Tag: M&A

A thaw in the market

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

In recent weeks, there’s been a lot of talk about a thaw in the once-frozen M&A market. While that’s true for overall activity, it’s also turning out to be true for specific deals that for one reason or another found themselves on ice at some point. Whether the transaction originally froze because of financing, regulation or pricing, a few of the notable deals are now looking like they’ll get done. That warming trend in dealmaking stands in sharp contrast to the climate at the beginning of the year. The Ice Age that spanned the first few months of 2009 is the main reason why total M&A spending for this year is likely to come in at just half the level it was in 2008.

Among the transactions that have been reheated in recent weeks: JDA Software’s consolidation play for i2, the sale of once-hot-but-now-cold 3Com and Cisco Systems warming up to the shareholders of Tandberg, who had given the networking giant a Nordic brush-off in its first bid for the videoconferencing company. (Incidentally, the additional $400m that Cisco will kick in for Tandberg will deplete its overseas cash stash by a whopping 1.3%.) What’s interesting in this trio of deals is that all of them involve the target company pocketing more money than was offered in an earlier proposed transaction. That’s certainly a change in the climate from this time last year, when we were writing about bidders ‘recalibrating’ their offers lower.

A management ‘buy-under’ at Silicon Storage Technology?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

In the third-quarter earnings report for Silicon Storage Technology at the end of October, chief executive Bing Yeh went out of his way to tout the vastly improving outlook for the flash memory vendor. Yeh noted that end-market demand had recovered and pricing had firmed up in what had been a pretty tough market. Third-quarter sales picked up sequentially and the company actually posted black numbers after three straight quarters of losses. The rebound was expected to continue in the fourth quarter, with a profit forecast for the period, as well.

And yet, the price that Yeh and his buyout partners at Prophet Equity bid for SST last week is actually lower than the vendor’s share price on the day Yeh made his comments about the rosy outlook for the company he heads. In fact, over the past two months, shares of SST have only traded below the proposed sale price of $2.10 in 11 of the 46 trading days. Looked at another way, the proposed management buyout (MBO) of SST represents a ‘take-under’ (rather than a takeover) when compared to the closing price in three out of four sessions since early September.

By their very nature, MBOs are fraught with conflict. In cases like SST, where executives plan to roll over their stakes in the company, the executives are effectively both buyers and sellers of the firm. (According to SST’s proxy, Yeh holds roughly 11% of all shares, making him the single-largest owner of the vendor.) The conflict emerges when we look at the basic economic self-interest on both sides of the transaction: The owners of SST (including Yeh) want to get as high a price as possible in the sale of their business, while the buyers (including Yeh) want to pay as low a price as possible to purchase the business.

Beyond the mismatch of motivation in MBOs, there’s also the thorny issue that executives almost certainly have insights on their business that aren’t available to other owners. We would guess that Yeh, who helped found SST 20 years ago and also serves as the chairman of the company’s board, probably knows more about the firm’s business and its prospects than anyone else on the planet.

At least one other insider at SST, however, didn’t share the support of the below-market MBO. Board member Bryant Riley, the founder of the Southern California investment firm B. Riley & Co., voted against the proposed buyout and then resigned from the board. (It’s worth noting that Riley got his seat in May 2008 only after agreeing to stop pestering the company about ‘strategic alternatives.’) Most SST investors – at least those who don’t stand to have a stake in the privately held company – have also voted against the deal. Shares have traded above the offer price since the bid was revealed November 12.

Amid consolidation, Ixia opens its wallet

-Contact authors: Thomas Rasmussen, Steve Steinke

Historically, networking test and measurement vendor Ixia has never been much of a shopper. However, that has started to change this year as the Calabasas, California-based company reached for Catapult Communications in June for $105m as well as wrapped up its $44m acquisition of rival Agilent Technologies’ N2X product line earlier this month. For those keeping track, Ixia’s recent deals represent some 85% of all M&A spending at the company since 2002. (We would note that the pickup in dealmaking, coincidentally or not, has come since a European private equity investor joined the firm’s board and its strategic planning committee in October 2008.) Having recently assumed the role of consolidator, the small-cap vendor ($425m market capitalization) says it still has about $85m in cash after its recent purchases and is still pursuing deals. Who might be next?

One of the growing fields in the space is wireless network testing. Given Ixia’s desire for a larger presence in the segment, we think it could look to snap up a company here. Two interesting targets are privately held Metuchen, New Jersey-based Berkeley Varitronics Systems and Bandspeed of Austin, Texas. As for more traditional targets, we would point to competitors ClearSight Networks of Fremont, California, and Canada’s publically traded EXFO. EXFO currently sports an enterprise valuation of approximately $150m and would almost double Ixia’s revenue. Doubling down on EXFO might not be such a bad idea given that, despite its aggressiveness, Ixia is still relatively small compared to larger players such as JDSU and Spirent, which could look to do some consolidation in the space of their own.

Ixia’s historical acquisitions

Date announced Target Deal value
October 21, 2009 Agilent Technologies (N2X product line assets) $44m
May 11, 2009 Catapult Communications $105m
January 24, 2006 Dilithium Networks (test tool business assets) $5.1m
July 18, 2005 Communication Machinery $4m
July 14, 2003 NetIQ (Chariot product assets) $17.5m
February 15, 2002 Empirix (ANVL product assets) $5m

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Nordic freeze-out for Cisco

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

With a fat treasury and well-drilled deal team, Cisco Systems typically storms through acquisitions. Over the past five years, the networking giant has announced some 50 purchases, including more than a few that combined big money and quick moves. (For instance, several sources have indicated that Cisco snatched WebEx Communications away from IBM in just a week, after Big Blue had the online conferencing company all but locked up.) But it appears that something in Cisco’s M&A methods has been lost in translation in its reach across the Atlantic for Norway’s Tandberg.

A little over a month ago, Cisco announced plans to hand over $3bn in cash for Tandberg, as a way to bolster its videoconferencing lineup. Although Tandberg’s board of directors backed the offer, a fair number of shareholders have balked at what they see as Cisco’s low-ball bid. Critics point to the fact that Cisco’s all-cash offer values Tandberg just 11% higher than the company’s closing stock price the day before the announcement. (We noted recently that the premium was just half the amount that Cisco is paying for Starent Networks, which was announced a week after Tandberg.)

Further complicating Cisco’s play for Tandberg is the fact that 90% of shareholders at the Norwegian company have to agree to the deal. Already, holders of about one-quarter of Tandberg equity have said they won’t support Cisco’s proposed purchase – at least not at its current valuation. We suspect that Cisco may well end up having to reach a bit deeper to land Tandberg. (The company gave itself more time on Monday, bumping back the expiration of its tender offer for Tandberg until November 18.) And as the standoff drags on, other vendors are closing their own videoconferencing deals. On Wednesday, Logitech said it will spend $405m in cash for LifeSize Communications. Logitech’s bid values LifeSize at slightly more than 4x trailing sales, which is not out of line with Cisco’s bid for Tandberg of 3.6x trailing sales.

It wouldn’t be surprising to see Cisco top its existing offer for what’s undoubtedly a valuable asset. Tandberg would give Cisco a solid mid-level videoconferencing offering, slotting nicely between its high-end Telepresence product and the low-level Web conferencing and collaboration offering it got when it picked up WebEx. In terms of markets, adding Tandberg would significantly expand Cisco’s reach in Europe, particularly with government customers. And as a bonus, securing Tandberg would prevent the target from landing with rival Hewlett-Packard, which has its own videoconferencing wares. (Although HP actually beat Cisco to market with its Halo product, it has little to show for its early advantage.) We doubt that would happen, but wouldn’t it be a kicker if HP pulled a Cisco on Cisco, quickly firing off a topping bid and walking away with Tandberg?

Is mobile advertising back?

-Contact Thomas Rasmussen

In a clear sign that mobile advertising has grown up, Google spent a whopping $750m in stock on Monday to pick up San Mateo, California-based AdMob in what we hear was a contested process. This transaction goes a long way toward securing control of mobile display advertising for Google and comes just days after the launch of Android 2.0. Although we’ve been projecting dealmaking in the mobile advertising market for quite some time, we’re nonetheless floored by the rich valuation for AdMob, a three-year-old startup that’s raised just shy of $50m. We estimate that the 140-person firm pulled in about $20m in gross revenue in 2008 and was on track to double that figure this year (we surmise that this translates to roughly $20m on a net revenue basis).

The double-digit valuation for AdMob reminds us more than a little bit of the high-multiple online advertising deals that we saw in 2007. Viewed in that context, Google’s purchase of AdMob stands as the third-largest ‘new media’ advertising purchase since 2002. Of course, like many of those transactions, this was not based on revenue, but instead on technology and market extension, which is consistent with Google’s strategy of acquiring big into core adjacencies.

Looking forward, AdMob’s top-dollar exit is sure to have a number of rival mobile advertising startups excited. One competitor that’s preparing to raise an additional sizable round of funding quipped at the near-perfect timing of this transaction. This is an industry that has seen its ups and downs over the past few years. When we first wrote about AdMob back in May it was in the backdrop of fire sales and failed rounds of funding. If nothing else, this deal will dramatically change that.

Microsoft has been actively playing catch-up to Google in advertising and search, and is sure to follow it onto the mobile device. As are many other niche advertising shoppers such as Yahoo, Nokia, AdKnowledge, Adobe-Omniture and traditional media conglomerates such as Cox. AOL has already made its move, reaching for Third Screen Media two years ago. (We would note that AOL’s $105m purchase of Third Screen is a rare case of that company actually being ahead of the market.)

Startups that could benefit from this increasing focus on the sector include AdMarvel, Amobee, InMobi, and Velti’s Ad Infuse. However, we suspect that some of the major advances – and consequently the most promising targets – are likely to come from players that are just now getting started, with fresh and profitable approaches to location-based mobile advertising.

Some recent mobile advertising deals

Date announced Acquirer Target Deal value Target TTM revenue
November 9, 2009 Google AdMob $750m $20m*
September 14, 2009 Nokia Acuity Mobile Not disclosed Not disclosed
August 27, 2009 AdMob AdWhirl Not disclosed Not disclosed
May 21, 2009 Limelight Networks Kiptronic $1m $2m*
May 12, 2009 Velti Ad Infuse <$1m* $1.3m*
March 11, 2008 Qualcomm Xiam Technologies $32m Not disclosed
August 21, 2007 Yahoo Actionality Not disclosed Not disclosed
May 15, 2007 AOL Third Screen Media $105m $3m*

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase *451 Group estimate

Is IAC looking to sell Ask.com?

-Contact Thomas Rasmussen

It looks like acquisitive IAC/InterActiveCorp could be gearing up to undo its largest buy ever, Ask.com. At least Barry Diller’s opening remarks during IAC’s conference call last week seem to indicate a desire to explore the possibility. The New York City-based Internet media company has successfully expanded into a content giant by snapping up dozens of Internet properties. IAC has inked 36 deals worth more than $4.5bn since 2002. Many of those purchases have been tiny (Airfarewatchdog.com, for instance), but IAC did make a significant pickup when it handed over $1.85bn for Ask.com in March 2005.

However, we suspect that Ask.com hasn’t delivered the kind of returns that IAC had hoped for, since the search engine remains far behind Yahoo, Microsoft and Google in terms of usage. Still, with roughly 4% of US search market share, Ask.com would be a significant addition to any acquirer in the competitive scale-driven space, where every percentage point counts.

Though we won’t rule out a financial buyout, which would have more than a few echoes of the just-closed Skype carve-out, we think a strategic buyer for Ask.com makes more sense. Two obvious suitors spring to mind: Google and Microsoft. Although Google recently made its intentions for more acquisitions known and even signaled a willingness to do large deals again, we do not think it is likely to pick up Ask.com. Rather than make a consolidation play, we expect Google to continue to snare startups to offer additional services to existing users, while also bolstering its recent moves into new markets such as online video and mobile communications.

On the other hand, Microsoft has displayed a willingness to spend a lot of money in its game of catch-up with Google. With an acquisition of Ask.com coupled with its impending Yahoo deal, Microsoft could come very close to capturing one-third of all search traffic. While that would undoubtedly help Microsoft, a divestiture of Ask.com could also benefit IAC. Granted, it would mean slicing its revenue roughly in half, but IAC would have a cleaner story to tell Wall Street. And it could use some help in that area. Investors give a paltry valuation to the cash-heavy company, valuing the business at less than one times sales on the basis of enterprise value. IAC sports a $2.6bn market capitalization, but holds $1.8bn in cash.

IAC’s historic acquisitions and divestitures, 2002 – present

Year Number of acquisitions Number of divestitures
2009 5 4
2008 7 0
2007 6 0
2006 3 0
2005 3 0
2004 4 0
2003 4 0
2002 4 0

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

A fittingly imperfect end for Kana

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

As liquidity events go, the just-announced sale of Kana Software is shaping up to be a pretty dry one for most shareholders. The customer service automation vendor said on Tuesday that it plans to sell its operating business to buyout group Accel-KKR for $49m and retain the publicly listed shell of a company as an acquisition vehicle. The proceeds from the sale of the business will flow to what essentially amounts to a special-purpose acquisition company, or SPAC, rather than long-suffering Kana shareholders. Shares of Kana have barely moved since the announcement, holding steady at around $0.75 each.

From our view, the structure of the deal reflects a creativity born out of necessity. Essentially, the challenge that shaped the sale process at Kana, which has been playing out for several years, was how to realize value for a decidedly mediocre operating business, while at the same time preserve the value of the tax advantages accrued from having burned money ($4.3bn and counting) since the company opened its doors. (The sole ‘asset’ at the SPAC, besides access to the capital markets, is the $400m in credits to offset taxes on any profit generated at whatever company it does acquire.) While the deal goes some distance toward satisfying both goals, several disgruntled shareholders have charged that it doesn’t go far enough.

For starters, the shareholders point out that if the carve-out goes through, as is expected within three months, they will have nothing to show for the sale of ‘their’ company. Instead, their future returns will be determined by an unknown group that may – or may not – buy some yet-to-determined business. (So much for the Wall Street maxim of investing in management and markets.) Particularly galling to those shareholders stuck holding illiquid Bulletin Board equity is that two of the largest owners of Kana (hedge funds KVO Capital Management and Nightwatch Capital Management, which also has a board seat) got to exit their investments at an above-market price of $0.95 per share, with the possible addition of another $0.10 for each share on top of that.

Kana would probably counter that shareholders who don’t want to roll their ownership of the company into a SPAC are free to sell their shares. And we have little doubt that the vendor exhausted every opportunity to get some value from the business, since we know that the process has been grinding along fitfully for years. In the end, though, we can’t help but view the less-than-ideal transaction as a fittingly imperfect ending to a thoroughly flawed company. Or more precisely, a thoroughly flawed public company. Red ink-stained Kana went public in 1999 on less than $5m in aggregate sales, but within a year of the offering had topped $1,000 per share on a split-adjusted basis. As shareholders now argue about dimes on the firm’s Bulletin Board-listed stock, the end of Kana just seems pathetic.

Dassault Systemes bulks up through an old friend

Brenon Daly

Contact: John Abbott

Dassault Systèmes’ $600m purchase of IBM’s CATIA product lifecycle management (PLM) sales and client support operations on Tuesday is the latest twist in a complex, 30-year relationship between the two companies. Dassault, founded in 1981, inherited the rights to CATIA, one of the first 3-D computer-aided design (CAD) packages, from its aerospace parent Avions Marcel Dassault (now Dassault Aviation). Then in 1992, Dassault bought the rights to the other pioneering CAD package, CADAM, from IBM. It set about combining the two, and continued to jointly market the product set with Big Blue.

Now it seems that Dassault wants more control over its business. Through the deal, which is expected to close during the first half of next year, it gains access to 1,000 more clients and around $700m in annual sales. The transaction is expected to boost earnings in the first year. (Dassault plans to speak more about the financial impact of the deal during its third-quarter earnings call on Thursday.)

The partnership will continue with IBM in the services role, but should enable Dassault to simplify its contracts with very large customers such as Ford Motor and Boeing, which until now had to negotiate with both vendors. The scope of CAD software has evolved over the years from core engineering and complex product design into collaborative PLM focused on business processes, workflows and the supply chain. However, Big Blue didn’t have the agreements in place to sell the full set of Dassault tools. The result was that more big firms were dealing directly with Dassault. A side effect is that both companies will be more able to work with other partners: Dassault with Hewlett-Packard, for instance, and IBM with other PLM providers such as Siemens PLM Software and PTC.

The deal is the biggest in Dassault’s history, though it has spent heavily in the past on industry consolidation, most notably through the acquisitions of MatrixOne (March 2006, $408m), ABAQUS (May 2005, $413m) and SolidWorks (June 1997, $310m). Other vendors have also been buying up big chunks of the PLM market. Siemens inked the sector’s largest deal in January 2007, spending $3.5bn on UGS, while Oracle handed over $495m for Agile Software in May 2007. The PLM shop that appears to be left behind is PTC, which despite spending more than $600m on 11 purchases of its own since 2004 is now much smaller than either Siemens or Dassault and is under pressure from moves into PLM by mainstream enterprise software houses such as Oracle and SAP. Several market sources indicated that PTC has retained Goldman Sachs to advise it on a possible sale.

Patient Smith Micro is big on M&A

-Contact: Thomas Rasmussen, Chris Hazelton

Up until the credit crisis knocked the economy into a recession, mobile software company Smith Micro Software had been a fairly active acquirer. The Aliso Viejo, California-based firm closed five deals worth $93m in 2007 alone. However, as the economy slid into a tailspin, Smith Micro pretty much stepped out of the market. Last year, it announced only a pair of tuck-in acquisitions, which we estimate cost just $3m total.

We suspect Smith Micro may be looking to return to a quicker M&A pace. Last month, it announced its second-largest deal, picking up Mountain View, California-based Core Mobility for $18.5m. (We understand the two sides discussed a deal back in 2007, but couldn’t get together on price.) Smith Micro will hand over $10m in cash and cover the rest of the Core Mobility purchase in stock, which will hardly limit its ability to do future deals. The debt-free company, with a market cap of $340m, claimed $44m in cash and short-term investments (at least before announcing the Core Mobility purchase). Moreover, it recently filed a shelf offering intended to fatten its treasury toward additional deals. At current prices, the four million-share offering will effectively double Smith Micro’s cash on hand. So where might it be looking to shop?

The Core Mobility acquisition reached into a new market segment. But we believe any significant future deal would see the company aiming to bolster its core mobile enterprise VPN offerings. That is where it shopped before putting the breaks on its M&A program in late 2007, when it picked up PCTEL’s mobility assets and Ecutel Systems. Potential targets include Norwegian Birdstep Technology, Swedish Columbitech, Seattle-based NetMotion Wireless and Canadian vendor ipUnplugged.

Although all four would make excellent tuck-in acquisitions, we view publicly traded Birdstep as a particularly good fit for Smith Micro. The Norwegian company has trailing revenue of about $18m, which would be a not-insignificant boost to Smith Micro’s revenue. But more importantly, acquiring cash-burning Birdstep would provide a much-needed foot in the door to the Nordic/European markets to help Smith Micro expand beyond the Americas, which currently accounts for more than 90% of revenue. Birdstep can likely be had at a discount too, as the company currently sports a market cap of about $30m, a mere one-fifth of its 2007 levels. Patience might be the operative word for Smith Micro’s M&A strategy, and it looks like it’s paying off.

Smith Micro’s historical M&A

Period Number of acquisitions Total deal value
2009 YTD 1 $18.5m
2008 2 $2-3m*
2007 5 $93m

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase * official 451 Group estimate

Out with the old and in with the new at Compuware

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Deal flow at Compuware so far this year has been out with the old and in with the new. The 36-year-old company sold off its testing automation and software quality business to MicroFocus for $80m earlier this year, and then last week, it put some of those proceeds toward covering its $295m purchase of Gomez. (Interestingly, Updata Advisors worked both the divestiture and acquisition for Compuware.)

The purchase of Gomez significantly bolsters Compuware’s application performance management (APM) business. It also dramatically changes the face that Compuware shows to Wall Street. Most investors know Compuware – if they know it at all – as ‘a mainframe company.’ (Indeed, roughly two-thirds of the firm’s product revenue comes from its mainframe business.) Even in a robust IT spending environment, the mainframe business is a slow-growing one.

While only a small slice of overall revenue, Gomez brings a predictable base of subscription revenue that’s been growing at a pretty good clip recently. In the first two quarters of 2009, Gomez increased revenue 25%. Granted, Compuware paid for that growth, valuing Gomez roughly four times as richly as Wall Street currently values Compuware itself. But the fact that Compuware shares actually ticked higher when the vendor announced the acquisition indicates that the deal has some support. (In contrast to, say, Wall Street’s punishment of Xerox shares on that company’s plan to pick up ACS.)

And Compuware is essentially paying the prevailing market valuation (5.5x trailing sales) for an on-demand company in its reach for Gomez. Undeniably, the firm could have found any number of targets available at a sharp discount if it wanted to consolidate a bunch of mainframe software providers. After all, Compuware has some experience with M&A, having inked nearly 40 deals since it went public in 1992. However, we would argue that few of those transactions have been as forward-looking as the addition of Gomez.