IBM and HP bag big game on M&A safari

Contact: Brenon Daly

With the news today that Hewlett-Packard is closing its recent pickup of Fortify Software, we wanted to take the opportunity to point out that the deal almost belongs in the minority of M&A moves HP has made so far this year. What are we talking about? Basically, that the tech giant has been doing giant deals. Of the seven acquisitions HP has announced so far in 2010, fully three of them have been valued at more than $1bn.

We noted in mid-April, which is before it inked any of its three 10-digit acquisitions, that HP had telegraphed to the market that it was going to do fewer transactions, but they were going to be bigger deals. (And we should add that its purchase of application security vendor Fortify wasn’t just a pocket-change deal. We understand that it paid $275m or so for the company.)

What’s interesting to note is that in the five months since we indicated that HP would be big-game hunting, one other company has joined it on safari: IBM. Big Blue has inked a pair of deals valued at more than $1bn since April – the pickup of AT&T’s Sterling Commerce business as well as Monday’s purchase of Netezza. Along the way, it has also done a steady flow of transactions valued at $150m-500.

Altogether, we calculate the tab for Big Blue’s five-month shopping spree at roughly $4.8bn for its nine acquisitions. (Incidentally, the amount of cash it spent is basically the same amount its business generated over that same period.) Meanwhile, HP spent about $1bn more ($5.8bn in disclosed or estimated deal values) on its seven purchases since mid-April. Taken together, these two companies have averaged about $2bn of M&A spending in each of the past five months. And they were sniping at each other about ‘buying’ R&D? Really?

M&A activity since mid-April 2010

Company Number of acquisitions Total M&A spending
HP 7 $5.8bn*
IBM 9 $4.8bn*

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase *Includes disclosed and estimated deal values

A bit of Big Blue inconsistency

Contact: Brenon Daly

Perhaps Mark Hurd feels vindicated. No, we’re not referring to the former Hewlett-Packard chief executive settling a lawsuit with his old shop. Instead, we’re talking about IBM’s stunning flip-flop with regard to high-profile M&A by itself and rival HP. At the least, Big Blue’s recent comments now appear inconsistent; at the worst, they smack of hypocrisy.

The specifics: A week ago, Big Blue’s CEO was blasting HP for ‘overpaying’ for deals, and for relying on M&A rather than R&D. Ironically, Sam Palmisano made these comments just as his own company was putting the final touches on its acquisition of Netezza, a deal that values the data-warehousing vendor at nearly 7 times this year’s forecasted sales for the current fiscal year. That’s more than twice the median software valuation, and basically matches the valuation that HP is handing over for ArcSight.

Incidentally, both transactions valued the targets, which had only come public within the past three years, at their highest-ever valuations. But if we look at how the shares of ArcSight and Netezza have performed so far this year, it becomes very clear that IBM was the much more aggressive suitor. Excluding the pop ArcSight shares got when word of a deal leaked in late August, the security vendor’s stock had only ticked up about 10%. In contrast, Netezza stock had run 150% from January to the day before Big Blue announced its purchase.

A Big Blue move into the data warehousing market

Contact: Brenon Daly

A little more than three years after Netezza debuted on the NYSE, the data-warehousing vendor is being erased from the Big Board at basically twice its valuation at the time of its IPO. Under terms, IBM is handing over $27 in cash for each share of Netezza, which went public at $12 in July 2007. However, after the strong debut, which valued the company at around $1bn, gravity set in on Netezza shares. They spent most of 2008 and all of 2009 under the $12 offer price.

Earlier this summer, however, Netezza shares started running. The run was fueled by strong second-quarter results that saw total revenue surge 45%, as well as lingering M&A rumors. (We noted in early July that we had heard EMC was interested in Netezza before it opted for rival data-warehousing vendor Greenplum. IBM’s bid values Netezza at twice the level it was trading at the time.)

As Netezza shares continued climbing to new highs on the market, the move whittled away the premium Big Blue is offering. Compared to the previous day’s close, IBM is paying just a 10% premium for Netezza. But judged against where Netezza was trading a month ago, the premium is 80%. We would add that Netezza shares have traded above the $27 bid since the open Monday morning. UBS advised IBM, while Qatalyst Partners advised Netezza.

Based on the enterprise value of $1.7bn given by IBM, the offer values Netezza at 8.9 times sales in its fiscal year that ended in January. (As a trading comparison, Teradata currently garners a valuation that’s about one-third that level.) At the end of its second quarter, Netezza guided Wall Street to expect about $250m in sales for the current fiscal year, meaning IBM is paying 6.8x projected sales. While that is a relatively rich valuation, it’s much lower than rival EMC paid in its big data-warehousing purchase. We understand that it handed over $400m for Greenplum, which was running at about $30m in sales.

Any deals to be done in open source content management market?

Contact: Brenon Daly, Kathleen Reidy

Following a massive wave of consolidation that swept through the enterprise content management (ECM) market, the list of significant vendors has basically narrowed to a handful of tech giants. Essentially, it’s just one stand-alone ECM provider with other software companies offering ECM as part of their broader portfolio. All of them have done deals to expand their ECM business, with the collective bill for acquisitions across the sector topping more than $12bn since 2002.

However, all of that activity has been done by – and for – proprietary software firms. In a recent report, my colleague Kathleen Reidy analyzes how M&A might play out for open source content management startups. Granted, the market is still young, with many of the startups still bootstrapped. (Reidy looks at a dozen potential open source content management targets, including their funding and their focus.)

So which startup might be the first to go? We speculate that Alfresco Software could eventually find itself inside a larger company. However, it probably won’t be the company we initially thought it would be. Adobe and Alfresco have a tight relationship, with Adobe embedding an Alfresco repository in its LiveCycle for content services like workflow, indexing and version control. But with Adobe reaching across the Atlantic for Day Software, it probably has all the Web content management technology it needs.

OpenPages: a restart that finished strong

Contact: Brenon Daly

In the startup world, a restart rarely goes anywhere. What typically happens is a company swaps one failing business plan for another, with the inevitable wind-down delayed only by a fresh round of capital. Yet that’s not the case with OpenPages, which secured a solid exit with its sale to IBM after completely overhauling its business.

OpenPages, which sells software for the governance, risk and compliance (GRC) market, has virtually nothing in common with the company that started out in 1996. As its name implies, OpenPages was originally a content management vendor. The firm survived the dot-com bust, but only after trimming its headcount from more than 300 down to 15. In the aftermath, it also switched to Plan B for the business: GRC.

Although the initial draw to the GRC space was Sarbanes-Oxley, OpenPages found success in the broader market. By 2006, Sarbanes-Oxley only accounted for about 15% of revenue at the firm. As it recast its business, OpenPages also recapitalized the business. It raised some $10m in 2004 and added another $10m in 2007. (Back in the Bubble Era, it had raised about $60m from investors.)

The sale to IBM makes a fair amount of sense, both strategically and financially. Big Blue and OpenPages have been partners for at least three years. In addition to OpenPages’ technology fitting well with the BI portfolio IBM acquired with Cognos, there’s also a large chunk of services revenue that Big Blue can pocket around an OpenPages implementation. (OpenPages has some 140 customers.)

And, at least as we understand the deal, the exit valued OpenPages at a healthy 5 times its estimated $35m in sales. (Both the price and the valuation line up almost exactly with the other large GRC deal of the year, EMC’s purchase of Archer Technologies back in January.) In our view, whatever valuation OpenPages got should probably be viewed as a rich one when we consider the fact that the company nearly died penniless earlier in its life.

Is HP overcompensating?

Contact: Brenon Daly

Since when does an army without its top general go on the attack? That strategy would seem to go against convention, yet Hewlett-Packard has done just that since dumping Mark Hurd for his foibles. The tech giant has chased a pair of deals to valuations that are basically 2-3 times the prevailing market multiple. HP’s recent bidding war over 3PAR and the purchase of ArcSight shows a level of aggressiveness that indicates to us that the drivers for the acquisitions may have been emotional as well as financial, at least to a small degree.

If we step back and look at the setting for both deals, we can’t help but conclude that HP announced the transactions at a time when it looked vulnerable. Its star CEO had dramatically crashed back to earth, while its board (yet again) appeared to have bungled what looked like a fairly routine internal investigation. Statements by the company that it was ‘business as usual’ didn’t get much of a hearing on Wall Street. Shares that changed hands in the low $50s in April have been worth less than $40 for much of the past month. HP’s market cap lingers below $100bn, despite the company ringing up sales of about $120bn.

At the risk of drifting too far into psychology, we wonder if the deals weren’t a bit of overcompensation. (Certainly, paying 11x trailing sales for 3PAR might be considered overcompensation, or at the least, ‘heavy compensation,’ if you’ll forgive the pun.) If investors and others were going to view HP as weak or directionless while its corner office was empty, well, HP could use its vast resources to counter with a signal to remind everyone that it was formidable, with or without a fulltime CEO. Of course, we’re just playing armchair psychologist here. But something beyond just straight numbers seemed to be at work in HP’s recent moves.

A second exits gets ArcSight a 2x valuation

Contact: Brenon Daly

Hewlett-Packard’s pending purchase of ArcSight is the third IT security deal so far this year valued at more than $1bn, after not having a single security transaction valued in 10 digits in 2009. While the other two deals have gone off at basically market multiples, ArcSight is being valued at twice that level. The largest ESIM vendor agreed to sell itself to HP for $43.50 per share, valuing the security firm at more than four times the level it went public just two and a half years ago.

HP put the enterprise value of the transaction, which is slated to close by the end of the year, at $1.5bn. That means the tech giant is paying 7.5 times ArcSight’s trailing sales of $200m. (For the current fiscal year, ArcSight is expected to put up about $225m in sales, meaning HP is paying about 6.7x projected sales.) On a trailing basis, both McAfee and VeriSign’s identity and authentication business garnered 3.5x sales in their respective sales to Intel and Symantec. (Morgan Stanley advised both McAfee and ArcSight, while JP Morgan Securities advised VeriSign.)

The high-multiple deal represents a stunningly successful outcome for ArcSight. As we have mentioned in the past, both HP and McAfee approached ArcSight in the summer of 2007, ahead of the company’s IPO. We gather that both were bidders in the range of $600-750m. Unlike other dual-track candidates, ArcSight didn’t opt for the trade sale, but went ahead with its offering even as the equity market turned bearish. ArcSight spent virtually its entire first year as a public company trading in the single digits, including a fair amount of time below its offer price. (At one point when its shares were underwater, CA Technologies lobbed a low-ball bid at the firm, we understand.) If we had to guess at another suitor in the current process around ArcSight, we might tap EMC as an interested party.

Even as its stock took off over the past two years, ArcSight never did a secondary offering. (For a company with about $200m in sales, it has a very narrow base of shares, totaling only about 38 million.) In this case, the unwillingness to sell shares – either a small chunk or all of them – except at an eye-popping valuation has generated a return that seems reminiscent of the late 1990s. ArcSight raised only about $30m to build a business that got valued at 55 times that level on the exit.

Economic realities set in for boutiques

Contact: Brenon Daly

Already this month, we’ve tallied deals advised by boutique banks including Revolution Partners, Pagemill Partners, GCA Savvian and others. The firms are all part of an increasingly crowded low end of the tech M&A market, which we covered more fully in a special report on boutique banks. Consider this fact: Each year, more than 100 distinct firms advise on at least one transaction closed. (We track that information in The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase and use it in our annual league table rankings.)

Despite the increasing number of boutiques, their share of the market continues to decline, at least when looked at on the basis of percentage of overall M&A spending. In 2009, spending on transactions advised by boutiques fell to just 6% of overall tech M&A – down from about 10% of advised spending in both 2007 and 2008. That cutthroat competition has left more than a few small advisory shops desperately trying to keep their doors open.

We wouldn’t at all be surprised if some of the boutiques started to wind up their practices later this year, with some partners moving on to other firms while other partners get out of the business altogether. In some ways, a thinning of the ranks is overdue, at least according to the industry itself (bankers can be so cold-blooded). In each of our past two annual surveys of tech investment bankers, by far the more likely change they predicted for the overall banking landscape was the shutdown of boutique banks. In late 2008, roughly four out of five tech bankers told us that a number of boutiques were likely to close their doors in 2009, while last December, more than two out of three bankers said the same thing about this year.

Advisory market share*

Firm classification 2007 2008 2009
Boutique 9% 11% 6%
Bulge boutique 9% 6% 11%
Full-service midmarket 15% 14% 9%
Bulge bracket 67% 69% 74%

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

*Based on disclosed and estimated deal values, as percentage of overall annual M&A spending

Fat cat bankers? More like alley cat bankers

Contact: Brenon Daly, Adam Phipps

If the recent upheaval in the tech advisory practices at bulge-bracket banks was primarily caused by exotic financial instruments that nobody could really understand or even value, the shakeup looming for boutique banks has its roots in something much more fundamental: supply and demand. Essentially, there is an ever-shrinking number of tech M&A mandates available for an ever-growing number of firms.

With all the scrapping and discounting in the low end of the market, many boutiques are finding that getting a print these days is a costly bit of business. So what happened that turned the boutique bankers’ once-profitable and vibrant practice into a market where they’re all tripping over each other to pitch and then trying to undercut each other on price? We’ll look at that question – and the implications of the answer – in a special report on boutique banks in tonight’s Daily 451.

Shrinking mandates

Year Number of sell-side transactions*
2010 300 (annualized number, based on Jan. 1-Aug. 15 activity)
2009 296
2008 397
2007 464

*US-based technology companies, excluding telcos, that used advisers

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

A deal in sight for ArchSight?

Contact: Brenon Daly

If nothing else, the long Labor Day weekend gave us all a chance to catch our breath following a week of some of the most frenetic dealmaking we’ve seen in some time. We had bidding wars, doubleheader deals and even a billion-dollar chip transaction. But in some ways, the loudest buzz in the tech M&A market came from a deal that didn’t happen: ArcSight still stands on its own.

The ESIM vendor was supposedly in play, at least according to a thinly sourced and almost woefully vague recent article in The Wall Street Journal. Not to pick apart the piece, but listing a half-dozen of the largest tech companies as ‘potential bidders’ misses a great deal of context. For instance, we noted two and a half years ago that Hewlett-Packard was rumored to have offered about $600m for ArcSight the summer before it went public. ArcSight is now worth twice HP’s rumored bid, and roughly four times the amount the market valued it at when it came onto the Nasdaq in February 2008, just before the IPO window pretty much slammed shut. (For the record, Morgan Stanley led the ArcSight offering.)

That stellar aftermarket performance raises another interesting point about ArcSight: despite the fact that its shares have quadrupled during a time when the Nasdaq has essentially flat-lined, the company has never done a secondary offering. It has just 37 million shares outstanding. That strikes us a narrow base for a firm with $200m in sales and a market valuation of more than $1bn. But maybe the company figures it shouldn’t bother selling shares at current market prices if it stands to get a substantial takeout premium on top of that. For our part, we wouldn’t at all be surprised to see ArcSight get a second exit.