Corel erases iGrafx from its portfolio

Contact: Brenon Daly

A decade after picking up iGrafx, the private equity-backed Corel firm has divested the business process management (BPM) software company to newly formed buyout shop The Limerock Group. The move should allow new focus and resources for iGrafx, which was always an odd fit inside Corel. For its part, iGrafx sold almost entirely to enterprises, while Corel is known as a home for many faded, second-rate consumer brands, such as WordPerfect and PaintShop.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the iGrafx business suffered from a bit of neglect inside Corel. At one point, we understand the business was generating about $20m in sales, although it is probably only running at about half that level now. One area that iGrafx will undoubtedly look to expand is around consulting and other services that tend to play a not-insignificant part of BPM deployments. IGrafx may look to build that up through internal development, or the newly capitalized company could tuck-in a small consulting shop.

The move by Limerock, a firm founded by the team that built and eventually sold NetQoS for $200m, comes after a number of big-name buyers have inked BPM deals of their own over the past two years. (Limerock was advised by Northside Advisors, while Pagemill Partners worked the other side.) Significant acquirers that have bought their way into the market since mid-2009 include IBM, Software AG, Progress Software and Open Text. Valuations for these BPM deals has ranged from roughly 1x sales to almost 6x sales. Given iGrafx’s slumping sales and its awkward fit inside Corel, we suspect the business would have likely traded at the low end of that range.

Jive talkin’ on Wall Street

by Brenon Daly

Despite one of the more inhospitable environments for IPOs, Jive Software has put in its paperwork for a $100m offering. The company, which sells a social network for businesses, has seen revenue nearly triple from 2008 to $46m last year. In the first half of this year, Jive has continued its strong growth on the top line, pushing revenue up 77%. Assuming it continues to track to that level, it would finish 2011 at about $80m in sales.

Clearly, that growth is what Jive will be selling on Wall Street. And that pitch seems to have caught the attention of IPO investors, at least looking at recent offerings that resemble the planned IPO from Jive. For instance, the financials of Cornerstone OnDemand, which went public in March, line up very similarly with those at Jive. Both companies are relatively immature, having only really begun generating any revenue of note in 2007 and still finishing 2010 with less than $50m in sales. Further, neither Jive nor Cornerstone have been running their businesses at an operating profit, much less a net profit, in recent years.

Not that the ‘sub-scale size’ or red ink has hurt Cornerstone on the Nasdaq. The company hit the market at about $900m, and even after the historical declines on the broad market earlier this month, it is still valued at close to $700m. That works out to an incredibly rich valuation of almost 13 times trailing sales. So maybe Cornerstone’s eye-popping multiple has something to do with Jive’s decision to file its prospectus, even as the market and the economic outlook have deteriorated since Cornerstone debuted.

RealPage gets diluted on a deal

by Brenon Daly

Exactly a year after going public, RealPage on Monday evening announced its largest-ever acquisition. However, the $74m cash-and-stock purchase of MyNewPlace didn’t exactly go over with Wall Street as the property management software vendor might have hoped. The recently minted shares of RealPage dropped 11% on heavy trading, hitting their lowest level since just about a month after their debut.

The concern? The acquisition will lower earnings at the company, trimming non-GAAP net income at RealPage by more than $1m this year. Conscious of the dilution, RealPage opened the conference call discussing the deal in an almost apologetic tone, acknowledging that it paid ‘a lot’ for MyNewPlace. In fact, the purchase price of this latest transaction is only slightly more than RealPage paid, collectively, in its three previous acquisitions.

But on the other side, the deal positions the company to be more relevant in the lead generation part of the rental housing market, which is undergoing dramatic changes. During the call, the company estimated that it would take five years and an investment of $30-40m to build a business, internally, that would do what MyNewPlace does right now. So, RealPage billed the purchase as a play to be more relevant in the long term. After a year on the market, we would have thought that RealPage would already know enough about the myopic vision on Wall Street to not talk about delayed gratification from acquisitions.

Stepping to the sidelines

Contact: Brenon Daly

Despite a few high-profile acquisitions recently, companies are tempering their buying plans for the rest of the year. At least that’s what they indicated in our ‘flash’ survey of corporate development executives, which we closed last week after a record turnout. Nearly 100 respondents offered their views on what they expect in both the M&A market as well as for IPOs for the balance of 2011.

In terms of projected activity at their own companies, just one-third of the respondents indicated that they expected their company to pick up the pace of M&A during the rest of the year. That’s down from 50% who said that for full-year 2011 in our main survey back in December. On the other side, the number projecting a slowdown in their own shopping more than doubled from 7% to 18% here in August.

For a full discussion of the survey – along with our own projections for deal flow, valuation and trends for the rest of 2011 – please join us Tuesday at 11:00am PST for a special webinar on tech M&A. Registration for the free one-hour event can be found here.

A longshot for Leo?

Contact: Brenon Daly

Hewlett-Packard is now, officially, Leo Apotheker’s company. Since his somewhat surprising appointment as HP’s chief executive last fall, Apotheker has been taking small steps while also dropping big hints that he would be recasting the tech giant. But few observers could have imagined the almost unprecedented scope of the transition that Apotheker laid out late Thursday: HP will be integrating the largest acquisition in the software industry in seven years while simultaneously looking into selling off its hardware business.

Wall Street appears to be skeptical that HP can pull that off, as shares in the company on Friday sank to their lowest level since mid-2006. (Incidentally, that’s just before Apotheker’s predecessor, Mark Hurd, took over the company.) On their own, either one of HP’s dramatic moves (working through the top-dollar acquisition of Autonomy Corp and possibly selling the world’s largest PC maker) would be enough to keep any company busy. Taken together, the combination appears doubly difficult. And that’s even more the case for HP, which, to be candid, has a spotty record on M&A.

Consider this: Autonomy will be slotted into HP’s software unit, which has been built primarily via M&A. But that division runs at a paltry 19% operating margin, less than half the rate of many large software companies, including Autonomy itself. And then there’s the $13.9bn HP spent in mid-2008 for EDS in an effort to become a services giant. So far this year, however, that business hasn’t put up any growth. And perhaps most damning is the fact that HP now doesn’t really know what it will do with its hardware business – a unit that largely comes from the multibillion-dollar purchases of Compaq Computer and Palm Inc.

Microsemi opens the hostilities

Contact: Brenon Daly

In a bear-hug letter last month, Microsemi warned fellow chipmaker Zarlink Semiconductor that it was ready to ‘take all necessary actions’ to consolidate the Canadian company. On Wednesday, that came to pass: Microsemi said it would bypass Zarlink’s board, which shot down the unsolicited offer, and take its $549m all-cash bid directly to shareholders. Incidentally, the opening of this hostile offer in the semiconductor industry came on the same day that SABMiller launched its $10bn hostile bid for Australian brewer Foster’s Group.

Going hostile in deals is relatively rare, as the drawn-out procedure can be expensive and disruptive to business on both sides. Further, in the tech industry, the conventional wisdom has always been that hostile approaches would cause an exodus of employees at the target company, undermining the very reason for the acquisition. (Given our realpolitik view of the world, we’ve always been a little bit skeptical about that bromide. We just can’t help but think back a few years ago to how PeopleSoft, with its culture of hugs and Hawaiian shirts, stood up to the relentless push by Oracle.)

Whatever the theoretical concerns, Microsemi must have certainly factored them in before launching the offer. The company says it has the financing in place, and will have its bid open through September 22. (Morgan Stanley and Stifel Nicolaus Weisel are advising Microsemi, while Ottawa-based Zarlink is relying on RBC Capital Markets.) It’s hard to know exactly which way Zarlink shareholders will go on this one, but we can’t help but note that shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange have already traded through the bid since Microsemi floated its offer.

A little something for your trouble

Contact: Brenon Daly

Breaking up is hard to do. And it can be expensive, too. But as a pair of deals this week shows, the costs aren’t necessarily borne equally by the two sides in a planned transaction. In the higher-profile case, the market is buzzing that Google may be on the hook for a $2.5bn payment to Motorola Mobility if that deal unravels. If that’s the case, the payment (known as a reverse breakup fee) would be 6-7 times larger than the payment Google would stand to pocket if Motorola Mobility walks away from the transaction.

That gap is much wider than is seen in deals that feature reverse breakup fees, where a would-be buyer might face a fee that would be closer to twice the amount the seller might pay. That’s how it is, for instance, in Permira’s planned $440m buyout of education software maker Renaissance Learning. According to terms of Tuesday’s leveraged buyout (LBO), if Permira walks away from the transaction, it will have to come up with $26m, or nearly 6% of the equity value of the proposed deal. On the other side, if Renaissance Learning backs away, it will have to hand over just $13m, or about 3% of the equity value.

Reverse breakup fees have long been an accepted way for a would-be seller to receive compensation for any risks in getting a transaction closed. (The rationale is that the disruption in business due to an acquisition is much greater to the target company than the acquirer, so the greater potential risk is offset by a greater potential reward.) Of course, these fees are far more common in LBOs than when the deal is struck between two companies, like Google buying Motorola Mobility. But then again, the search giant – going back to its Dutch auction IPO and continuing to today’s practice of not giving quarterly financial guidance – has never been a company that really follows Wall Street convention.

Google gets discounted Droids

Contact: Brenon Daly

Google didn’t have to reach too deeply to fatten its patent portfolio as it also becomes one of the few vertically integrated smartphone and tablet makers. Sure, it will have to hand over $12.5bn in cash for Motorola Mobility to cover its planned purchase of the hardware manufacturer. But it will immediately get back some $3bn in cash from Motorola Mobility, as well as an undisclosed amount of tax advantages that can be used to lower the amount of taxes that the wildly profitable search giant will face in the future. Even setting aside the very real tax breaks, Google is on the hook for just $9.5bn for Motorola Mobility.

The enterprise value of $9.5bn works out to just 0.75 times the $12.7bn of revenue that Motorola Mobility has generated over the past four quarters. That’s less than half the median valuation (1.8x trailing sales) of all tech transactions announced so far this year, according to our calculations. Further, it’s just one-third the multiple of 2.2x trailing sales that we calculated for the 50 largest deals (by equity value) so far this year.

More relevantly, it’s half a turn less than Hewlett-Packard paid in 2010 to bolster its integrated mobile strategy. Last April, HP paid $1.4bn for Palm Inc in a transaction that valued the struggling company at some 1.1x sales. (And we could certainly make the case that Motorola Mobility is in better financial shape than Palm, which was burning cash amid a dramatic sales slowdown.) Another way to look at it: Google’s bid values Motorola Mobility only slightly above the current market multiple for fellow mobile device vendor Research In Motion. But then, we should add that shares in the Blackberry maker are currently changing hands at their lowest level in a half-decade.

A ‘patently’ big deal for Google

Contact: Brenon Daly

Google said Monday that it plans to hand over $12.5bn in cash for Motorola Mobility, spending more for the mobile company than it has, collectively, on the more than 100 acquisitions it has done in its history. The deal makes it more likely that Google, which will continue to offer its Android OS free to other handset manufactures, will be able to more deeply integrate the hardware and software on future devices. Additionally, Google will be gaining substantial heft in its patent portfolio, with the Motorola division counting some 17,000 issued patents and another 7,500 pending. That’s a key concern for Google, which has found itself at the center of several IP-related lawsuits.

Under terms, Google will pay $40 for each share of Motorola Mobility, for an equity value of some $12.5bn. While the bid represents a premium of 65% over the previous closing price of Motorola Mobility, it is only slightly above the price the shares fetched on their own in the days following their debut back in January. (Under pressure from activist investors including Carl Icahn, 80-year-old Motorola split itself into two companies at the start of 2011. The remaining company, Motorola Solutions, sells primarily networking and communications technology and is unaffected by Google’s proposed acquisition of the smaller but faster-growing mobile division.)

In looking at the price, however, we should note that Google will enjoy a substantial ‘rebate’ when the deal closes because Motorola Mobility basically carried no debt but held nearly $3bn in cash. So Google’s net cost is closer to $9.5bn, which works out to just 0.75x the $12.7bn of revenue that Motorola Mobility has generated over the past four quarters. Google shares, which have underperformed the Nasdaq for nearly all of 2011, were down slightly Monday on an otherwise up day on Wall Street. We’ll have a full report on the transaction in tonight’s Daily 451.

Summing up the IPO calculus

Contact: Brenon Daly

At the risk of oversimplifying the market for new offerings this week, we might nonetheless formulate an equation like this: AAA to AA+ = RW. Spelled out, that means: The historic downgrade in the credit worthiness of the US contributed to some of the bloodiest days Wall Street has seen, which in turn contributed to many IPO candidates deciding to scrap their planned offering. (Companies formally do this by filing what’s known as an RW form, for ‘Registration Withdrawal,’ with the SEC.)

Amid the choppy trading this week, both WageWorks and Trustwave shelved their proposed IPOs, which were originally expected to raise, collectively, about $200m for the companies. Instead, they’ll be heading home empty-handed from their aborted push to the public market. (The sole tech firm that made it to market, online backup vendor Carbonite, did so only after trimming its offering, which meant raising one-third less money than planned.)

While WageWorks and Trustwave – both of which have been active acquirers, even as private companies – will undoubtedly miss that windfall from their planned IPOs, the decision to scrap the offerings this week was inevitable. For a bit of context, consider this: When the two companies originally filed their paperwork to go public back in April, the Nasdaq was roughly 10% higher and the overall market volatility (as measured by the CBOE Volatility Index, or VIX) was less than half the level it is now.