Category: investment banking

A management ‘buy-under’ at Silicon Storage Technology?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

In the third-quarter earnings report for Silicon Storage Technology at the end of October, chief executive Bing Yeh went out of his way to tout the vastly improving outlook for the flash memory vendor. Yeh noted that end-market demand had recovered and pricing had firmed up in what had been a pretty tough market. Third-quarter sales picked up sequentially and the company actually posted black numbers after three straight quarters of losses. The rebound was expected to continue in the fourth quarter, with a profit forecast for the period, as well.

And yet, the price that Yeh and his buyout partners at Prophet Equity bid for SST last week is actually lower than the vendor’s share price on the day Yeh made his comments about the rosy outlook for the company he heads. In fact, over the past two months, shares of SST have only traded below the proposed sale price of $2.10 in 11 of the 46 trading days. Looked at another way, the proposed management buyout (MBO) of SST represents a ‘take-under’ (rather than a takeover) when compared to the closing price in three out of four sessions since early September.

By their very nature, MBOs are fraught with conflict. In cases like SST, where executives plan to roll over their stakes in the company, the executives are effectively both buyers and sellers of the firm. (According to SST’s proxy, Yeh holds roughly 11% of all shares, making him the single-largest owner of the vendor.) The conflict emerges when we look at the basic economic self-interest on both sides of the transaction: The owners of SST (including Yeh) want to get as high a price as possible in the sale of their business, while the buyers (including Yeh) want to pay as low a price as possible to purchase the business.

Beyond the mismatch of motivation in MBOs, there’s also the thorny issue that executives almost certainly have insights on their business that aren’t available to other owners. We would guess that Yeh, who helped found SST 20 years ago and also serves as the chairman of the company’s board, probably knows more about the firm’s business and its prospects than anyone else on the planet.

At least one other insider at SST, however, didn’t share the support of the below-market MBO. Board member Bryant Riley, the founder of the Southern California investment firm B. Riley & Co., voted against the proposed buyout and then resigned from the board. (It’s worth noting that Riley got his seat in May 2008 only after agreeing to stop pestering the company about ‘strategic alternatives.’) Most SST investors – at least those who don’t stand to have a stake in the privately held company – have also voted against the deal. Shares have traded above the offer price since the bid was revealed November 12.

Google, the not-so-gentle giant, steps into mobile apps

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly, Chris Hazelton

In order to grow and foster broad support, technology platforms need to be open and inclusive. Of course, that’s a sentiment that runs counter to M&A, which by definition is selective and exclusionary. (See our earlier report on how selecting a company to buy often means giving a ring to one while giving the finger to another.) The all-embracing aspect of platforms is one of the main reasons why platform providers (notably Apple and Salesforce.com) have not inked many acquisitions.

We’ve been musing on this in recent days as we’ve tallied up the valuation devastation brought on by Google’s announcement that it will give away free navigation services for certain mobile phones. One of the hardest-hit companies, Garmin, has shed some $1.8bn in market capitalization in the two weeks since Google announced its move. We also noted that Google Maps Navigation is likely to weigh on the IPO of TeleNav, even though the offering won’t hit the market until next spring. And pity poor Networks in Motion (NiM), which has built its business largely on Verizon Wireless, which just happens to be the network that will be the first to offer Google’s free navigation, albeit on a very limited basis. (Although a bit smaller and less profitable than TeleNav, NiM still has a solid business, likely finishing this year at $75m in revenue and hoping to hit $100m in 2010.)

So what does navigation software (whether free or fee) have to do with platforms? Well, remember that Google Maps Navigation is only available (for now at least) on devices that run Android, Google’s mobile OS that effectively serves as the vendor’s mobile platform. So rather than just be a platform provider and let startups develop software on top of that, Google has also stepped into the applications market with its turn-by-turn navigation offering. We would note that this product, which collectively generates hundreds of millions of dollars in fees each year, is one of the few mobile applications that subscribers are willing to pay serious money for.

So in strict economic terms, it’s easy to see why Google is willing to run roughshod over current and potential ISVs as it rolls out its own turn-by-turn navigation offering. Of course, to realize the full potential of the service (where Google infuses ads and paid search results into navigation, as it has done with wild success for Internet searches), the company will need to push it to other mobile platforms.

While most of the focus on Google’s mobile moves has been on that expansion, we can’t help but consider the subtler implications of what it’s already done. The key concern: We wonder whether Google Maps Navigation could undermine the company’s effort to attract other mobile application developers to the Android platform. Not that Google seems particularly worried about throwing elbows in the mobile software development market. After all, coincidentally or not, it timed the announcement of its turn-by-turn navigation product to come just two days before the maker of a rival product filed its IPO paperwork. That’s a curious bit of synchronicity from a vendor that has ‘don’t be evil’ as its informal motto.

Profiting from the battle for the datacenter

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Although the battle between Hewlett-Packard and Cisco Systems over outfitting datacenters is still playing out, some winners have already emerged. First and foremost, the shareholders of 3Com have benefitted tremendously from the turf war between the two tech titans. On Wednesday, HP said it is picking up 3Com for $3.1bn, bolstering its ProCurve lineup with 3Com’s switches and routers, which are Cisco’s core products.

Terms call for HP to hand over $7.90 in cash for each share of 3Com. That’s roughly 50% higher than 3Com shares garnered in an unsuccessful buyout two years ago and nearly four times the price of 3Com stock just one year ago. Additionally, it means that anyone who bought shares in 3Com over the past half-decade will be above water on their holdings when the sale to HP closes in the first half of next year. We can’t say that we’ve seen many situations like that in recent transactions. In most cases this year, the sale prices of public companies – particularly those that have faded in recent years, like 3Com – have been below the market prices they fetched back in 2007. And that was before any takeout premium.

But there are other parties that stand to come out ahead in the HP-3Com deal, as well. We have to imagine that the bankers at Goldman Sachs are glad (if not relieved) to have their client, 3Com, looking likely to have finally been sold. Goldman was advising the networking vendor back in 2007 on its proposed sale to Bain Capital and Huawei Technologies, which dragged on for a half-year before being scuttled due to national security concerns. There are success fees and then there are well-earned success fees.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the desk, Morgan Stanley also has reason to celebrate its work with HP. Not only is the pending purchase of 3Com the largest enterprise networking transaction since mid-2007, but the deal continues a strong recent run by Morgan Stanley. This week alone, the bank advised HP on its $3.1bn purchase of 3Com, AdMob on its $750m sale to Google and Logitech on its $405m acquisition of LifeSize Communications. Altogether, that means Morgan Stanley has had a hand in three of the four largest deals this week.

Nordic freeze-out for Cisco

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

With a fat treasury and well-drilled deal team, Cisco Systems typically storms through acquisitions. Over the past five years, the networking giant has announced some 50 purchases, including more than a few that combined big money and quick moves. (For instance, several sources have indicated that Cisco snatched WebEx Communications away from IBM in just a week, after Big Blue had the online conferencing company all but locked up.) But it appears that something in Cisco’s M&A methods has been lost in translation in its reach across the Atlantic for Norway’s Tandberg.

A little over a month ago, Cisco announced plans to hand over $3bn in cash for Tandberg, as a way to bolster its videoconferencing lineup. Although Tandberg’s board of directors backed the offer, a fair number of shareholders have balked at what they see as Cisco’s low-ball bid. Critics point to the fact that Cisco’s all-cash offer values Tandberg just 11% higher than the company’s closing stock price the day before the announcement. (We noted recently that the premium was just half the amount that Cisco is paying for Starent Networks, which was announced a week after Tandberg.)

Further complicating Cisco’s play for Tandberg is the fact that 90% of shareholders at the Norwegian company have to agree to the deal. Already, holders of about one-quarter of Tandberg equity have said they won’t support Cisco’s proposed purchase – at least not at its current valuation. We suspect that Cisco may well end up having to reach a bit deeper to land Tandberg. (The company gave itself more time on Monday, bumping back the expiration of its tender offer for Tandberg until November 18.) And as the standoff drags on, other vendors are closing their own videoconferencing deals. On Wednesday, Logitech said it will spend $405m in cash for LifeSize Communications. Logitech’s bid values LifeSize at slightly more than 4x trailing sales, which is not out of line with Cisco’s bid for Tandberg of 3.6x trailing sales.

It wouldn’t be surprising to see Cisco top its existing offer for what’s undoubtedly a valuable asset. Tandberg would give Cisco a solid mid-level videoconferencing offering, slotting nicely between its high-end Telepresence product and the low-level Web conferencing and collaboration offering it got when it picked up WebEx. In terms of markets, adding Tandberg would significantly expand Cisco’s reach in Europe, particularly with government customers. And as a bonus, securing Tandberg would prevent the target from landing with rival Hewlett-Packard, which has its own videoconferencing wares. (Although HP actually beat Cisco to market with its Halo product, it has little to show for its early advantage.) We doubt that would happen, but wouldn’t it be a kicker if HP pulled a Cisco on Cisco, quickly firing off a topping bid and walking away with Tandberg?

A fittingly imperfect end for Kana

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

As liquidity events go, the just-announced sale of Kana Software is shaping up to be a pretty dry one for most shareholders. The customer service automation vendor said on Tuesday that it plans to sell its operating business to buyout group Accel-KKR for $49m and retain the publicly listed shell of a company as an acquisition vehicle. The proceeds from the sale of the business will flow to what essentially amounts to a special-purpose acquisition company, or SPAC, rather than long-suffering Kana shareholders. Shares of Kana have barely moved since the announcement, holding steady at around $0.75 each.

From our view, the structure of the deal reflects a creativity born out of necessity. Essentially, the challenge that shaped the sale process at Kana, which has been playing out for several years, was how to realize value for a decidedly mediocre operating business, while at the same time preserve the value of the tax advantages accrued from having burned money ($4.3bn and counting) since the company opened its doors. (The sole ‘asset’ at the SPAC, besides access to the capital markets, is the $400m in credits to offset taxes on any profit generated at whatever company it does acquire.) While the deal goes some distance toward satisfying both goals, several disgruntled shareholders have charged that it doesn’t go far enough.

For starters, the shareholders point out that if the carve-out goes through, as is expected within three months, they will have nothing to show for the sale of ‘their’ company. Instead, their future returns will be determined by an unknown group that may – or may not – buy some yet-to-determined business. (So much for the Wall Street maxim of investing in management and markets.) Particularly galling to those shareholders stuck holding illiquid Bulletin Board equity is that two of the largest owners of Kana (hedge funds KVO Capital Management and Nightwatch Capital Management, which also has a board seat) got to exit their investments at an above-market price of $0.95 per share, with the possible addition of another $0.10 for each share on top of that.

Kana would probably counter that shareholders who don’t want to roll their ownership of the company into a SPAC are free to sell their shares. And we have little doubt that the vendor exhausted every opportunity to get some value from the business, since we know that the process has been grinding along fitfully for years. In the end, though, we can’t help but view the less-than-ideal transaction as a fittingly imperfect ending to a thoroughly flawed company. Or more precisely, a thoroughly flawed public company. Red ink-stained Kana went public in 1999 on less than $5m in aggregate sales, but within a year of the offering had topped $1,000 per share on a split-adjusted basis. As shareholders now argue about dimes on the firm’s Bulletin Board-listed stock, the end of Kana just seems pathetic.

Dassault Systemes bulks up through an old friend

Brenon Daly

Contact: John Abbott

Dassault Systèmes’ $600m purchase of IBM’s CATIA product lifecycle management (PLM) sales and client support operations on Tuesday is the latest twist in a complex, 30-year relationship between the two companies. Dassault, founded in 1981, inherited the rights to CATIA, one of the first 3-D computer-aided design (CAD) packages, from its aerospace parent Avions Marcel Dassault (now Dassault Aviation). Then in 1992, Dassault bought the rights to the other pioneering CAD package, CADAM, from IBM. It set about combining the two, and continued to jointly market the product set with Big Blue.

Now it seems that Dassault wants more control over its business. Through the deal, which is expected to close during the first half of next year, it gains access to 1,000 more clients and around $700m in annual sales. The transaction is expected to boost earnings in the first year. (Dassault plans to speak more about the financial impact of the deal during its third-quarter earnings call on Thursday.)

The partnership will continue with IBM in the services role, but should enable Dassault to simplify its contracts with very large customers such as Ford Motor and Boeing, which until now had to negotiate with both vendors. The scope of CAD software has evolved over the years from core engineering and complex product design into collaborative PLM focused on business processes, workflows and the supply chain. However, Big Blue didn’t have the agreements in place to sell the full set of Dassault tools. The result was that more big firms were dealing directly with Dassault. A side effect is that both companies will be more able to work with other partners: Dassault with Hewlett-Packard, for instance, and IBM with other PLM providers such as Siemens PLM Software and PTC.

The deal is the biggest in Dassault’s history, though it has spent heavily in the past on industry consolidation, most notably through the acquisitions of MatrixOne (March 2006, $408m), ABAQUS (May 2005, $413m) and SolidWorks (June 1997, $310m). Other vendors have also been buying up big chunks of the PLM market. Siemens inked the sector’s largest deal in January 2007, spending $3.5bn on UGS, while Oracle handed over $495m for Agile Software in May 2007. The PLM shop that appears to be left behind is PTC, which despite spending more than $600m on 11 purchases of its own since 2004 is now much smaller than either Siemens or Dassault and is under pressure from moves into PLM by mainstream enterprise software houses such as Oracle and SAP. Several market sources indicated that PTC has retained Goldman Sachs to advise it on a possible sale.

At long last, Kana gets gone

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Exactly three years ago, we bluntly wrote that there was no reason for Kana Software to be a public company, at least in its current form. Kana’s performance in the intervening 1,000 days since we published that report did nothing to change our view. If anything, as the red ink continued to gush at Kana, we became even more convinced of the need for a sale of the customer support software vendor. The sale finally happened Tuesday, with Accel-KKR agreeing to pay $49m in cash for most of Kana.

We were hardly alone in our assessment that Kana – a money-burning, Bulletin Board-listed company that also had negative working capital – should be cleared off the exchange. As we noted earlier this summer, Kana’s largest shareholder also wanted something to change at the company. KVO Capital Management, which had owned some 8.5% of the company, was pushing earlier this summer to get a director on the Kana board. KVO, which declined to comment, has agreed to back the sale to the buyout group, according to the release.

A PE rebound?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

After the turmoil in the credit market essentially knocked PE shops out of tech M&A for much of the past two years, we’re hearing various indications that buyouts may be coming back. We recently noted the rumor in the market that in the coming weeks PE firm Francisco Partners will ink in the paperwork for a public offering for one of its portfolio companies, RedPrairie. And bankers indicate financial buyers are once again looking to add to their portfolios, rather than just support their existing investments.

Meanwhile, on the other end of the PE lifecycle, there’s also some bullishness for buyout funds from limited partners, at least according to one source. Marlin Equity Partners is said to have recently raised a $450m third fund – and even had commitments for up to $600m. Los Angeles-based Marlin, which last raised a $300m fund two years ago, didn’t return a call.

Of course, we have to look at any rebound in the overall LBO market in context. Certainly, we have seen some notable purchases this year by Symphony Technology Group, Vista Equity Partners and Thoma Bravo – as well as, of course, the pending carve-out of Skype, which is being led by Silver Lake Partners. But even with all of that, the value of tech LBOs announced so far in 2009 is only $12bn – just half the $23bn announced in the same period last year. And forget about the time when the buyout barons accounted for more that one-quarter of all tech M&A spending; so far this year, the share of PE firms of overall deal flow is just 11%.

Does Wall Street run through the RedPrairie?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Along with the rising equity markets, there’s a new flow of companies that are planning to file their IPO paperwork in the next few weeks. For instance, we know of two venture-backed mobile vendors that have picked underwriters and plan to put in their prospectuses shortly. And we’re willing to bet that the expected strong offering from Fortinet, which initially filed in early August and is likely to debut before Thanksgiving, will catch the eye of quite a few VCs who have sizeable security providers in their portfolios.

Altogether, it looks like a decent IPO pipeline for VCs, as long as the equity markets hold. But what about their brethren at PE firms? We’ve seen the buyout barons file to flip a few non-tech holdings back onto the market, and the big offering from Avago Technologies (the carve-out of Hewlett-Packard’s semiconductor business by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Silver Lake Partners) has been above water since it hit the Nasdaq in early August. But there are still a lot of PE firms with pretty full portfolios that would like to post a realized gain – as opposed to ‘paper gains’ – before going out and raising a new fund.

So which PE-backed company is likely to hit the public market? Several sources have indicated that RedPrairie, an inventory management software vendor owned by Francisco Partners, has selected bankers and plans to ink an S-1 in the coming weeks. Francisco acquired RedPrairie in mid-2005, 30 years after the company was founded. Since the buyout, RedPrairie has rolled up six other companies. In 2008, the firm generated almost $300m in revenue. That puts RedPrairie’s revenue in the same neighborhood as rivals i2 and Manhattan Associates, but below the sales of JDA Software and Epicor Software.

Is Riverbed floating toward a deal?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Riverbed Technology is one of those companies that has seemingly been in play for as long as it’s been around. And that’s understandable enough, given that the company has an attractive profile as the fast-growing leader in a market that’s taking off. Add to that the fact that Riverbed plays in the networking space, which is dominated by deep-pocketed giants hungry for growth, and acquisition rumors are inevitable. The most-recent would-be buyer for Riverbed? Juniper Networks.

Of course, Juniper is just the latest in a long list of rumored suitors. Cisco Systems is said to have made at least two runs at Riverbed before the company went public in September 2006. More recently, we heard that EMC also looked very closely at Riverbed before its IPO. (We understand that while EMC was seriously interested in Riverbed, Cisco effectively killed the deal by telling its partner EMC that it wouldn’t look kindly on the information management giant stepping into the WAN traffic optimization (WTO) market.)

And last summer, we noted that Hewlett-Packard would make a logical buyer for Riverbed. The two companies have had a long relationship with HP reselling Riverbed boxes and integrating the Riverbed Optimization System into its ProCurve infrastructure. (Not to mention that HP could stick it to its new rival Cisco by picking up Riverbed.) And several sources have pointed to talks in the past between F5 and Riverbed. We suspect that would be a tricky combination because Riverbed’s current market capitalization ($1.7bn) is half that of F5’s market value ($3.5bn).

All of that leaves us with Juniper. However, we don’t think a deal between the two is likely. For starters, Juniper has already gone shopping once in the WTO market. It shelled out a princely $337m (most of it in stock) for Peribit Networks in April 2005. From Juniper’s perspective, the Peribit purchase gave the networking vendor a hot product to sell to its enterprise customers, many of which came via Juniper’s $4bn acquisition of NetScreen Technologies a year earlier. However, we wouldn’t hold out Peribit as a particularly successful transaction for Juniper. Certainly, it hasn’t generated the type of returns for Juniper that would make the company want to double down with a multibillion-dollar bid for Riverbed, we would think.