Google, the not-so-gentle giant, steps into mobile apps

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly, Chris Hazelton

In order to grow and foster broad support, technology platforms need to be open and inclusive. Of course, that’s a sentiment that runs counter to M&A, which by definition is selective and exclusionary. (See our earlier report on how selecting a company to buy often means giving a ring to one while giving the finger to another.) The all-embracing aspect of platforms is one of the main reasons why platform providers (notably Apple and Salesforce.com) have not inked many acquisitions.

We’ve been musing on this in recent days as we’ve tallied up the valuation devastation brought on by Google’s announcement that it will give away free navigation services for certain mobile phones. One of the hardest-hit companies, Garmin, has shed some $1.8bn in market capitalization in the two weeks since Google announced its move. We also noted that Google Maps Navigation is likely to weigh on the IPO of TeleNav, even though the offering won’t hit the market until next spring. And pity poor Networks in Motion (NiM), which has built its business largely on Verizon Wireless, which just happens to be the network that will be the first to offer Google’s free navigation, albeit on a very limited basis. (Although a bit smaller and less profitable than TeleNav, NiM still has a solid business, likely finishing this year at $75m in revenue and hoping to hit $100m in 2010.)

So what does navigation software (whether free or fee) have to do with platforms? Well, remember that Google Maps Navigation is only available (for now at least) on devices that run Android, Google’s mobile OS that effectively serves as the vendor’s mobile platform. So rather than just be a platform provider and let startups develop software on top of that, Google has also stepped into the applications market with its turn-by-turn navigation offering. We would note that this product, which collectively generates hundreds of millions of dollars in fees each year, is one of the few mobile applications that subscribers are willing to pay serious money for.

So in strict economic terms, it’s easy to see why Google is willing to run roughshod over current and potential ISVs as it rolls out its own turn-by-turn navigation offering. Of course, to realize the full potential of the service (where Google infuses ads and paid search results into navigation, as it has done with wild success for Internet searches), the company will need to push it to other mobile platforms.

While most of the focus on Google’s mobile moves has been on that expansion, we can’t help but consider the subtler implications of what it’s already done. The key concern: We wonder whether Google Maps Navigation could undermine the company’s effort to attract other mobile application developers to the Android platform. Not that Google seems particularly worried about throwing elbows in the mobile software development market. After all, coincidentally or not, it timed the announcement of its turn-by-turn navigation product to come just two days before the maker of a rival product filed its IPO paperwork. That’s a curious bit of synchronicity from a vendor that has ‘don’t be evil’ as its informal motto.

Amid consolidation, Ixia opens its wallet

-Contact authors: Thomas Rasmussen, Steve Steinke

Historically, networking test and measurement vendor Ixia has never been much of a shopper. However, that has started to change this year as the Calabasas, California-based company reached for Catapult Communications in June for $105m as well as wrapped up its $44m acquisition of rival Agilent Technologies’ N2X product line earlier this month. For those keeping track, Ixia’s recent deals represent some 85% of all M&A spending at the company since 2002. (We would note that the pickup in dealmaking, coincidentally or not, has come since a European private equity investor joined the firm’s board and its strategic planning committee in October 2008.) Having recently assumed the role of consolidator, the small-cap vendor ($425m market capitalization) says it still has about $85m in cash after its recent purchases and is still pursuing deals. Who might be next?

One of the growing fields in the space is wireless network testing. Given Ixia’s desire for a larger presence in the segment, we think it could look to snap up a company here. Two interesting targets are privately held Metuchen, New Jersey-based Berkeley Varitronics Systems and Bandspeed of Austin, Texas. As for more traditional targets, we would point to competitors ClearSight Networks of Fremont, California, and Canada’s publically traded EXFO. EXFO currently sports an enterprise valuation of approximately $150m and would almost double Ixia’s revenue. Doubling down on EXFO might not be such a bad idea given that, despite its aggressiveness, Ixia is still relatively small compared to larger players such as JDSU and Spirent, which could look to do some consolidation in the space of their own.

Ixia’s historical acquisitions

Date announced Target Deal value
October 21, 2009 Agilent Technologies (N2X product line assets) $44m
May 11, 2009 Catapult Communications $105m
January 24, 2006 Dilithium Networks (test tool business assets) $5.1m
July 18, 2005 Communication Machinery $4m
July 14, 2003 NetIQ (Chariot product assets) $17.5m
February 15, 2002 Empirix (ANVL product assets) $5m

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

Cavium’s quick moves on MontaVista

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly, Jay Lyman

It was hardly surprising when embedded OS vendor MontaVista Software got snapped up earlier this week. In fact, my colleague Jay Lyman put MontaVista at the top of his hit list for targets in the market in his report back in August. After all, the company was a pioneer of the embedded space and was a clear leader among startups chasing this opportunity. MontaVista was running at about $30m in sales, and we understand that the vendor was targeting $40m and a few million dollars in profit in 2010. What did surprise some observers (including us, to some extent) was the buyer: Cavium Networks. Cavium will pay $50m ($16m in cash, $34m in equity) for MontaVista.

Along with much of the market, we expected IBM to reach for MontaVista as a way to match Intel’s acquisition of Wind River in June. Wind River stands as the giant in the embedded OS sector with revenue about 10 times higher than MontaVista. In a rather uncharacteristic transaction for Intel, the chipmaker paid $884m for Wind River. Several sources indicated that Big Blue, which was a heavy user of Wind River software for its embedded Power chip business, was the cover bidder for the company. Whether or not that’s the case, we understand that IBM’s interest in MontaVista was fitful and ultimately hinged on Big Blue being able to cobble together a coalition of other processor providers. As that effort dragged on, we understand that Cavium moved quickly and wrapped up the deal in about a month.

Profiting from the battle for the datacenter

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Although the battle between Hewlett-Packard and Cisco Systems over outfitting datacenters is still playing out, some winners have already emerged. First and foremost, the shareholders of 3Com have benefitted tremendously from the turf war between the two tech titans. On Wednesday, HP said it is picking up 3Com for $3.1bn, bolstering its ProCurve lineup with 3Com’s switches and routers, which are Cisco’s core products.

Terms call for HP to hand over $7.90 in cash for each share of 3Com. That’s roughly 50% higher than 3Com shares garnered in an unsuccessful buyout two years ago and nearly four times the price of 3Com stock just one year ago. Additionally, it means that anyone who bought shares in 3Com over the past half-decade will be above water on their holdings when the sale to HP closes in the first half of next year. We can’t say that we’ve seen many situations like that in recent transactions. In most cases this year, the sale prices of public companies – particularly those that have faded in recent years, like 3Com – have been below the market prices they fetched back in 2007. And that was before any takeout premium.

But there are other parties that stand to come out ahead in the HP-3Com deal, as well. We have to imagine that the bankers at Goldman Sachs are glad (if not relieved) to have their client, 3Com, looking likely to have finally been sold. Goldman was advising the networking vendor back in 2007 on its proposed sale to Bain Capital and Huawei Technologies, which dragged on for a half-year before being scuttled due to national security concerns. There are success fees and then there are well-earned success fees.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the desk, Morgan Stanley also has reason to celebrate its work with HP. Not only is the pending purchase of 3Com the largest enterprise networking transaction since mid-2007, but the deal continues a strong recent run by Morgan Stanley. This week alone, the bank advised HP on its $3.1bn purchase of 3Com, AdMob on its $750m sale to Google and Logitech on its $405m acquisition of LifeSize Communications. Altogether, that means Morgan Stanley has had a hand in three of the four largest deals this week.

Nordic freeze-out for Cisco

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

With a fat treasury and well-drilled deal team, Cisco Systems typically storms through acquisitions. Over the past five years, the networking giant has announced some 50 purchases, including more than a few that combined big money and quick moves. (For instance, several sources have indicated that Cisco snatched WebEx Communications away from IBM in just a week, after Big Blue had the online conferencing company all but locked up.) But it appears that something in Cisco’s M&A methods has been lost in translation in its reach across the Atlantic for Norway’s Tandberg.

A little over a month ago, Cisco announced plans to hand over $3bn in cash for Tandberg, as a way to bolster its videoconferencing lineup. Although Tandberg’s board of directors backed the offer, a fair number of shareholders have balked at what they see as Cisco’s low-ball bid. Critics point to the fact that Cisco’s all-cash offer values Tandberg just 11% higher than the company’s closing stock price the day before the announcement. (We noted recently that the premium was just half the amount that Cisco is paying for Starent Networks, which was announced a week after Tandberg.)

Further complicating Cisco’s play for Tandberg is the fact that 90% of shareholders at the Norwegian company have to agree to the deal. Already, holders of about one-quarter of Tandberg equity have said they won’t support Cisco’s proposed purchase – at least not at its current valuation. We suspect that Cisco may well end up having to reach a bit deeper to land Tandberg. (The company gave itself more time on Monday, bumping back the expiration of its tender offer for Tandberg until November 18.) And as the standoff drags on, other vendors are closing their own videoconferencing deals. On Wednesday, Logitech said it will spend $405m in cash for LifeSize Communications. Logitech’s bid values LifeSize at slightly more than 4x trailing sales, which is not out of line with Cisco’s bid for Tandberg of 3.6x trailing sales.

It wouldn’t be surprising to see Cisco top its existing offer for what’s undoubtedly a valuable asset. Tandberg would give Cisco a solid mid-level videoconferencing offering, slotting nicely between its high-end Telepresence product and the low-level Web conferencing and collaboration offering it got when it picked up WebEx. In terms of markets, adding Tandberg would significantly expand Cisco’s reach in Europe, particularly with government customers. And as a bonus, securing Tandberg would prevent the target from landing with rival Hewlett-Packard, which has its own videoconferencing wares. (Although HP actually beat Cisco to market with its Halo product, it has little to show for its early advantage.) We doubt that would happen, but wouldn’t it be a kicker if HP pulled a Cisco on Cisco, quickly firing off a topping bid and walking away with Tandberg?

Is mobile advertising back?

-Contact Thomas Rasmussen

In a clear sign that mobile advertising has grown up, Google spent a whopping $750m in stock on Monday to pick up San Mateo, California-based AdMob in what we hear was a contested process. This transaction goes a long way toward securing control of mobile display advertising for Google and comes just days after the launch of Android 2.0. Although we’ve been projecting dealmaking in the mobile advertising market for quite some time, we’re nonetheless floored by the rich valuation for AdMob, a three-year-old startup that’s raised just shy of $50m. We estimate that the 140-person firm pulled in about $20m in gross revenue in 2008 and was on track to double that figure this year (we surmise that this translates to roughly $20m on a net revenue basis).

The double-digit valuation for AdMob reminds us more than a little bit of the high-multiple online advertising deals that we saw in 2007. Viewed in that context, Google’s purchase of AdMob stands as the third-largest ‘new media’ advertising purchase since 2002. Of course, like many of those transactions, this was not based on revenue, but instead on technology and market extension, which is consistent with Google’s strategy of acquiring big into core adjacencies.

Looking forward, AdMob’s top-dollar exit is sure to have a number of rival mobile advertising startups excited. One competitor that’s preparing to raise an additional sizable round of funding quipped at the near-perfect timing of this transaction. This is an industry that has seen its ups and downs over the past few years. When we first wrote about AdMob back in May it was in the backdrop of fire sales and failed rounds of funding. If nothing else, this deal will dramatically change that.

Microsoft has been actively playing catch-up to Google in advertising and search, and is sure to follow it onto the mobile device. As are many other niche advertising shoppers such as Yahoo, Nokia, AdKnowledge, Adobe-Omniture and traditional media conglomerates such as Cox. AOL has already made its move, reaching for Third Screen Media two years ago. (We would note that AOL’s $105m purchase of Third Screen is a rare case of that company actually being ahead of the market.)

Startups that could benefit from this increasing focus on the sector include AdMarvel, Amobee, InMobi, and Velti’s Ad Infuse. However, we suspect that some of the major advances – and consequently the most promising targets – are likely to come from players that are just now getting started, with fresh and profitable approaches to location-based mobile advertising.

Some recent mobile advertising deals

Date announced Acquirer Target Deal value Target TTM revenue
November 9, 2009 Google AdMob $750m $20m*
September 14, 2009 Nokia Acuity Mobile Not disclosed Not disclosed
August 27, 2009 AdMob AdWhirl Not disclosed Not disclosed
May 21, 2009 Limelight Networks Kiptronic $1m $2m*
May 12, 2009 Velti Ad Infuse <$1m* $1.3m*
March 11, 2008 Qualcomm Xiam Technologies $32m Not disclosed
August 21, 2007 Yahoo Actionality Not disclosed Not disclosed
May 15, 2007 AOL Third Screen Media $105m $3m*

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase *451 Group estimate

Is IAC looking to sell Ask.com?

-Contact Thomas Rasmussen

It looks like acquisitive IAC/InterActiveCorp could be gearing up to undo its largest buy ever, Ask.com. At least Barry Diller’s opening remarks during IAC’s conference call last week seem to indicate a desire to explore the possibility. The New York City-based Internet media company has successfully expanded into a content giant by snapping up dozens of Internet properties. IAC has inked 36 deals worth more than $4.5bn since 2002. Many of those purchases have been tiny (Airfarewatchdog.com, for instance), but IAC did make a significant pickup when it handed over $1.85bn for Ask.com in March 2005.

However, we suspect that Ask.com hasn’t delivered the kind of returns that IAC had hoped for, since the search engine remains far behind Yahoo, Microsoft and Google in terms of usage. Still, with roughly 4% of US search market share, Ask.com would be a significant addition to any acquirer in the competitive scale-driven space, where every percentage point counts.

Though we won’t rule out a financial buyout, which would have more than a few echoes of the just-closed Skype carve-out, we think a strategic buyer for Ask.com makes more sense. Two obvious suitors spring to mind: Google and Microsoft. Although Google recently made its intentions for more acquisitions known and even signaled a willingness to do large deals again, we do not think it is likely to pick up Ask.com. Rather than make a consolidation play, we expect Google to continue to snare startups to offer additional services to existing users, while also bolstering its recent moves into new markets such as online video and mobile communications.

On the other hand, Microsoft has displayed a willingness to spend a lot of money in its game of catch-up with Google. With an acquisition of Ask.com coupled with its impending Yahoo deal, Microsoft could come very close to capturing one-third of all search traffic. While that would undoubtedly help Microsoft, a divestiture of Ask.com could also benefit IAC. Granted, it would mean slicing its revenue roughly in half, but IAC would have a cleaner story to tell Wall Street. And it could use some help in that area. Investors give a paltry valuation to the cash-heavy company, valuing the business at less than one times sales on the basis of enterprise value. IAC sports a $2.6bn market capitalization, but holds $1.8bn in cash.

IAC’s historic acquisitions and divestitures, 2002 – present

Year Number of acquisitions Number of divestitures
2009 5 4
2008 7 0
2007 6 0
2006 3 0
2005 3 0
2004 4 0
2003 4 0
2002 4 0

Source: The 451 M&A KnowledgeBase

A fittingly imperfect end for Kana

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

As liquidity events go, the just-announced sale of Kana Software is shaping up to be a pretty dry one for most shareholders. The customer service automation vendor said on Tuesday that it plans to sell its operating business to buyout group Accel-KKR for $49m and retain the publicly listed shell of a company as an acquisition vehicle. The proceeds from the sale of the business will flow to what essentially amounts to a special-purpose acquisition company, or SPAC, rather than long-suffering Kana shareholders. Shares of Kana have barely moved since the announcement, holding steady at around $0.75 each.

From our view, the structure of the deal reflects a creativity born out of necessity. Essentially, the challenge that shaped the sale process at Kana, which has been playing out for several years, was how to realize value for a decidedly mediocre operating business, while at the same time preserve the value of the tax advantages accrued from having burned money ($4.3bn and counting) since the company opened its doors. (The sole ‘asset’ at the SPAC, besides access to the capital markets, is the $400m in credits to offset taxes on any profit generated at whatever company it does acquire.) While the deal goes some distance toward satisfying both goals, several disgruntled shareholders have charged that it doesn’t go far enough.

For starters, the shareholders point out that if the carve-out goes through, as is expected within three months, they will have nothing to show for the sale of ‘their’ company. Instead, their future returns will be determined by an unknown group that may – or may not – buy some yet-to-determined business. (So much for the Wall Street maxim of investing in management and markets.) Particularly galling to those shareholders stuck holding illiquid Bulletin Board equity is that two of the largest owners of Kana (hedge funds KVO Capital Management and Nightwatch Capital Management, which also has a board seat) got to exit their investments at an above-market price of $0.95 per share, with the possible addition of another $0.10 for each share on top of that.

Kana would probably counter that shareholders who don’t want to roll their ownership of the company into a SPAC are free to sell their shares. And we have little doubt that the vendor exhausted every opportunity to get some value from the business, since we know that the process has been grinding along fitfully for years. In the end, though, we can’t help but view the less-than-ideal transaction as a fittingly imperfect ending to a thoroughly flawed company. Or more precisely, a thoroughly flawed public company. Red ink-stained Kana went public in 1999 on less than $5m in aggregate sales, but within a year of the offering had topped $1,000 per share on a split-adjusted basis. As shareholders now argue about dimes on the firm’s Bulletin Board-listed stock, the end of Kana just seems pathetic.

Dassault Systemes bulks up through an old friend

Brenon Daly

Contact: John Abbott

Dassault Systèmes’ $600m purchase of IBM’s CATIA product lifecycle management (PLM) sales and client support operations on Tuesday is the latest twist in a complex, 30-year relationship between the two companies. Dassault, founded in 1981, inherited the rights to CATIA, one of the first 3-D computer-aided design (CAD) packages, from its aerospace parent Avions Marcel Dassault (now Dassault Aviation). Then in 1992, Dassault bought the rights to the other pioneering CAD package, CADAM, from IBM. It set about combining the two, and continued to jointly market the product set with Big Blue.

Now it seems that Dassault wants more control over its business. Through the deal, which is expected to close during the first half of next year, it gains access to 1,000 more clients and around $700m in annual sales. The transaction is expected to boost earnings in the first year. (Dassault plans to speak more about the financial impact of the deal during its third-quarter earnings call on Thursday.)

The partnership will continue with IBM in the services role, but should enable Dassault to simplify its contracts with very large customers such as Ford Motor and Boeing, which until now had to negotiate with both vendors. The scope of CAD software has evolved over the years from core engineering and complex product design into collaborative PLM focused on business processes, workflows and the supply chain. However, Big Blue didn’t have the agreements in place to sell the full set of Dassault tools. The result was that more big firms were dealing directly with Dassault. A side effect is that both companies will be more able to work with other partners: Dassault with Hewlett-Packard, for instance, and IBM with other PLM providers such as Siemens PLM Software and PTC.

The deal is the biggest in Dassault’s history, though it has spent heavily in the past on industry consolidation, most notably through the acquisitions of MatrixOne (March 2006, $408m), ABAQUS (May 2005, $413m) and SolidWorks (June 1997, $310m). Other vendors have also been buying up big chunks of the PLM market. Siemens inked the sector’s largest deal in January 2007, spending $3.5bn on UGS, while Oracle handed over $495m for Agile Software in May 2007. The PLM shop that appears to be left behind is PTC, which despite spending more than $600m on 11 purchases of its own since 2004 is now much smaller than either Siemens or Dassault and is under pressure from moves into PLM by mainstream enterprise software houses such as Oracle and SAP. Several market sources indicated that PTC has retained Goldman Sachs to advise it on a possible sale.

At long last, Kana gets gone

Brenon Daly

Contact: Brenon Daly

Exactly three years ago, we bluntly wrote that there was no reason for Kana Software to be a public company, at least in its current form. Kana’s performance in the intervening 1,000 days since we published that report did nothing to change our view. If anything, as the red ink continued to gush at Kana, we became even more convinced of the need for a sale of the customer support software vendor. The sale finally happened Tuesday, with Accel-KKR agreeing to pay $49m in cash for most of Kana.

We were hardly alone in our assessment that Kana – a money-burning, Bulletin Board-listed company that also had negative working capital – should be cleared off the exchange. As we noted earlier this summer, Kana’s largest shareholder also wanted something to change at the company. KVO Capital Management, which had owned some 8.5% of the company, was pushing earlier this summer to get a director on the Kana board. KVO, which declined to comment, has agreed to back the sale to the buyout group, according to the release.