Tag: storage

Is HP overcompensating?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Since when does an army without its top general go on the attack? That strategy would seem to go against convention, yet Hewlett-Packard has done just that since dumping Mark Hurd for his foibles. The tech giant has chased a pair of deals to valuations that are basically 2-3 times the prevailing market multiple. HP’s recent bidding war over 3PAR and the purchase of ArcSight shows a level of aggressiveness that indicates to us that the drivers for the acquisitions may have been emotional as well as financial, at least to a small degree.

If we step back and look at the setting for both deals, we can’t help but conclude that HP announced the transactions at a time when it looked vulnerable. Its star CEO had dramatically crashed back to earth, while its board (yet again) appeared to have bungled what looked like a fairly routine internal investigation. Statements by the company that it was ‘business as usual’ didn’t get much of a hearing on Wall Street. Shares that changed hands in the low $50s in April have been worth less than $40 for much of the past month. HP’s market cap lingers below $100bn, despite the company ringing up sales of about $120bn.

At the risk of drifting too far into psychology, we wonder if the deals weren’t a bit of overcompensation. (Certainly, paying 11x trailing sales for 3PAR might be considered overcompensation, or at the least, ‘heavy compensation,’ if you’ll forgive the pun.) If investors and others were going to view HP as weak or directionless while its corner office was empty, well, HP could use its vast resources to counter with a signal to remind everyone that it was formidable, with or without a fulltime CEO. Of course, we’re just playing armchair psychologist here. But something beyond just straight numbers seemed to be at work in HP’s recent moves.

A hoarse auctioneer for 3PAR?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

The back-and-forth bidding for 3PAR moved higher again Friday, as the counteroffer to the counteroffer pushed the value of the high-end data storage vendor to $2bn. In the latest move, Hewlett-Packard lobbed a bid of $30 for each share of 3PAR, topping its offer from Thursday of $27 per share that had been matched by Dell. If 3PAR opts for HP’s bid, Dell has three days to come back with an offer of its own, according to terms. Dell, which opened the process 10 days ago with a bid of $18 per share, has already matched two efforts by HP to derail the deal.

As is pretty much always the case when would-be buyers with deep pockets go against each other, the price of the target company moves higher. (It’s fundamental supply-and-demand economics, after all.) Yet in the case of 3PAR, we’re not talking bids that are sweetened with a teaspoon or two of sugar – we’re talking cups of the stuff. (To recap the investment banks that are helping to advise their clients on how much sugar to dole out: Qatalyst Partners is banking 3PAR, while Credit Suisse Securities is banking Dell and JP Morgan Securities is banking HP.)

The latest offer values 3PAR at basically $830m higher than the opening takeout valuation, which was already the highest the storage company had ever seen. (In fact, Wall Street valued 3PAR at less than $800m before all this bidding started. Shares had basically bounced around $10 each for most of the year.) HP’s offer gives 3PAR an equity valuation of $2bn, two-thirds higher than Dell’s initial bid that gave it a $1.25bn equity valuation. For those wondering about the ‘price discipline’ at the two suitors, we would note that the going rate for 3PAR is now 10 times trailing sales.

Why wouldn’t HP jump the McAfee bid instead?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

If we had to guess about Hewlett-Packard making an uncharacteristic move and jumping an announced transaction, we would have thought the company would go after McAfee rather than 3PAR. After all, HP has a giant hole in its security portfolio (we might describe it as a ‘McAfee-sized’ hole), while it’s already pretty well covered on the storage side, even if much of its offering is a bit long in the tooth.

Yet that isn’t the way it’s playing out. The recently decapitated company offered $1.7bn earlier this week for 3PAR, adding roughly $410m, or 33%, to the proposed price of the high-end storage vendor. Meanwhile, McAfee’s planned $7.8bn sale to Intel, announced last week, continues to track to a close before the end of the year. (We would note that McAfee is being valued at 3.4 times trailing sales, exactly half the level of 3PAR following HP’s bumped bid, which took the valuation to 7.6x trailing sales.)

HP’s topping bid for 3PAR appears to be a fairly defensive move. For starters, there’s the matter that 3PAR would overlap more than a little bit with its existing core storage offering called StorageWorks Enterprise Virtual Array. Betting on an acquired property to replace – or at the very least, refresh – the heart of a company’s current offering is a risky proposal. On top of that, 3PAR would require a new architecture, rather than just running on top of HP’s existing hardware like its other software-based storage acquisitions (PolyServe, IBRIX and Lefthand Networks).

All in all, looking to derail Dell’s offer for 3PAR appears to be at odds with much of HP’s previous strategy and rationale around storage. And while it pursues that deal (cost what it may), HP passes on McAfee, a one-of-a-kind security asset that would instantly make it much more competitive with IBM, EMC and Cisco Systems. If HP has sincere aspirations about outfitting the next generation of datacenters, we might suggest that it needs to actually own its intellectual property (IP) for security.

So far, however, HP has been content with just OEM arrangements to cover itself for security. (Notably, it has extracted a fairly one-sided agreement with Symantec for consumer anti-malware protection.) And even though buying McAfee would mean an unraveling of a number of those arrangements, we would note that reality isn’t preventing HP from making its bid for 3PAR. Remember that HP currently has an OEM arrangement with Hitachi Data Systems for a high-end offering like 3PAR. Yet it’s prepared to pay – and pay a lot of money – to own the IP itself. Couldn’t the same rationale be used for McAfee?

There’s only one 3PAR

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Let’s see, where have we heard this before? A storage company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue finds itself in a billion-dollar bidding war between two tech giants, advised in the process by high-end boutique Qatalyst Partners. Last summer, scarcity value drove the price of Data Domain; today it’s 3PAR.

Looking to trump Dell’s existing agreement for 3PAR, Hewlett-Packard on Monday lobbed a topping bid for the high-end storage provider. HP, advised by JP Morgan Securities, is offering $24 for each share of 3PAR, giving the proposed transaction an enterprise value of $1.56bn. (That’s according to our math, compared to the $1.66bn that HP gives its bid.) In any case, the offer is some $380m, or 33%, richer than Dell’s initial bid. Recall that Dell’s offer of $18 valued 3PAR at the highest level ever for the stock.

One interesting observation about HP’s topping bid: it is exactly the same percentage (33%) that EMC had to hand over for Data Domain, which had agreed to sale to NetApp. Of course, this is HP’s first counter, while EMC had to bump its own bid. (Initially it offered $30 for each Data Domain share, but ultimately paid $33 per share when it closed the deal in July 2009.) Of course, there was little hope of NetApp matching EMC in a bidding war for Data Domain. In the case of 3PAR, however, rivals Dell and HP are on much closer financial footing. Terms of Dell’s original agreement with 3PAR call for a $53.5m breakup fee

Dell’s not-so-identical twin storage deals

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

From an investment banking perspective, both EqualLogic and 3PAR started out and finished their lives in much the same way. The two storage vendors filed to go public within a week of one another back in August 2007, and – pending the close of 3PAR’s sale – both will end up inside Dell. Yet while the final destination is the same, the two vendors’ not-so-parallel tracks to Round Rock, Texas, underscore the fact that the tech M&A market, as well as the capital markets, still have a long way to go to recover from the Credit Crisis.

Consider this: In the sale announced Monday, 3PAR garnered just half the multiple that fellow storage vendor EqualLogic got in its sale to the same buyer, at least based on one key metric. 3PAR sold for 5.6 times trailing sales, while EqualLogic went for 12x trailing sales. We would chalk up the eye-popping premium for EqualLogic mostly to the fact that Dell had to effectively outbid the public market to prevent the company from going public. More to the point, Dell had to outbid a bull market, as the Nasdaq had tacked on 20% in the year leading up to its purchase of EqualLogic in November 2007.

As any company – including 3PAR and Dell – can attest, the bull market ended abruptly and painfully just days after the EqualLogic trade sale. So now we’re left with a market where Dell can offer the highest-ever price for 3PAR shares (representing a staggering 87% premium) and still get a ‘half-off discount’ on valuation compared to its earlier billion-dollar storage deal. But then Dell knows all about discounts over that time period. The company’s market cap has been cut in half (to $25bn from $50bn) from the day it announced its EqualLogic acquisition to Monday’s announcement of the 3PAR purchase.

RainStor, the structured data retention and compression startup that recently renamed itself from Clearpace, has raised $7.5m in series B funding. The round brought in two new investors – Storm Ventures and data integration software specialist Informatica (which licenses RainStor’s technology as part of its Applimation data archive suit <!– /* Font Definitions */ @font-face {font-family:”Cambria Math”; panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4; mso-font-charset:0; mso-generic-font-family:roman; mso-font-pitch:variable; mso-font-signature:-1610611985 1107304683 0 0 159 0;} @font-face {font-family:Calibri; panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4; mso-font-charset:0; mso-generic-font-family:swiss; mso-font-pitch:variable; mso-font-signature:-1610611985 1073750139 0 0 159 0;} @font-face {font-family:Verdana; panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4; mso-font-charset:0; mso-generic-font-family:swiss; mso-font-pitch:variable; mso-font-signature:536871559 0 0 0 415 0;} /* Style Definitions */ p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal {mso-style-unhide:no; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:””; margin:0in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:”Times New Roman”,”serif”; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;} a:link, span.MsoHyperlink {mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; color:blue; mso-text-animation:none; text-decoration:none; text-underline:none; text-decoration:none; text-line-through:none;} a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed {mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; color:purple; mso-themecolor:followedhyperlink; text-decoration:underline; text-underline:single;} p.bodytxt02, li.bodytxt02, div.bodytxt02 {mso-style-name:body_txt_02; mso-style-unhide:no; mso-margin-top-alt:auto; margin-right:0in; mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto; margin-left:0in; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:”Times New Roman”,”serif”; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;} .MsoChpDefault {mso-style-type:export-only; mso-default-props:yes; font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;} @page WordSection1 {size:8.5in 11.0in; margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in; mso-header-margin:.5in; mso-footer-margin:.5in; mso-paper-source:0;} div.WordSection1 {page:WordSection1;} –>
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by Brenon Daly

From an investment banking perspective, both EqualLogic and 3PAR started out and finished their lives in much the same way. The two storage vendors filed to go public within a week of one another back in August 2007, and – pending the close of 3PAR’s sale – both will end up inside Dell. Yet while the final destination is the same, the two vendors’ not-so-parallel tracks to Round Rock, Texas, underscore the fact that the tech M&A market, as well as the capital markets, still have a long way to go to recover from the Credit Crisis.

Consider this: In the sale announced Monday, 3PAR garnered just half the multiple that fellow storage vendor EqualLogic got in its sale to the same buyer, at least based on one key metric. 3PAR sold for 5.6 times trailing sales, while EqualLogic went for 12x trailing sales. We would chalk up the eye-popping premium for EqualLogic mostly to the fact that Dell had to effectively outbid the public market to prevent the company from going public. More to the point, Dell had to outbid a bull market, as the Nasdaq had tacked on 20% in the year leading up to its purchase of EqualLogic in November 2007.

As any company – including 3PAR and Dell – can attest, the bull market ended abruptly and painfully just days after the EqualLogic trade sale. So now we’re left with a market where Dell can offer the highest-ever price for 3PAR shares (representing a staggering 87% premium) and still get a ‘half-off discount’ on valuation compared to its earlier billion-dollar storage deal. But then Dell knows all about discounts over that time period. The company’s market cap has been cut in half (to $25bn from $50bn) from the day it announced its EqualLogic acquisition to Monday’s announcement of the 3PAR purchase. e

Thoma Bravo doubles down on Double-Take

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Just a week after we noted that the bidding for Double-Take Software had hit the final stretch, with a trio of buyout shops still in the running, one of the private equity firms announced plans Monday to pick up the file-replication software vendor. Thoma Bravo, through its Vision Solutions portfolio company, will pay $242m for Double-Take in a take-private that’s expected to close in the third quarter. Assuming it goes through, the deal will end Double-Take’s three and a half years as a public company.

Frankly, Double-Take’s run as a public company was one that we didn’t really understand. It never cracked $100m in sales, and has basically been trapped at the same revenue level it hit in 2007. In that year, the vendor recorded sales of $83m. Although sales jumped 16% to $96m in 2008, they ticked back down to $83m in 2009 and Double-Take recently guided to expect about $86m in revenue this year. And the small company was competing against the replication offerings from some of the largest storage providers on the planet: EMC with RepliStor, Symantec with Replication Exec and the replication products CA Inc obtained in its XOsoft purchase.

Perhaps it’s not surprising, then, that the $10.50-per-share bid is actually slightly below the price Double-Take fetched when it came public. In its December 2006 IPO, Double-Take priced its shares at $11 each. And although the stock did trade at twice that price in late 2007, it has been below the IPO price since September 2008. In its time as a public company, Double-Take basically matched the performance of the Nasdaq.

At an equity value of $242m, the actual cost of Double-Take is much lower. The profitable, debt-free vendor held $89m in its treasury at the end of the first quarter, meaning Thoma Bravo/Vision Solutions will only have to hand over $153m in cash. That’s just 1.8 times this year’s projected revenue, and about 4 times maintenance revenue.

Sources: a take-private for Double-Take

Brenon Daly1 Comment

Contact: Brenon Daly

The final bidders for Double-Take Software have narrowed to three buyout shops, and a purchase of the file-replication software vendor could be announced within the next two weeks, we have learned. The company said a month ago that an undisclosed bidder had approached it about a possible transaction.

A number of sources have pointed to Vector Capital as the unidentified suitor, adding that the firm is one of the three bidders still in the running. Although we speculated early on that Double-Take’s two main channel partners (Dell and Hewlett-Packard) might be interested, we understand now that there aren’t any strategic bidders currently at the table.

The price couldn’t immediately be learned, but we suspect there won’t be a huge premium for the company, which was trading at $9.36 on Monday afternoon. The reason? Double-Take recently trimmed its sales outlook for 2010, essentially saying it doesn’t expect to grow this year. It recently guided to about $86m in sales for 2010, about 10% lower than it had expected earlier this year. It finished the recession-wracked 2009 with revenue of $83m, down from $96m in 2008.

Even without growth, Double-Take undoubtedly holds some appeal to a private equity (PE) firm. For starters, the company is cheap. It currently sports a market capitalization of just $200m, but nearly half that amount is made of its cash and short-term investments. (The company held $89m in its treasury at the end of the first quarter.)

With an enterprise value of only $111m, Double-Take now garners just 1.3x projected sales. Another way to look at it: even with a decent premium to the company’s current valuation, a buyer could still pick up Double-Take for about 4x maintenance revenue. Small wonder that a few PE shops are still considering a Double-Take takeout.

A Double-Take takeout?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Never mind the business, somebody has their eye on Double-Take Software. The file-replication software vendor said Monday that it came up short in its first-quarter performance, continuing the struggles that it saw throughout 2009. Last year, maintenance revenue flat-lined, while license sales dropped by one-quarter. And although the first quarter is starting off a bit underwhelming, Double-Take is still projecting that it will grow this year. However, even if the company hits the high end of its estimate of $95m, sales for 2010 will still fall just short of 2008’s level of $96m.

Apparently, that lackluster performance hasn’t dimmed the company’s appeal. As Double-Take was announcing its Q1 miss, it also said – in an ‘Oh, by the way…’ manner – that it had received an ‘unsolicited, non-binding’ expression of interest from an unnamed suitor. No terms were revealed so it’s hard to know, specifically, what’s on offer to Double-Take shareholders. The company says only that the bid is ‘above recent trading prices.’ Does ‘recent’ mean a bit under $9, where shares have been since early February? Or does ‘recent’ also include the period in January when shares changed hands above $10, before the company warned (for the first time) that the quarter was coming in a bit light? On the report, Double-Take stock jumped 15% to $10.05 in Monday afternoon trading.

As to who might have floated the bid, it strikes us that this looks like a private equity (PE) play. If a strategic buyer wanted Double-Take, we don’t see it approaching the company in such a fast-and-loose way. Besides, there are basically only two companies that would make obvious bidders: Dell and Hewlett-Packard. The two tech giants are Double-Take’s main channel partners, with Dell accounting for a full 17% of the company’s revenue on its own. Also, both vendors could presumably benefit from Double-Take’s large customer base of SMBs, which numbers more than 22,000. Of course, an auction could draw out any interested strategic player, so the potential bidders aren’t necessarily limited to HP and Dell.

But as we say, we think this offer came from a buyout shop. And we can certainly understand Double-Take’s attractiveness to a financial buyer. In short, it’s cheap. Even with the stock’s pop on Monday, the company still only garners a market cap of about $220m. And the net cost is even cheaper, because the debt-free, profitable vendor carries almost $100m in cash on its balance sheet. At an enterprise value of just $120m, Double-Take is valued at less than three times its maintenance stream. That’s a valuation that any number of PE firms probably figure they could make money on.

Nexsan: Next to go out

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Nearly two years after it first filed its IPO paperwork, storage vendor Nexsan appears set to hit the Nasdaq later this week. The company is planning to sell 4.8 million shares at $10-12 each. At the high end of the range, the offering would raise some $59m for Nexsan, which would start life as a public company with an initial valuation of about $200m. Thomas Weisel Partners is running the books for Nexsan, which will trade under the ticker NXSN.

The offering continues the trend of smaller IPOs and lower initial valuations that we recently noted. Back in April 2008, Nexsan planned to raise $81m in its offering. However, the actual proceeds will come in about one-quarter below its original expectation. Similarly, the valuation that we penciled out for Nexsan two years ago has proved a bit too rich.

Back in our initial report on the company, we figured that Nexsan would hit the market at a valuation of around $300m. Built into that projection, however, was the assumption that the storage vendor would be able to increase revenue at about a 20% clip. (That didn’t seem unreasonable back in 2008, considering Compellent Technologies – a similar storage startup that had recently gone public – increased revenue 78% that year.)

Instead, Nexsan actually shrank. In its fiscal year that ended June 30, 2009 – a period that basically covers the recent ‘Great Recession’ – overall sales slipped to $61m from $63m in the previous fiscal year. In the two quarters since then, Nexsan has started to grow again, although at a rather muted 6% pace. On the other hand, Nexsan did manage to move into profitability during the worst economic conditions that most US businesses have seen.

Blue-light special on Brocade

Brenon Daly

by Brenon Daly

For all of the would-be suitors of Brocade Communications, now is seemingly the time to move on the enterprise networking vendor. The value of the company has been trimmed by about one-quarter this week, meaning that a buyer paying a typical premium would be getting Brocade for the price that it fetched on its own last week. (We understand that valuations aren’t quite that simple – and it probably shortchanges Brocade – but it’s directionally accurate.) The recent problems at Brocade stem largely from the Foundry Networks business that it acquired a little more than a year ago.

With investors lopping off the gains that Brocade had run up over the past 10 months, the company has clearly been marked down. Yet, on the other side of any theoretical deal for Brocade, the demand has probably dipped since M&A speculation was swirling around Brocade last October. The reason? One company that had been mentioned as a possible buyer for Brocade is probably now out of the market.

Hewlett-Packard made a major networking move of its own shortly after most people put it at the top of the list of potential suitors for Brocade. Last November, HP handed over some $3.1bn for 3Com, which means that it doesn’t need Brocade (or more specifically, Foundry) quite as much. Of course, IBM is still a big OEM partner for Brocade, as is Dell. Both of those vendors could still be interested in a major networking acquisition, particularly at a discounted price. Brocade currently sports an enterprise value of $3.1bn.