Post-acquisition decapitation

The write-offs from wrong-headed acquisitions just keep coming. And we don’t mean just financial write-offs. Instead, we’re referring to the practice of a company’s board ‘writing off’ the executives who crafted a deal. This week’s high-profile example came when Alcatel-Lucent finally tossed overboard the two architects of ‘la grande fusion.’ Since that deal was announced in April 2006, the combination has incinerated some $20bn over shareholder value, leaving the telco equipment vendor with a market capitalization of just $13.6bn. (That’s less than the sales the company posted in 2007.) That two-year performance finally got Serge Tchuruk, the company’s chairman who represents the Alcatel side of the combination, and Patricia Russo, the Lucent legacy, shown the door.

This house-cleaning at Acaltel-Lucent comes just two weeks after AMD kicked Hector Ruiz upstairs. In virtually the same breath that AMD announced Ruiz would be relieved of his CEO post but continue as chairman, the company said it will divest much of the business it picked up with its $5.4bn purchase of graphics chip maker ATI Technologies. Announcing the deal two years ago, Ruiz said his combination offered ‘limitless’ possibilities for innovation. Instead, the future of AMD looks rather limited, in large part because of the $2.5bn it borrowed to cover its disastrous purchase of ATI. AMD’s total debt stands at $5bn, compared with just $1.6bn in cash.

Meanwhile, a chief executive who we’ve always thought must be on the hot-seat for a misguided acquisition appears to have gotten a bit of a reprieve this week. Symantec CEO John Thompson said Wednesday that fiscal first-quarter sales of its backup products outpaced overall revenue growth. That reverses the recent weakness in the company’s storage offering, which Symantec acquired with its $13.5bn purchase of Veritas in December 2004. Wall Street applauded the company’s report, with shares up about 10% since Wednesday. Still, Thompson has yet to recognize much value from the three-and-half-year-old purchase of Veritas. Symantec shares, which changed hands at $21.74 midday on Friday, are still about $6 below where they were when the company picked up Veritas. Perhaps that goes some distance to explaining the loose rumors this week that something big – possibly the much-discussed divestiture of the storage business or even an outright sale of the company – was brewing at Symantec.

Leading the acquisition

Deal Stock performance since deal Status of acquiring company CEO since deal
Symantec-Veritas, Dec. 2004 Down 35% John Thompson, CEO since April 1999, continues to serve
Alcatel-Lucent, April 2006 Down 61% CEO Russo and chairman Tchuruk ousted this week
AMD-ATI, July 2006 Down 77% Long-time CEO Hector Ruiz replaced in mid-July
Secure Computing-CipherTrust, July 2006 Down 51% Chairman and CEO John McNulty replaced in April

Source: Company reports, The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Sizing up Secure Computing

In many ways, Secure Computing’s divestiture of its authentication business to Aladdin Knowledge Systems raises more questions than it answers. Secure’s rationale for the sale is pretty simple: pay down some debt and get out of a sideline business that’s dominated by RSA and has a solid number two in Vasco Data Security. (For the record, Vasco is about four times the size of Secure’s SafeWord business and runs at a highly respected 25% operating margin.)

So it’s pretty clear why Secure was a willing seller (in fact, we hear that Secure had been a willing seller of the business for more than a year). Less clear is why Aladdin was a willing buyer of the property – at a relatively rich price of 2x sales, no less. Aladdin investors chose not to stick around for the company’s explanation of why it was willing to shell out two-thirds of its cash holdings for a product line in a cutthroat market. They fled the stock, trimming 14% off the price and sending Vasco to its lowest level since January 2004.

Of course, Secure has had an even rougher run of it on the market recently, as the company has come up short of Wall Street estimates for the past two quarters. Shares of Secure currently change hands lower than they have at any point during the past half-decade. Since the beginning of the year, the stock has shed 60%, a decline that recently cost longtime CEO James McNulty his job.

The long, uninterrupted slide in Secure’s valuation raises an even larger question about the divestiture: Was the sale of SafeWord just a prelude to an outright sale of the company itself? The numbers certainly don’t work against a deal. In fact, Secure is currently valued at basically 1x sales – just half the level it got for the divested property. (Usually, it’s the reverse, with corporate cast-offs getting sold at less than half the overall company’s valuation.)

Any planned acquisition, however, would probably have to go through Warburg Pincus, which holds the equivalent of about 7% of Secure’s common stock, going back to a financing deal it struck to help Secure buy CipherTrust in July 2006 for $264m. Warburg invested $70m at a time when Secure stock was trading at about 3x higher than it is now. With Warburg that far underwater on its holding, we can only imagine the pointed questions the private equity firm will ask Secure.

Netezza’s bogeyman

When Microsoft gets into a new market, the impact on the existing vendors tends to be in line with the software giant’s gargantuan size. After all, fears among startups over getting ‘Netscape-d’ have often been realized. That’s particularly true in the days before the convicted monopolist started putting on a softer face on its business. Gone are the days when Microsoft would threaten ‘to cut off the air supply’ of other companies, as it famously did to the Internet browser pioneer. Maybe it’s middle-aged softness at the 33-year-old company, but Microsoft’s bite often seems a little toothless these days. (Does anyone really think Microsoft – with or without spending $45bn on Yahoo – will be able to narrow the gap to Google in search advertising?)

Still, there was a moment last week when it appeared the Redmond, Wash.-based behemoth once again looked like it had the power to scare the bejesus out of a company (and its investors) by buying its way into a market. Last Thursday, as it was holding its annual meeting with Wall Street, Microsoft said it was purchasing Datallegro, a data-warehousing startup that we estimate was running at about $35m in sales. A market source indicated that rumors of the deal started percolating late Wednesday, a day before official word of the acquisition. Almost immediately, shares of data-warehousing vendor Netezza came under pressure. After hitting an intra-day high of $13.36 on Wednesday, Netezza stock slumped as much as 8% and closed basically at the low of the day. It opened even lower Thursday and sunk the entire day, finishing the session at $11.48. From its peak to its trough in those two sessions, Netezza lost 14%, with trading on Thursday about 50% busier than average.

However, as easy as it may be to point to Microsoft’s competitive move as the reason for Netezza’s decline, the two events are linked only by coincidence rather than causality. According to two market sources, Netezza actually distributed shares back to its VCs, meaning the stock’s slump can be attributed to the supply side, rather than demand side. (There have been no SEC filings about the move, and calls to the company to verify the information weren’t immediately returned.) Maybe Microsoft isn’t the big, bad company we all thought it was?

Sophos bags an elephant

In a twist on a private-public transaction, Sophos laid out on Monday a bold $340m plan to pick up Utimaco, an encryption vendor that trades on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Rather than rolling into the public company, Sophos plans to take Utimaco off the market. It plans to fund the acquisition by drawing on three sources. (My colleague, Nick Selby, has the details on the financing as well as the strategy.)

The financing is crucial because this deal is a whopper. If it goes through, it’ll be the largest IT security deal in seven months. More significantly, however, Sophos’ planned acquisition of Utimaco stands as the biggest purchase by a privately held security company. In fact, it’s nearly twice the size as the number two deal, Barracuda’s unsolicited run at Sourcefire. (And it’s not certain that deal will close at all. Sourcefire, which is slated to report second-quarter earnings on Thursday, has shot down the deal so far.)

Although Utimaco will be erased from the market, we view the disappearance as temporary. Once the two companies get through the integration, we expect Sophos to try to go public once again. (Recall that last fall, it announced plans to list on the London Stock Exchange but shelved them as the markets deteriorated.) Among the underwriters for the planned IPO was Deutsche Bank, which advised Sophos on the purchase of Utimaco. Indeed, it was the same DB banker on this deal that also co-advised on a very similar transaction last fall, McAfee’s $350m purchase of Dutch encryption vendor SafeBoot. (DB and UBS Investment Bank advised SafeBoot, while Morgan Stanley advised McAfee.)

A scratch-and-dent sale for Vignette?

With its shares currently bumping their lowest level in three years, Vignette has done little to help itself. In its second-quarter report Thursday, the dismaying decline in sales of its software continued. In the first half of 2008, Vignette has recorded just $20m in license sales, down from $30m in the first half of 2007. By way of understatement, CEO Mike Aviles acknowledged that Vignette’s software sales ‘are not where we want them’ but added additional marketing spending and recent changes in the company’s sales executives should help.

We’re not so sure those moves will help the struggling company. Vignette already spends one-third of its revenue on sales and marketing, and indicated that it may bump up that level for the rest of the year. (Not that the company has much insight into how business will run in the coming months. Consider its laughably broad guidance to Wall Street on its loss of the current quarter: It said it’ll lose something between 7 and 21 cents per share in the third quarter, representing a net loss in the period of $1.7-5m.)

One of the main reasons Vignette continues to struggle is that it’s going against some tough competition, including Oracle and IBM, as well as stand-alone content management players. For that reason, we could certainly see Vignette benefiting from being part of a larger company. And indeed, we’ve heard from two sources that the ongoing auction for Vignette has narrowed to two final parties. While we don’t know the specific names, we suspect Hewlett-Packard may well be one. (Don’t forget that the head of HP’s software division, Tom Hogan, knows Vignette intimately. Hogan served as CEO of the company from 2002-2006 before moving to HP.)

And the price for Vignette certainly isn’t prohibitive. With the stock having slid 40% over the past year, Vignette currently garners a market capitalization of just $280m. However, the debt-free company also has $90m in cash and equivalents in its bank account, lowering the net cost of Vignette to just $190m. That’s about the same level of sales it is likely to report this year. In the past, shoppers have paid 2.6 to 2.9 times enterprise value/revenue for their purchases of other publicly traded content management vendors. However, we doubt Vignette – with its slumping software sales and spendthrift marketing plans – will command that kind of multiple.

Selected significant content management deals

Date Acquirer Target Price EV/sales multiple
August 2006 IBM FileNet $1.6bn 2.6x
November 2006 Oracle Stellent $440m 2.9x

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Transatlantic cold front in M&A

In terms of North American tech companies shopping in Europe, the past year has been a case of overlooking deals rather than being over there looking for deals. Eastbound M&A (or North American acquirers of EU-based companies) totaled just $12.5bn from July 2007 through June 2008. That’s down two-thirds from the $45.2bn worth of deals inked from mid-2006 to mid-2007. The primary reason: a 15% decline in the Nasdaq and the US dollar (relative to the euro) over the past year that has sapped buying power.

Of course, the slumping greenback offered European acquirers a bit of a ‘rebate’ on their purchases. And they took advantage of that, pushing westbound M&A (or EU-based acquirers of North American companies) to a new record. From July 2007 through June 2008, European acquirers spent $30.2bn picking up North American-based companies, a 38% increase from $21.9bn in the same period in the previous year.

But even that record amount of eastbound spending wasn’t nearly enough to offset the utter disappearance of their North American counterparts. Overall spending on transatlantic tech M&A fell by more than one-third, dropping to $42.7bn from $67.1bn in the same period of the previous year. We look at the numbers and the trends in a full report that’s available here.

Transatlantic deals

Period EU to North America North America to EU Total
July 2005-June 2006 $14.5bn $19.4bn $33.9bn
July 2006-June 2007 $21.9bn $45.2bn $67.1bn
July 2007-June 2008 $30.2bn $12.5bn $42.7bn

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Cisco’s M&A machine unplugged

While Brocade Communications has used its $3bn purchase of Foundry Networks to turn up the pressure on Cisco Systems, we would quickly add that Cisco itself has hardly used M&A at all this year. Typically one of the busiest corporate acquirers, Cisco has averaged about a deal per month in recent years. However, so far this year, the networking giant has acquired just one company, DiviTech. (In addition to last month’s purchase of the tiny Danish company, the only other announced move in 2008 was snapping up the 20% stake in its subsidiary Nuova Systems that it didn’t already own.)

Earlier this year, we noted that Cisco was rumored to be making a run at Citrix. Although that speculation initially helped boost Citrix shares, they have since sunk to a 52-week low. The decline over the past three months has shaved a half-billion dollars off Citrix’s market capitalization, representing a decent ‘rebate’ for any acquirer of the infrastructure software vendor. It currently sports a $5bn market capitalization. In the past, Cisco has shown itself ready to seal multibillion-dollar deals, including its $6.9bn purchase of Scientific-Atlanta in late 2005 and its $3.2bn acquisition of WebEx Communications in March 2007. Cisco is slated to report its fiscal 2008 results in two weeks.

 Cisco’s disappearing deals

Period Deal volume Deal value Notable acquisitions
Jan. 1 – July 21, 2005 7 $899m FineGround Networks, Airespace, Topspin Communications
Jan. 1 – July 21, 2006 4 $143m Meetinghouse Data Communications, SyPixx Networks
Jan. 1 – July 21, 2007 9 $4.2bn WebEx Communications, IronPort Systems, Neopath Networks
Jan. 1 – July 21, 2008 1 undisclosed DiviTech

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Star-crossed companies?

Having already made a pair of profitable on-demand investments, venture firm StarVest Partners has decided to take a larger bite in its most recent software-as-a-service (SaaS) deal. The New York City-based firm recently led the majority acquisition of Iron Solutions, which provides online information about used farm and industrial machinery. (Want to buy a John Deere tractor? There are nearly 2,900 of them for sale on the Iron Solutions site.) StarVest put up $8.5m of the $15m for 90% of Iron Solutions, with the remaining money coming from Dublin Capital Partners, Spring Mountain Capital and GVIC Communications.

The deal caught our eye because StarVest was also an early investor in NetSuite, owning 5% of the company according to the S-1 filed ahead of NetSuite’s IPO in 2007. (StarVest’s other SaaS exit came when Dell paid $155m in cash for portfolio company MessageOne, an on-demand email archiving company run by Michael Dell’s brother.)

StarVest’s interest in NetSuite dates back to May 2000, when it led a Series C investment in the SaaS applications suite vendor together with Oracle head honcho Larry Ellison. (Ellison, of course, is the co-founder and majority owner of NetSuite.) Iron Solutions and NetSuite teamed up in October 2007 to provide industry-specific applications for agricultural equipment dealerships, and the on-demand player often uses that example to illustrate how its software can be tailored to a specific industry.

Does StarVest’s simplification of the capital structure at Iron Solutions make a sale more likely, perhaps making the firm a broker in a deal between a pair of portfolio companies? (We would note that Oak Investment Partners recently played matchmaker in an inter-portfolio marriage of two SaaS companies.)

Speculation about a possible purchase of Iron Solutions by NetSuite may be a bit of a stretch. However, it’s worth noting that NetSuite’s only acquisition so far has been a vertical deal: the $31m purchase of OpenAir, which helped boost NetSuite’s services industry expertise.

Perhaps NetSuite could broaden the focus of Iron Solutions’ online marketplace, appraisal and valuation services to a much wider market. The applications vendor has already begun to offer applications tailored for light manufacturing and has voiced a desire to add in heavy manufacturing in the future. If it’s serious about those moves, NetSuite may well find that Iron Solutions’ equipment marketplace and other know-how come in handy. The two sides, and their backers, certainly know each other well enough.

Selected StarVest exits

Company Event
MessageOne Sale to Dell for $155m
NetSuite IPO in December 2007

TomorrowNot

There will be no more tomorrows for TomorrowNow. SAP, which bought the software maintenance provider in January 2005, said Monday it’s shuttering the division. Even though the German giant is killing off TomorrowNow, the lawsuit involving its subsidiary will live on. Recall that Oracle sued SAP more than a year ago, alleging TomorrowNow illegally downloaded information about Oracle’s support program. (SAP initially acquired TomorrowNow as a way to siphon off some of the rich maintenance stream that Oracle collects for supporting its application. Ironically, SAP launched the program with the title ‘Safe Passage.’)

Since the original lawsuit was filed in March 2007, the scope of it has broadened. Oracle is now seeking $1bn in damages. With TomorrowNow facing that kind of a hit, it’s perhaps not surprising that SAP, which had been shopping the division for several months now, found no willing buyer. We can only imagine the lengths that SAP must have gone through to write around the potential $1bn liability in putting together a pitch-book for TomorrowNow. However SAP worded the ‘for sale’ ad, it failed to generate any interest, even with the person who probably knows more about the business than anyone else.

Seth Ravin, who founded and ultimately sold TomorrowNow to SAP, has since moved on and founded a similar business supplying discounted support for ERP applications, Rimini Street. Although Rimini Street may have looked at bulking up through acquiring TomorrowNow, reports indicated that the company passed on a deal. We can only imagine how much SAP wishes it go back in time and pass on the TomorrowNow deal, which has brought it so much trouble.

Troubled timeline

Date Event
Jan. 2005 SAP acquires TomorrowNow
March 2007 Oracle sues SAP, alleging illegal corporate espionage
Nov. 2007 SAP looks to sell off TomorrowNow
April 2008 Oracle expands lawsuit
Feb. 2010 Case scheduled to be heard in court