Less than zero?

The company once known as MathSoft has been cancelled out by the following equation: 1 – 0.5 – 0.5 = 0. The firm made its first subtraction in early 2001, with the divestiture of its core technical calculations software business. That was followed up last week with the sale of the remaining chunk of the company – which sold data analysis software under the name Insightful Corp – to Tibco for $25m. (Along the way, Insightful further whittled off a small sliver of its business, some search assets it sold to Hypertext Solutions, which now does business as Evri, for $3.7m last year.)

If the name MathSoft seems only vaguely familiar, it’s because the old-line firm hasn’t existed for seven years, at least not under its original name and original business. Founded in 1984, the Massachusetts-based company emerged as MathSoft two years later. And while it’s too soon to say whether Tibco’s tiny purchase of Insightful will pay dividends, the former had better hope the acquisition goes smoother than the last one involving Insightful’s CEO. Before running Insightful, Jeff Coombs headed up marketing at Acta Technology – a startup selling ETL technology that was snapped up by Business Objects in mid-2002 for $65m.

Actually, that deal ended up costing Business Objects a fair bit more, in both money and time. The reason? Just a week after the deal was inked, ETL powerhouse Informatica filed a patent infringement case against Acta. That worked its way through the courts for the following four and a half years, until a jury decided a year ago to award Informatica $25m in damages. Tibco, too, has had courtroom headaches from one of its deals, picking up a company that was later sued in the widespread lawsuit over share allocations of IPOs in the bubble era. So both the buyer and seller in this deal have firsthand experience with negative additions through acquisitions. 

Subtraction from MathSoft

Date Event Price
Jan. 2001 Divestiture of core education products division $7m
August 2007 Surviving company Insightful sells search assets $3.7m
June 2008 Insightful sells to Tibco $25m

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

VeriSign’s yo-yo diet

We’ve noted several times in the past that former binge eater VeriSign has set itself on a fairly severe corporate diet. (Last November, we outlined VeriSign’s divestiture plan that could trim up to one-third of the company’s revenue.) Having already sold off three businesses so far in 2008, VeriSign is nearing a fourth divestiture, we hear.

At the America’s Growth Capital security conference in early April, we heard hallway chatter that VeriSign was deep into talks with a networking equipment vendor and a services shop about selling its managed security service provider (MSSP) business. Now, a source indicates that VeriSign has a letter of intent signed to shed its MSSP business. The acquirer isn’t immediately known, but we hear it’s a strategic, rather than financial, buyer. Given the recent moves by telcos to buy security service shops – for instance, Verizon Business’ purchase of Cybertrust a year ago and BT Group’s acquisition of Counterpane Internet Security in October 2006 – we could also imagine a phone company adding the MSSP business to its service offering.

Like any divorce, a divestiture tends to take longer and be more expensive than any of the parties imagined at the start. And we can only guess at the discount for VeriSign’s MSSP business. The divestiture would effectively unwind its $140m cash-and-stock acquisition of Guardent in December 2003. Ironically, VeriSign inked the Guardent purchase at a time when it was also dieting, having shed its domain name-registry business and other assets. Is this the corporate equivalent of yo-yo dieting? 

Coming and going at VeriSign

Year Acquisitions Divestitures
YTD 2008 0 3
2007 0 1
2006 8 1
2005 7 1

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

SanDisk amps up its music player offerings

With its $6.5m tuck-in acquisition of MusicGremlin last week, SanDisk is bulking up its digital music player business. MusicGremlin, with just eight employees and about $5m in revenue, will obviously not have a material effect on SanDisk’s business. Nonetheless, the importance is not so much the size or scope of the company, but more the technology it has developed during its four years in operation. Specifically, MusicGremlin gives SanDisk the ability to effectively stream music wirelessly to its products. We have learned that SanDisk was very eager to acquire the startup, with the large company initiating talks and sealing a deal within a few weeks. Given SanDisk’s recent effort to build its product offerings through strategic acquisitions, what other acquisitions might the company be considering?

From our perspective, SanDisk needs to do some shopping. It currently ranks a distant second place to Apple in the digital music player market, but also faces stiff competition from the likes of Microsoft, Sony and Panasonic. Perhaps the biggest hole in SanDisk’s offerings is the lack of an in-house music and video content provider, like Apple has with its iTunes and Microsoft has with its Zune Marketplace. To date, SanDisk has relied exclusively on partnerships, but learned the downside of that strategy the hard way in February, when Yahoo suddenly shuttered its Music Unlimited service. The disappearance of the service, which was the very foundation of SanDisk’s Sansa Connect player, left users understandably sour.

As to where SanDisk might look for a music service, two names come to mind: Rhapsody (owned by RealNetworks) and Napster. Despite taking in about $150m and $130m last year, respectively, both are consistently running at a loss. Clearly they could be had for a steal. More importantly, they are both proven and established music services with mobile offerings that would make integrating MusicGremlin’s technology an easy task. Using Napster as a comparable, we believe either company can be had for just under $100m, representing a 40% premium over Napster’s current price on Nasdaq. With $1.22bn in cash and a market cap of $5.2bn, SanDisk could certainly afford a few deals to shore up its defenses for the inevitable battle of the titans.

A chippy deal

After more than two months of discussions, Cadence Design Systems put a bear hug on Mentor Graphics on Tuesday, June 17, offering roughly $1.6bn in cash for the smaller chip-design vendor. Under terms of the unsolicited offer, Cadence would pay $16 for each of the roughly 91 million Cadence shares. Cadence said it would cover roughly one-third of the purchase with its available cash, while borrowing an additional $1.1bn. Deutsche Bank Securities is advising Cadence.

The deal – if it gets approved by Mentor shareholders and survives regulatory review – would combine two of the three largest electronic design automation (EDA) companies. Cadence and rival Synopsys are roughly the same size at about $1.6bn in sales last year, which is twice as big as Mentor. (Various pairings of these three players have been discussed over the years.) However, Mentor said later Tuesday that it was not interested in a pairing with Cadence.

Cadence’s approach, which we would characterize as ‘opportunistic consolidation,’ continues a recent trend toward unsolicited offers for underperforming rivals made in a very public way. (Although Mentor has recently trimmed its rather bloated cost structure, the company’s operating margins are less than half the level at Cadence.) The outcome of these ‘bear hugs’ has spanned the possibilities: Iomega recently accepted a raised offer from EMC; Microsoft walked away from its unsolicited bid for Yahoo; and Electronic Arts took its bid for Take-Two Interactive hostile.

EDA deal flow, by year

Year Deal volume Deal value
2005 5 $298m
2006 6 $888m
2007 13 $225m
YTD 2008* 11 $2.7bn

*includes announced Cadence-Mentor transaction. Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Emerald Isle M&A

Given that today is Bloomsday, we’ve given ourselves literary license to take a look at deal flow between the US and Ireland. (Don’t worry, if you’re like us and have never actually managed to get through James Joyce’s ‘Ulysses’ – despite taking more than a few cracks at the tome – this Insight will still make sense. Quick show of hands: Who’s actually read all the way to “…and yes I said yes I will Yes”?)

In any case, deal-flow between the two countries has been remarkably stable during the past four years, clipping along at about 30 deals each year. M&A spending in the most-recent year, however, has fallen to its lowest level, just half the previous year and one-quarter the level in the year before that. (Note: In three weeks, we’ll publish our annual Trans-Atlantic Tech M&A Banking Review. Obviously, the steady decline of the US dollar has had a big influence in deal-making. So far, we’ve seen European acquirers be even more active than the previous year, while US buyers have only spent about half as much as the same period last year. You can request a copy of last year’s report here.)

One company that may very well figure into the US-Ireland M&A tally very shortly is Iona Technologies. We noted in February that the Dublin-based company had attracted an unsolicited bid from an unknown company, which turned out to be Germany’s Software AG. Iona has retained Lehman Brothers, which led its IPO in the late-1990s, to advise it. At the time, we tapped SAP and Sun Microsystems as the most-logical buyers of Iona. More recently, an Irish newspaper reported that Progress Software or Red Hat is Iona’s ‘preferred’ buyer. Meantime, Software AG now says it’s out of the running. So it looks like we could very well be seeing an American company pick up another piece of the Old Sod. 

Irish-US M&A (year ending each Bloomsday)

Period Deal volume Deal value
June 16 2004-05 28 $1.2bn
June 16 2005-06 29 $3.8bn
June 16 2006-07 36 $1bn
June 16 2007-08 33 $860m

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Buyout blues

Three years ago, the buyout barons shook up the technology M&A market with the $11.3bn LBO of services giant SunGard. At the time it was the largest tech buyout, equaling basically half the money spent on all LBOs in the previous year. Even as financial acquirers became more active – increasingly their spending sevenfold from 2004-07 – the SunGard buyout stood as the third-largest tech LBO.

SunGard’s brozen-medal placing seemed unlikely to hold at this time last year. There seemed to be a new multibillion-dollar LBO every week, with the targets getting bigger in every transaction. (Remember the half-serious speculation that Microsoft could be taken private?) All that changed in late summer, when debt became more expensive, sending the LBO market into a funk from which it hasn’t recovered. So far this year, LBO firms have announced 49 deals worth $10.3bn, down from 59 deals worth $97bn in the same period last year, according to The 451 Group’s M&A KnowledgeBase.

The change in climate isn’t lost on the financial deal-makers. Underscoring the difficulties in the current credit market, SilverLake’s Alan Austin said at the recent IBF VC Investing Conference in San Francisco that his firm couldn’t pull off a deal like SunGard right now. The buyout firm put in $3bn of equity and borrowed the remaining $8bn. ‘We could never do something like that today – never mind the terms (of the debt)’, Austin said at the conference.

PE deal flow

Period Deal volume Deal value
Jan. – June 2008 51 $11bn
Jan. – June 2007 59 $97bn
Jan. – June 2006  35  $17bn
Jan. – June 2005 25 $24bn

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Captive deal

For many startups, the deeper a partnership is, the shallower the pool of potential acquirers. Consider the case of SwapDrive and this week’s quiet sale to Symantec. The two sides inked an OEM agreement nearly two years ago – a bit of paperwork that turned out to be a precursor to an M&A contract. With Symantec likely accounting for a majority of sales at SwapDrive, a trade sale seemed the realistic exit for SwapDrive. That became even more likely as sales of Norton 360, which is based on the technology supplied by SwapDrive, outstripped Symantec’s early projections, according to our understanding. The Norton 360/SwapDrive offering targets the consumer market, which complements the company’s enterprise-focused Symantec Protection Network.

However, perhaps because it was essentially a captive deal, SwapDrive ended up getting taken out at a significant discount to its rival Berkeley Data Systems. Just half a year ago EMC shelled out $76m for Berkeley Data, which runs the Mozy service. We understand Mozy generated about $8m in sales in the year leading up to the sale, meaning EMC paid 9.5 times sales for the online backup startup. In contrast, SwapDrive went for 5.6 times trailing sales. According to reports, Symantec paid $123m for SwapDrive, which was running at $22m.

Symantec’s purchase of SwapDrive continues a run of larger storage players snagging online backup vendors. The earlier deals – inked by Iron Mountain and Seagate Technology – got done at multiples closer to Symantec-SwapDrive, although the market has heated up a bit since those first combinations. We wonder what that will mean for the last remaining online backup vendor of note: Carbonite Inc. The company took in $20m in its series B in February and has indicated it’s looking for an IPO late next year. Who knows, maybe the window will be open by then. 

Selected online backup deals

Acquirer Target Date Price Target revenue
Symantec SwapDrive June 2008 $123m* $22m*
EMC Berkeley Data Systems [Mozy] Oct. 2007 $76m* $8m*
Seagate EVault Dec. 2006 $185m $35m*
Iron Mountain LiveVault Dec. 2005 $42m $10m

*estimated, Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Bottom-fishing by Blackbaud

In almost four years of going head-to-head on the Nasdaq, Kintera never challenged Blackbaud’s stock performance. In fact, it never even came close. An internally funded and smaller rival, Kintera actually jumped ahead of Blackbaud’s IPO by about six months. The company had to trim its offer price in late 2003 to get the IPO out the door, but shares nearly doubled shortly after they hit the market.

Once Blackbaud hit the market in summer 2004, however, Kintera had started a slide from which it would never recover. Blackbaud put Kintera out of its misery last Thursday, shelling out $46m for the struggling company. Kintera was actually in danger of getting delisted from the Nasdaq. (Evercore Partners once again banked Blackbaud, a mandate that we noted last year that has its roots in Redmond, Washington.)

The price values Kintera at basically 1x trailing 12-month sales, while Blackbaud trades at nearly four times that level. Even though Blackbaud didn’t overpay for Kintera, the market has expressed some concern about buying a damaged rival in a deal that will lower Blackbaud earnings this year. Blackbaud shares are down about 7% since announcing the deal.

Kintera is run as a public company, and its paltry exit price certainly won’t help rival Convio get its offering to market. The Austin, Texas-based company filed its S-1 in September and has amended it three times since then. So, it may well be getting ready to price. However, we would note that the income statement of Kintera matches up fairly closely with Convio – both posted revenue of about $45m in 2007, but had negative operating margins. Let’s just hope that the market doesn’t value Convio the same as it did Kintera. 

Recent Blackbaud acquisitions

Date Target Price
May 29, 2008 Kintera $46m
Aug. 6, 2007 eTapestry $25m
Jan. 16, 2007 Target Software $60m

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Wire buys wireless

Two weeks ago, we noted Trapeze Networks had been sold without indicating what company had been sitting across the table from the wireless LAN (WLAN) infrastructure vendor. The buyer can now be named: Belden. The St. Louis-based company is more known for its wiring and cable products. (Indeed, before inking the Trapeze deal, Belden’s previous deal had been the $195m purchase of a Hong Kong cable company.) We’ll have a full report on this transaction – and the implications for the sector – in tonight’s Daily 451.

While the pairing of a wireless company with a company known for its wires may seem odd, there are actually a fair number of points that make sense for Belden-Trapeze. For starters, Belden is viewed in the WLAN market as a neutral vendor, which means that Trapeze’s sales arrangements shouldn’t be threatened by the acquisition. We would contrast that with the fallout from Cisco’s early 2005 purchase of Airespace, which forced Airespace partners Alcatel and Nortel Networks to scramble to find a replacement supplier of WLAN technology after the deal. Also, Trapeze had decent sales in Europe and Asia, markets that Belden has targeted.

In the end, however, it all comes back to money. In that sense, the Trapeze deal shows how steeply the valuations of the WLAN infrastructure vendors have come down. The multiple in this deal was two-thirds lower than the level that Cisco paid three years ago in its purchase to get into this market. (Granted, Cisco has a reputation of skewing the market with top-dollar bids.) Still, Trapeze exited for $133m after raising about $100m in venture funding. We understand that rival Meru Networks is currently out raising another round. The company already counts Lehman Brothers, Clearstone Venture Partners, Sierra Ventures and DE Shaw among its investors. While Meru may well land an up round, we’re guessing Trapeze’s valuation – combined with Aruba Networks’ rough ride on the Nasdaq – certainly haven’t helped those conversations. 

WLAN vendor valuations

Company Acquirer Price Price-to-TTM sales ratio
Airespace Cisco $450m 7.5x*  
Trapeze Belden $133m 2.3x  
Aruba NA $467m market cap 2.7x  

*estimated, Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Creative destruction and its discontents

In a February 2007 report, we asked an egghead question about valuations in a sector that had been ‘creatively destroyed,’ to borrow Joseph Schumpeter’s oft-used phrase. At the time, we weren’t asking for purely academic reasons. Rather, we were trying to put a price on Tumbleweed Communications following Cisco’s purchase of rival anti-spam appliance vendor IronPort Systems. (Rumors had private equity firms looking at Tumbleweed.)

It turns out we weren’t far off in our valuation. We slapped a $150m price tag on Tumbleweed; last Friday, French IT consulting firm Sopra Group said it would pay $138m in cash for the company. The deal is expected to close in the third quarter. While the companies see a bright future for the combination, we have some reservations. Specifically, we wonder how Sopra, which is making the acquisition through its Axway subsidiary, will hit its target of 12-15% operating margins for the combined company next year. (Tumbleweed has run at negative operating margins for years, piling up an accumulated deficit of $300m in its history.)

Whatever the performance of Tumbleweed under its new owners, we have to say that Sopra certainly didn’t overpay for the company, which should double its sales here in North America. At just two times trailing sales, Tumbleweed was valued at less than half the price-to-sales multiple found in comparable transactions.

Anti-spam shopping

Acquirer Target Date Price Target TTM sales
Sopra/Axway Tumbleweed June 2008 $138m $58m
Google Postini July 2007 $625m $70m*
Cisco IronPort Jan. 2007 $830m $100m
Secure Computing CipherTrust July 2006 $264m $48m
Symantec Brightmail May 2004 $370m $26m

*estimated, Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase