Wounded Bear

Given all the hardships (self-inflicted and otherwise) that have hit Bear Stearns over the past two months, we thought we found some good news for the investment bank earlier this week. Leafing through the paperwork around Borland’s sale of its CodeGear division to Embarcadero Technologies on Wednesday, we saw Bear listed as one of the advisers to CodeGear, along with boutique firm GTK Partners. (Embarcadero, owned by the sharp-penciled buyout guys at Thoma Cressey Bravo, didn’t use a banker.)

So does this mean Bear, whose rescue sale to JPMorgan is set to be voted on at the end of this month, stands to get a payday from the CodeGear engagement? Unfortunately not. Like so much happening at the bank these days, they’re in line for scraps. (For the record: Bear Stearns ranked 17th in our league tables last year, advising on nine deals collectively valued at $8bn.)

Bear Stearns had a long connection with Borland, particularly during the days of former CEO Dale Fuller, who was replaced in 2005 by current chief executive Tod Nielsen. (Bear banked Borland’s $185m acquisition of TogetherSoft and its $24m acquisition of Starbase, both in October 2002.) So it was natural for Borland to tap Bear when it decided two years ago to shed its CodeGear division as part of a step out of the developer tools business. To put it charitably, the Bear-led divestiture was fitful. A source familiar with the divestiture says the division was pulled out from under several possible acquirers, leaving the market a bit soured on the asset as the process dragged on for months.

Whatever the case, Borland pulled Bear off the deal last October and engaged boutique bank GTK Partners. (Why GTK? Managing director Ali Tabibian had previously worked with CodeGear CFO Cynthia Mignogna on the 1999 sale of Infoseek to Walt Disney. Mignogna also served as CFO there.) So GTK will be pocketing the majority of the advisory fee, with Bear getting a very small portion of that as part of a ‘tail.’ It’s just another sad event as the swan sings for Bear.

i2: The king watches an auction

Nearly three years after getting re-listed on the Nasdaq, i2 Technologies may well find itself taken off the exchange again. While accounting mistakes got the supply chain software vendor bumped the first time, a sale of i2 is likely to end its 12-year run as a public company sometime soon. Having shopped itself for a year now, i2 said last week there are ‘ongoing talks’ with two interested parties.

In our view, a far more important sign that the company is ready to sell is the fact that it knocked founder Sanjiv Sidhu from his spot as chairman of the company. Removing Sidhu is key to getting any deal done, in our view, because few software executives have dominated their companies to the degree that Sidhu has at i2. He had served as the company’s chairman for two decades since cofounding i2 in a Dallas apartment. He only gave up the CEO title three years ago. (Not even an SEC investigation into shady accounting – and a subsequent $10m fine paid by i2 – could dislodge Sidhu from his seat of power earlier this decade.)

Of course, any deal for i2 still has to flow through Sidhu. He owns 5.5 million, or 26%, of the company’s 21.4 million shares outstanding. And while he may be content to let the company’s ‘strategic review’ drag on, other large shareholders may not be as patient. Hedge funds BlackRock and SAC Capital Advisors both own about 1.9 million shares of i2 and are likely to push the company to get a deal done. (JPMorgan is advising i2 in the process.) Despite the tight credit market, we still think i2 will get snapped up by a private equity shop rather than a strategic acquirer.

Taleo shops with Vurv

After sitting out an earlier wave of consolidation of on-demand human capital management (HCM) vendors, Taleo will spend roughly $129m in cash and stock for rival Vurv. The deal would double the number of customers at Taleo. The acquisition values Vurv at roughly 2.8 times trailing revenue, a bit lower than other recent HCM transactions. In mid-2006, three comparable deals got done at roughly 3-5 times trailing revenue and Taleo itself trades at about 3.7 times trailing sales. Since the consolidation wave hit the HCM sector two years ago, we have heard that Vurv was being shopped several times.

However, we would note that Taleo and Vurv have a fair amount of overlapping technology, particularly in the offering around employee recruitment. A similar transaction by the one-time HCM market darling, Kenexa, caused a number of integration headaches, which landed it in the penalty box on Wall Street. Kenexa shares currently change hands about 25% lower than they did in October 2006, when it grabbed ahold of BrassRing for $115m.

Significant HCM deals

Announced Acquirer Target Deal value Target TTM sales
May 2008 Taleo Vurv $129m $45m*
Oct. 2006 Kenexa BrassRing $115m $36m*
Aug. 2006 ADP Employease $160m* $30m*
July 2006 Kronos Unicru $150m $40m*

*Official 451 Group estimate. Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Crisis averted

After three months of nonsense, Ballmer’s folly is over. Microsoft’s CEO said over the weekend he will not pursue Yahoo, a move that shareholders applauded right from the opening bell on Monday. (Microsoft stock never traded below Friday’s close, while shares of Yahoo, which had been abandoned to trade on the company’s fundamentals, were slashed 15% in early Monday afternoon trading.) In our view, the ‘relief rally’ in Microsoft stock solidifies our view that the company was wrong-headed — both in decision and execution — to go after Yahoo.

We need only look back in Microsoft’s own M&A history to see how unlikely it was to get the kind of returns it was hoping from Yahoo. In early part of this decade, Microsoft inked a pair of deals for business software companies that was supposed to narrow the gap to the long-dominant vendors. In quick order, Microsoft shelled out a combined $2.4bn for Great Plains Software and Navision Software and set about knocking off SAP and Oracle. Executives talked about Microsoft’s division, which sold ERP and CRM software, growing into a $10bn business. That hasn’t happened – not even close. More than a half-decade later, it barely scratches out $1bn in annual sales and increasingly appears technologically and competitively irrelevant. The acquisitions did nothing to make up ground on SAP or Oracle, much less the new breed of rivals including Salesforce.com and SugarCRM. (We recently made the case that Microsoft should divest this unit, called Dynamics.)
Adding Yahoo to Microsoft’s online division would have simply repeated the mistakes of Dynamics. The protracted and messy acquisition of Yahoo would not have gotten Microsoft any closer to knocking off Google from its top spot in online search advertising. To their credit, the folks in Redmond, Wash. saw the past as prelude. And if the cautionary tale served up by Dynamics was a little too close to home, Ballmer could always pick up the phone and call Jerry Levin to ask how Time Warner’s ‘transformative’ $185bn purchase of AOL worked out. Of course, Ballmer tabling the Yahoo bid does leave one question unanswered: Which transaction destroys more shareholder value? Trying to graft a sprawling Internet property onto a media company or trying to graft a sprawling Internet property onto a software company? Even though Ballmer left the door open for a future bid for Yahoo, his shareholders have already indicated they don’t want to pay to find out the answer to that question.    

Short and sour

Date Event Yahoo stock price
Feb. 1, 2008 Microsoft unveils $31 per share unsolicited offer for Yahoo $28.38 (up 48%)
May 5, 2008 Microsoft pulls offer $24.24 in afternoon trading (down 16%)