Category: Private Equity

Looking at Lawson

Brenon Daly1 Comment

Contact: Brenon Daly

What was shaping up as an explosive showdown between Carl Icahn and Genzyme has been defused ahead of today’s board meeting at the biotech company. By adding two nominees selected by Icahn to the expanded board of directors, Genzyme avoided the full-blown proxy fight that had been brewing. With that matter settled, we wonder if Icahn will turn his attention to his newest tech investment – Lawson Software.

The gadfly investor owns stock and options equaling about 15.6 million Lawson shares, or roughly 9.7% of the old-line ERP vendor. As is often the case in his investments, Icahn says he will push for moves that maximize shareholder value, which could include a sale of the company. However, we would note that in his recent role as shareholder activist, Icahn hasn’t succeeded in putting his holdings in play.

Although he helped spur the sale of BEA Systems in early 2008, his more recent agitation hasn’t necessarily resulted in M&A. Among other holdings, Icahn has owned or currently owns stakes in Yahoo, Motorola and Mentor Graphics – all of which still trade on their own. Likewise, we suspect Lawson will remain independent, even if Icahn pushes for a sale.

For starters, the company isn’t cheap. Shares have tacked on 60% over the past year – twice the return of the Nasdaq and three times the gain of Oracle over the same period. That gives Lawson a market capitalization of $1.3bn. (It holds roughly the same amount of cash and debt, so Lawson’s enterprise value is also about $1.3bn.)

If we assume the company will generate about $350m in maintenance revenue in its current fiscal year, Lawson currently trades at 3.7 times its maintenance revenue. A conservative 30% premium on top of Lawson’s current valuation would add $400m to the price, for a total cost of $1.7bn or nearly 5 times maintenance revenue. That valuation isn’t overly rich, but it is probably at the high end of the range that a financial-minded buyer could make work.

SonicWALL should be right at home in PE portfolio

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Except for losing its ticker, we don’t expect the soon-to-be private SonicWALL to be radically different from the one that traded on the Nasdaq. At least not the SonicWALL of the past few years. The reason? The unified threat management vendor has already been running a strategy that’s found fairly often in PE portfolios.

Basically, the company has taken the cash it has generated from its rather mature core product (firewalls) and done acquisitions to expand into emerging markets. SonicWALL has inked about a deal each year for the past half-decade, buying startups that had developed technology for anti-spam, continuous data protection and, most recently, WAN traffic optimization.

The collective bill on those deals is about $78m, a relatively small amount for a company that held more than $200m in its treasury and generated roughly $10m of cash each quarter. Once it goes private, we wonder if SonicWALL won’t start eyeing some larger deals. After all, it will have deep-pocketed new owners and will no longer be penalized in its accounting for acquisitions.

SonicWALL’s shopping trips

Date announced Target Deal value Market
April 19, 2010 DBAM Systems (assets) $4m WAN traffic optimization
June 12, 2007 Aventail $25m SSL/VPN
February 8, 2006 MailFrontier $31m Anti-spam
November 21, 2005 Lasso Logic $15.5m Continuous data protection
November 21, 2005 enKoo $2.4m SSL/VPN

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Who’s calling on Callidus?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Annual shareholder meetings are typically uneventful affairs, mixing equal parts of corporate glad-handing and self-congratulatory pabulum. The few bits of business that do get done are generally little more than corporate housekeeping, such as electing board members and signing off on auditing firms. And while that’s probably how the annual meeting for Callidus Software will go next Tuesday, we have picked up on some rumblings of discontent from the shareholder base of the sales performance management (SPM) vendor.

Shares of Callidus have basically been changing hands in the $2.50-3.50 range for the past year and a half. (On Friday afternoon, the stock traded at $3.10.) After going public at $14 in November 2003, the stock spent the next four months at around that level before dropping into the single digits, where it has remained ever since. At current prices, the company sports a market cap of nearly $100m.

With shares having been basically dead money, even as the market rebounded, investors are growing impatient with Callidus’ still-incomplete switch from a license-based software vendor to an on-demand model. Undeniably, the company has made progress in that difficult transition, but it has come up short in both its emerging SaaS business and its old-line business, particularly services.

That inconsistency hasn’t won it many fans on Wall Street, which is reflected in Callidus’ valuation. On a back-of-the-envelope basis, the company is trading at basically a $70m enterprise value, or just 1.4 times its 2010 recurring revenue (roughly $50m total, with $20m maintenance fees and $30m subscription revenue). It seems we aren’t the only ones struck by the rock-bottom valuation of Callidus. Several market sources have indicated recently that at least one would-be suitor has approached Callidus about a deal.

Our understanding is that Callidus has retained a banker and is still in the early stages of an initial market canvass. Obviously, that’s a long way from a completed transaction, which is the outcome many Callidus shareholders are hoping for. It’s also worth remembering that the company itself has a spotty track record in M&A. In late 2008, Callidus was lead bidder for SPM startup Centive, and stood to substantially accelerate its transition to SaaS with the acquisition. Instead, Xactly – a startup that’s run by a number of former Callidus executives – snatched away Centive in early 2009.

What’s new at Novell?

Brenon Daly2 Comments

Contact: Brenon Daly

Even though its shareholders aren’t overwhelmingly concerned with Novell’s financial numbers right now, the company will nonetheless be releasing results for its fiscal second quarter later Thursday afternoon. For what it’s worth, Wall Street expects earnings of about $0.07 per share on sales of $205m, representing year-over-year declines on both the top and bottom lines. (We should add that if Novell does manage to hit expectations, it will snap two straight quarters of earnings whiffs.)

But then Novell hasn’t traded on fundamentals for the past three months, ever since hedge fund Elliott Associates launched an unsolicited offer for the company. Novell, which is being advised by JP Morgan Securities, stiffed the bid, but did leave the door open to other ‘alternatives to enhance shareholder value.’ Since Elliott floated the offer, shares of Novell have basically changed hands at or above the $5.75-per-share bid.

As a decidedly mixed bag of businesses, Novell isn’t the cleanest match for any other company that might want to take it home. For that reason, most speculation around a possible buyer for Novell has centered on private equity firms. (The buyout shops are undoubtedly licking their chops at the prospect of picking up Novell’s $600m of maintenance and subscription revenue, not to mention the $1bn that sits in the company’s treasury.) However, we understand from a person familiar with the process that there are a handful of strategic buyers still interested in Novell.

If we were to put forward one potential suitor that could probably benefit more than any other company in picking up Novell’s broad portfolio of businesses, we might single out SAP. OK, we know it’ll never happen. (Never, ever.) But a hypothetical pairing certainly does go a long way toward filling a few notable gaps in SAP’s offering, while also making the German giant far more competitive with Oracle.

Consider this fact: some 70% of SAP apps that run on Linux run on Novell’s SUSE Linux Enterprise. Add in Novell’s additional technology around identity and access management, systems management, virtualization and other areas, and SAP’s stack suddenly looks a lot more competitive with Oracle’s stack. Again, an SAP-Novell deal will never happen, but the combination certainly does lend itself to some intriguing speculation.

Timeline: Novell in the crosshairs

Date Event Comment
March 2, 2010 Elliott Associates launches unsolicited bid of $5.75 per share for Novell The offer values Novell at a $2bn equity value but only a $1bn enterprise value
March 20, 2010 Novell rejects Elliott’s bid as ‘inadequate’ By our calculation, Elliott is valuing Novell at just 1.6 times its maintenance/subscription revenue

Source: The 451 Group

One last sale at VeriSign?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

With VeriSign having somewhat unexpectedly shed its identity and authentication business to Symantec last week, we started to think about what other transactions might be coming from the former serial acquirer. What about this for a final deal? A sale of itself to a private equity shop. After all, the value of the company is hardly reflected at all on Wall Street.

To be clear, we’re not suggesting that there are any plans to take VeriSign private, at least not that we’ve heard making the rounds. Instead, we’re looking at a leveraged buyout from a strictly hypothetical view, given that the company has a number of appealing characteristics for any would-be financial buyer.

For starters, VeriSign is now a very clean story, with just the core registry business remaining. For all intents and purposes, the registry business, which handles all the .com and .net registration, is a legal monopoly. The business certainly enjoys monopoly-like operating margins of about 40%. VeriSign recently indicated that sales for 2010 (excluding the identity and authentication business) will be in the neighborhood of $675m. Loosely, that would generate about $270m in operating income at the company this year.

Fittingly for a cash machine, VeriSign has a fat treasury. At the end of the first quarter, it held nearly $1.6bn in cash. Add to that amount the $1.3bn that Symantec will be handing over for the divested businesses, and VeriSign will have about $3bn in cash banked. The vendor’s market cap is $5bn, giving it an enterprise value of just $2bn. That works out to just 3 times sales and a little more than 7x operating cash flow. (Granted, that’s without any acquisition premium.)

If we were a buyout shop or some other acquisitive-minded group, another way to look at it is that VeriSign’s remaining registry business currently trades at a discount to the security business that it just got out of. And that’s despite the fact that the registry business is far more profitable and faster-growing than the security business. (In 2009, VeriSign’s naming business increased revenue 12%, four times the rate of growth of the security business.) Maybe it’s time for one last sale at VeriSign?

Thoma Bravo doubles down on Double-Take

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Just a week after we noted that the bidding for Double-Take Software had hit the final stretch, with a trio of buyout shops still in the running, one of the private equity firms announced plans Monday to pick up the file-replication software vendor. Thoma Bravo, through its Vision Solutions portfolio company, will pay $242m for Double-Take in a take-private that’s expected to close in the third quarter. Assuming it goes through, the deal will end Double-Take’s three and a half years as a public company.

Frankly, Double-Take’s run as a public company was one that we didn’t really understand. It never cracked $100m in sales, and has basically been trapped at the same revenue level it hit in 2007. In that year, the vendor recorded sales of $83m. Although sales jumped 16% to $96m in 2008, they ticked back down to $83m in 2009 and Double-Take recently guided to expect about $86m in revenue this year. And the small company was competing against the replication offerings from some of the largest storage providers on the planet: EMC with RepliStor, Symantec with Replication Exec and the replication products CA Inc obtained in its XOsoft purchase.

Perhaps it’s not surprising, then, that the $10.50-per-share bid is actually slightly below the price Double-Take fetched when it came public. In its December 2006 IPO, Double-Take priced its shares at $11 each. And although the stock did trade at twice that price in late 2007, it has been below the IPO price since September 2008. In its time as a public company, Double-Take basically matched the performance of the Nasdaq.

At an equity value of $242m, the actual cost of Double-Take is much lower. The profitable, debt-free vendor held $89m in its treasury at the end of the first quarter, meaning Thoma Bravo/Vision Solutions will only have to hand over $153m in cash. That’s just 1.8 times this year’s projected revenue, and about 4 times maintenance revenue.

IPO woes

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

For the second straight time, a tech company hoping to come to market has scaled back the money it planned to raise. TeleNav, which started trading Thursday, originally planned to sell shares at $11-13. The mobile navigation service vendor then cut the range to $9-10 before ultimately pricing its seven-million-share offering at $8. The erosion on TeleNav’s terms comes two weeks after Convio also had to reduce the price tag on its IPO.

Of course, in the period between the two IPOs we saw an almost inconceivable market plunge that erased 1,000 points from the Dow Jones Industrial Average in just five minutes. (OK, the collapse might not be inconceivable, but it is proving to be inexplicable. Was it the black-box, high-velocity firms or just a bunch of ‘fat-fingered traders’ that bled the Dow last Thursday?) And while that uncertainty continues to weigh on the overall market, it’s basically stifling the IPO market. After all, if investors are fleeing from billion-dollar companies that are household names, are they really going to embrace unknown and unproven would-be debutants?

But as we note in a new report on the IPO market, Wall Street – as it often does – appears to have swung too far in its avoidance of risk. Investors have been demanding a ridiculously steep discount on the valuations of the companies that want to come public. Take the case of TeleNav, which closed its initial day of trading with a market cap of just $400m. If we back out the cash that TeleNav already held ($46m) along with the cash that it just raised ($45m), the company starts its life on Wall Street with an enterprise value of just $310m. By our back-of-the-envelope calculation, that’s just 2 times sales and 5 times cash flow – a slap-in-the-face valuation for a profitable company that’s growing sales at 50%.

When we look at the capital markets today, we aren’t particularly concerned with the day-to-day trading. Stocks go up and stocks go down, just as risk in the market (real or perceived) ebbs and flows. Nonetheless, it’s hard to look at the tech IPO market and not be struck by the fact that companies are putting together smaller offerings and debuting at notably lower valuations than they would have in the time before the US economy slumped into its worst decline since the Great Depression. And we don’t see that changing anytime soon.

Recent tech IPO events

Date Company Comment
May 2010 TeleNav Cuts expected range, and then prices below it
April 2010 Convio Prices below range, goes public at sub-$200m market cap
April 2010 SPS Commerce Debuts at sub-$200m market cap
April 2010 IntraLinks Files for $150m IPO, the third time it has filed an S-1
April 2010 QlikTech Files for $100m IPO
April 2010 Nexsan Postpones $55m IPO after setting initial range

LANDesk on the block

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

When Emerson Electric picked up Avocent for $1.2bn last fall, we noted that the acquisition made a great deal of sense as a way for Emerson to get deeper into the datacenter. We also noted that the systems management business that Emerson was inheriting because of Avocent’s earlier purchase of LANDesk looked ‘increasingly out of place.’

No surprise, then, that Emerson has formally begun a process to sell off the LANDesk unit. What is kind of a surprise, however, is the fact that LANDesk is shaping up as a comparatively pricey divestiture. We’ve heard talk of 2 or even 3 times sales for the $150m business. That could get the price back to roughly the $416m that Avocent originally paid for LANDesk back in 2006.

The reason LANDesk is going for a richer multiple than the conventional 2x sales for a divestiture is that there appears to be a number of interested parties for the business. As my colleague Dennis Callaghan outlines in a new report, LANDesk could appeal to virtualization vendors (notably existing partner VMware), hardware providers (notably existing partner Lenovo) and security firms, which might be looking to match Symantec’s pickup of Altiris. (Incidentally, Big Yellow paid about 3.5x trailing sales in its big systems management buy.)

Additionally, the size and stability of LANDesk is also expected to draw interest from buyout shops. We understand that Greenhill & Co, which advised Emerson on the purchase of Avocent, is also handling the planned unwind of LANDesk. Emerson already classifies LANDesk as a ‘discontinued operation’ and plans to have the divestiture done this year.

Sources: a take-private for Double-Take

Brenon Daly1 Comment

Contact: Brenon Daly

The final bidders for Double-Take Software have narrowed to three buyout shops, and a purchase of the file-replication software vendor could be announced within the next two weeks, we have learned. The company said a month ago that an undisclosed bidder had approached it about a possible transaction.

A number of sources have pointed to Vector Capital as the unidentified suitor, adding that the firm is one of the three bidders still in the running. Although we speculated early on that Double-Take’s two main channel partners (Dell and Hewlett-Packard) might be interested, we understand now that there aren’t any strategic bidders currently at the table.

The price couldn’t immediately be learned, but we suspect there won’t be a huge premium for the company, which was trading at $9.36 on Monday afternoon. The reason? Double-Take recently trimmed its sales outlook for 2010, essentially saying it doesn’t expect to grow this year. It recently guided to about $86m in sales for 2010, about 10% lower than it had expected earlier this year. It finished the recession-wracked 2009 with revenue of $83m, down from $96m in 2008.

Even without growth, Double-Take undoubtedly holds some appeal to a private equity (PE) firm. For starters, the company is cheap. It currently sports a market capitalization of just $200m, but nearly half that amount is made of its cash and short-term investments. (The company held $89m in its treasury at the end of the first quarter.)

With an enterprise value of only $111m, Double-Take now garners just 1.3x projected sales. Another way to look at it: even with a decent premium to the company’s current valuation, a buyer could still pick up Double-Take for about 4x maintenance revenue. Small wonder that a few PE shops are still considering a Double-Take takeout.

One sale leads to another at Sophos?

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

As leading indicators go, the recent decisions around Sophos paint a rather bearish picture for the current IPO market. The anti-malware vendor had briefly filed to go public back in late 2007 but then pulled the paperwork as the markets tumbled. We understand that Sophos had lined up banks earlier this year for another run at an IPO, but it ended up selling a majority chunk to buyout shop Apax Partners earlier this week. (Two of the three bookrunners on the most recent lineup were the same as the 2007 prospectus, according to a source.)

A dual-track process typically adds at least a few dollars to the price of a company, since it at least introduces the idea of another buyer (the public market). However, Sophos’ sale to Apax, in our view, comes at a discount to the valuation we would have penciled out for the company. The deal values Sophos at $830m, about 3.2 times trailing sales and 2.7 times projected revenue. Sophos’ stillborn IPO comes at time when other would-be debutants are having to cut terms or shelve their offerings altogether.

Yet somewhat paradoxically, we think the move by Apax actually makes an offering by the security company more likely, at least down the road. For starters, it replaces Sophos’ somewhat cumbersome ownership structure, which didn’t always share the same alignment, with a single owner to call the shots. (For instance, we heard there was a fair amount of dissention inside Sophos over its mid-2007 purchase of Utimaco, which stands as the largest acquisition of a public security company by a private one.)

Also, Apax probably got in at a low enough price that it could make a decent return by taking Sophos public in a year or two, provided the equity markets stay receptive. (We would argue that’s a much more likely exit than a flip to yet another buyout shop.) And finally, there are plenty of banks ready to (at long last) get Sophos on the market. Many of the underwriters have been working with Sophos for more than a half-decade, so it would be just a matter of updating numbers in what has to be a well-worn pitch book.