2004 244 $10bn

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Strategic ardor for Arbor

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

In yet another sign that private equity (PE) still hasn’t recovered to the level that the buyout barons enjoyed in the halcyon days before the Credit Crisis, consider the process around Arbor Networks. The network security and monitoring vendor had many of the characteristics that would typically appeal to a PE shop: a mature company that was running at about $100m, with EBITDA margins approaching the mid-teens, according to our understanding. Along with the decent cash generation, 10-year-old Arbor was also growing, targeting about 20% expansion for 2011.

Even though some half-dozen PE firms looked at Arbor, the company ended up going to a strategic acquirer, Tektronix. (See our full report on the deal, which wasn’t the most intuitive pairing we could have come up with for Arbor. That said, as my colleague Andrew Hay notes in the report, the acquisition of Arbor gives Tektronix a way to couple its network diagnostics and management of fixed, mobile, IP and converged multiservice networks with security and threat mitigation products.)

So while the portfolio expansion certainly makes sense for Tektronix, there’s also the interesting side note that, in this case, a strategic buyer is outbidding would-be financial acquirers. Further, that’s largely without relying on so-called ‘synergies,’ or cost savings from cutting duplicative operations at the acquired company to effectively lower the valuation for a corporation. (The reason: Tektronix is basically absorbing all of Arbor, running it as a stand-alone business.) That sort of corporate dealmaking is a far cry from three years ago, when the low cost of capital sometimes allowed PE firms to outbid companies, even when a not-insignificant amount of synergies figured into the deal.

Private equity activity

Period Deal volume Deal value
Jan. 1-Aug. 10, 2010 170 $18.4bn
Jan. 1-Aug. 10, 2009 170 $3.8bn
Jan. 1-Aug. 10, 2008 158 $18.3bn
Jan. 1-Aug. 10, 2007 209 $109.7bn
Jan. 1-Aug. 10, 2006 189 $53bn

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

In the dark on Big Blue’s buys

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

At the risk of stepping into a Kantian dialectic on ‘materiality,’ we can’t help but comment on the fact that when IBM does a deal – even a semi-large deal – mum’s the word. So far this year, Big Blue has picked up two companies that were large enough to consider going public at some point, with each acquisition costing the company around $400m in cash (according to our estimates). Yet in both the purchase of Initiate Systems and BigFix, IBM declined to disclose the price.

Viewed from the Big Blue side, it’s understandable that a startup like Initiate or BigFix, both of which were generating less than $100m in sales, is hardly a significant addition to a tech giant that’s going to post about $100bn in sales this year. Further, even though $400m sounds like a lot of money to most of us, we have to remember that IBM generates that much in cash roughly every two weeks. So, the thinking goes, Big Blue is well within its rights to not disclose ‘immaterial’ transactions. (That’s a view shared by Apple, for instance, which we have taken to task in the past for being run more like a private fiefdom than a public company.)

However, as is often the case in arguments based on relativism, there’s a distinct lack of accountability in it. After all, IBM is spending other people’s money. Shareholders own the company and, at least theoretically, the executives and management at the company – including all those who had a hand in the deals – work for shareholders.

Not to get overly sanctimonious about it, but in deals like Initiate and BigFix, IBM’s true owners are in the dark about how their employees are spending their money. And we’re not talking about dipping into the petty cash jar, but emptying hundreds of millions of dollars from the corporate treasury. That seems to us to be a fairly significant event.

The Motricity monstrosity

Brenon Daly1 Comment

Contact: Brenon Daly

Pulled prospectuses, cut terms and broken issues – it’s a singularly poor time for any company to go public. We’ve already chronicled the dispiriting ‘new normal’ for IPOs, with smaller offerings and lower valuations. But just when it seemed that the IPO market couldn’t sink any further, along came Motricity’s offering.

The debut last Friday from the mobile data platform provider had to be trimmed, both in the number of shares and the price. Originally, Motricity planned to sell 6.75 million shares at $14-$16 each. At the midpoint of the range, that would have netted the unprofitable company, which has rung up a total deficit of some $313m, about $100m.

Instead, Motricity managed to raise just half that amount. It ended up selling just five million shares at $10 each, raising just $50m. Since then, the newly public shares been underwater, having only changed hands in the single digits. How bad is that? Consider this: Motricity’s valuation as a public company ($350m) is less than the amount of money that it raised as a private company.

IBM analyses Coremetrics, makes a deal

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

We were close on our earlier rumor-mongering on Coremetrics, but tapped the wrong buyer. Four months ago, we heard that the Web analytics firms was in play and had retained Goldman Sachs to represent it. (And, indeed, Goldman did advise Coremetrics in the process.) On June 15, IBM said it was picking up Coremetrics for an undisclosed amount. Originally, we thought salesforce.com made the most sense as the buyer for Coremetrics.

It’s not hard to imagine that IBM’s desire for Coremetrics increased significantly after its two most-recent acquisitions, Sterling Commerce and Cast Iron Systems. For instance, Coremetrics would give much more insight into the activities on the business-to-business network that Big Blue picked up three weeks ago when it paid $1.4bn for Sterling Commerce. Coremetrics has some 2,100 customers.

Even with this deal done, we still think Coremetrics would have been a natural fit for salesforce.com, and would have given a significant boost to the company’s effort to diversify from its legacy sales force automation (SFA) business. Sales of that product still account for two-thirds of overall company revenue.

Salesforce.com recently indicated it was willing to go shopping to increase its non-SFA business, reaching for business directory provider Jigsaw Data. At $142m in cash, the price of Jigsaw was more than salesforce.com spent, collectively, on its previous seven acquisitions. Who knows, maybe salesforce.com will turn to fellow analytics firm Webtrends, which is owned by buyout shop Francisco Partners. Incidentally, one of Francisco’s founding partners, Sandy Robertson, serves on salesforce.com’s board of directors.