Blank printing presses

Gutted by the arrival of Internet, newspaper companies have nonetheless printed very few transactions that could help them survive in the Media 2.0 era. One reason for the blank M&A pages: The currencies available to them are disappearing, according to Tim Connors, a partner at U.S. Venture Partners. Speaking on a panel at the recent IBF VC Investing Conference in San Francisco, Connors said the virtually uninterrupted slide in shares of many media company have taken a few would-be acquirers out of the market.

Indeed, we can only imagine it’s probably inconceivable for any of the newspaper companies to be shopping, at least not for an equity deal. Regional newspaper company McGannett shares are currently trading at their lowest level ever; USA Today-owner Gannett stock has sunk to a 14-year low and shares in the venerable New York Times are changing hands at levels not seen since mid-1996.

At the IBF conference, Connors noted USVP recently had an exit to an old media company. Portfolio company Adify, which runs advertising networks for some 120 vertically focused Web sites, got snapped up by Cox Enterprises for $300m. (Adify was in the midst of raising a third round of funding when Cox took them out. JP Morgan banked the deal after one of their analysts initially suggesting the two companies might strike a commercial relationship.) Incidentally, Cox paid its $300m bill for Adify in cash. 

Come on, Google, buy Salesforce.com already

Companies looking to get into new markets typically run the clichéd ‘buy, build or partner’ calculus on how to get the highest return on the lowest investment. Invariably, the answer is ‘yes’ to all of the options, as significant strategic moves require broad efforts to take the company in new directions.

Consider the case of Google and its still-emerging Apps business. (Like so much at the search engine company, there seems to be a ‘beta’ tag hanging on this division.) It has inked three deals for both technology and a sales channel, unleashed hundreds of engineers on the would-be ‘Office killer’ and, just recently, put together a distribution deal with Salesforce.com.

And yet, Apps still isn’t where Google needs it to be. Even more of a concern is that, in our opinion, the moves aren’t even enough to get Google Apps in a position to begin to challenge Microsoft Office. Google needs something more. In the end, a successful partnership isn’t simply about access. It’s about efficacy. In order for Google to control the Salesforce.com distribution channel, it has to control Salesforce.com. Read full report.

Crisis averted

After three months of nonsense, Ballmer’s folly is over. Microsoft’s CEO said over the weekend he will not pursue Yahoo, a move that shareholders applauded right from the opening bell on Monday. (Microsoft stock never traded below Friday’s close, while shares of Yahoo, which had been abandoned to trade on the company’s fundamentals, were slashed 15% in early Monday afternoon trading.) In our view, the ‘relief rally’ in Microsoft stock solidifies our view that the company was wrong-headed — both in decision and execution — to go after Yahoo.

We need only look back in Microsoft’s own M&A history to see how unlikely it was to get the kind of returns it was hoping from Yahoo. In early part of this decade, Microsoft inked a pair of deals for business software companies that was supposed to narrow the gap to the long-dominant vendors. In quick order, Microsoft shelled out a combined $2.4bn for Great Plains Software and Navision Software and set about knocking off SAP and Oracle. Executives talked about Microsoft’s division, which sold ERP and CRM software, growing into a $10bn business. That hasn’t happened – not even close. More than a half-decade later, it barely scratches out $1bn in annual sales and increasingly appears technologically and competitively irrelevant. The acquisitions did nothing to make up ground on SAP or Oracle, much less the new breed of rivals including Salesforce.com and SugarCRM. (We recently made the case that Microsoft should divest this unit, called Dynamics.)
Adding Yahoo to Microsoft’s online division would have simply repeated the mistakes of Dynamics. The protracted and messy acquisition of Yahoo would not have gotten Microsoft any closer to knocking off Google from its top spot in online search advertising. To their credit, the folks in Redmond, Wash. saw the past as prelude. And if the cautionary tale served up by Dynamics was a little too close to home, Ballmer could always pick up the phone and call Jerry Levin to ask how Time Warner’s ‘transformative’ $185bn purchase of AOL worked out. Of course, Ballmer tabling the Yahoo bid does leave one question unanswered: Which transaction destroys more shareholder value? Trying to graft a sprawling Internet property onto a media company or trying to graft a sprawling Internet property onto a software company? Even though Ballmer left the door open for a future bid for Yahoo, his shareholders have already indicated they don’t want to pay to find out the answer to that question.    

Short and sour

Date Event Yahoo stock price
Feb. 1, 2008 Microsoft unveils $31 per share unsolicited offer for Yahoo $28.38 (up 48%)
May 5, 2008 Microsoft pulls offer $24.24 in afternoon trading (down 16%)